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ABSTRACT
This dissertation uses administrative tax data to study behavioral responses to taxation
and tax enforcement. Chapter I focuses on the two tax penalties associated with Individual
Retirement Accounts (IRAs). Chapter II considers the impact of a temporary suspension of
tax collection efforts on future tax compliance and income. Chapter III investigates the use
of professional tax preparation services by the top 1% of the income distribution.
Chapter I, which is co-authored with Victoria Bryant, focuses on tax-benefited retirement
savings accounts. These accounts have features designed to encourage retirement savings,
including a penalty for withdrawing before age 591
2
. Account holders also face a penalty
for failing to take required minimum withdrawals after age 72. Using a bunching analysis,
we estimate that these penalties cause more than 17% of traditional IRA holders to change
their withdrawal timing each year, shifting close to $60 billion of distributions annually. We
estimate a dynamic life-cycle model and run counterfactual policy analysis to analyze the
effect of changing these penalties. For both penalties, we find alternative combinations of age
threshold and penalty rate that lead to increased average welfare and lifetime tax remittances:
increasing the age threshold for penalty-free withdrawals while simultaneously lowering the
penalty rate, and increasing the age threshold for required withdrawals while leaving the
penalty rate unchanged.
In chapter II, which is co-authored with William C. Boning, Joel Slemrod, and Alex Turk,
we ask whether a temporary suspension of efforts to collect outstanding tax debt ultimately
lead to lower or higher tax compliance and income. When economic hardship prevents a tax
debtor from paying basic living expenses, the Internal Revenue Service puts debt collection
efforts on hold and designates the debt currently not collectible (CNC). This paper uses the
quasi-random assignment of IRS Revenue Officers to tax debtors’ cases as an instrumental
variable to identify the causal effects of suspending debt collection on tax compliance and
future income. In contrast to uninstrumented estimates, we find no evidence that putting off
attempts to collect debt reduces compliance with future tax obligations or future reported
income. Among marginal hardship cases, pausing collection instead increases future income,
specifically wages earned by the taxpayer’s spouse.
Chapter III, which is co-authored with Giacomo Brusco, Yeliz Kaçamak, and Mark Payne,
xiv
considers a recent addition to the conversation about income inequality and the “top 1%:”
the extent to which this population avoids and evades its tax liability. As the vast majority
of the top 1% of the income distribution use a paid tax preparer, understanding the role
of professional tax preparation services among this population is critically important to
understanding their tax outcomes. We find that, among the bottom 99% of the income
distribution, self-prepared returns have smaller corrections from a random audit relative
to paid-prepared returns, but among the top 1%, paid-prepared returns experience smaller
corrections relative to self-prepared returns. We then turn to the question of why someone
in the top 1% wouldn’t use paid tax preparation. We conclude that individuals in the top
1% who are either an accountant or financial advisor, or who have a higher proportion of




The Impact of Withdrawal Penalties on Retirement
Savings (with Victoria Bryant)
1.1 Introduction
There is growing concern about the state of retirement security in the United States. In
2015, the Government Accountability Office found that a third of U.S. households with the
head of house aged 55 or older had no retirement income other than Social Security, and a
quarter had no retirement income other than Social Security and a pension (Government
Accountability Office, 2015). For households with additional retirement savings, the median
account balance translated into a monthly annuity of just $400.
One way the U.S. government encourages individuals to improve their retirement finances
is by offering tax benefits to certain types of retirement savings accounts, including Individual
Retirement Accounts (IRAs). IRAs are subject to two tax penalties. To discourage premature
spending out of these accounts, withdrawals before age 591
2
are penalized with an additional
10% tax (the “early withdrawal penalty”). To minimize the tax cost of IRAs, account holders
are required to make annual minimum withdrawals beginning at age 701
2
.1 Failure to take
these required withdrawals results in an additional 50% tax on the amount not withdrawn
(the “excess accumulation penalty”). Although these penalties have existed for decades, their
effect on retirement savings, welfare, and tax remittances is not well understood.
This paper makes two contributions. First, we use reduced-form bunching methods to
estimate how many people change the timing of withdrawals from traditional IRAs in response
to the two withdrawal penalties. Our analysis suggests that, each year, 1.4% of traditional
IRA holders change the timing of their withdrawals in response to the early withdrawal
penalty, while 16.2% of traditional IRA holders take withdrawals when they otherwise would
1In 2019, the age for annual minimum withdrawals was raised to 72.
1
not have in response to the excess accumulation penalty. These responses shift the timing of
nearly $60 billion worth of withdrawals from traditional IRAs each year.
Second, we estimate a dynamic life-cycle model, which provides a framework for analyzing
the effect of changing the early withdrawal and excess accumulation penalties on welfare and
tax remittances. The estimation routine yields estimates of four preference parameters: the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS), the discount factor, and two bequest motive
parameters. Identification of the preference parameters is driven by exogenous budget set
discontinuities generated by the two tax penalties.
For both penalties, we identify combinations of the age threshold and penalty rate that
lead to increased average welfare and tax remittances relative to the base policy. For the






, and lowering the penalty rate from 10% to 5%. These alternative
combinations also yield higher IRA balances at age 651
2
, furthering the purported aim of the
early withdrawal penalty: to increase retirement savings. The intuition for this finding is
as follows: conditional on having these penalties in place, there are benefits to encouraging
taxpayers to keep their money in these accounts as long as possible. However, if individuals
need to take early distributions as the result of an unexpected income shock, they can do so
with minimal sanction.







, while leaving the 50% penalty rate unchanged,
increases both welfare and the present discounted value of lifetime income tax remittances.
While there is a trade-off between allowing account holders to keep their money in the
tax-benefited account longer and the governments receipt of the tax revenue sooner, our
results suggest that the delay in receiving the tax revenue is worth the increase in income tax
remittances that come from higher account balances.
Understanding the role the two withdrawal penalties play in savings behavior is
increasingly urgent. More than half of U.S. households held at least one IRA, 401(k),
or other defined-contribution account by the end of 2017, with $17 trillion of assets saved
(Investment Company Institute, 2019). Employers have shifted to offering 401(k)s and
other defined-contribution accounts instead of defined-benefit accounts such as pensions, and
often auto-enroll their employees. States and localities have begun establishing “Auto-IRA”
programs in which workers not eligible for other retirement plans are automatically enrolled
in an IRA. Contemporaneous to the growing prevalence of these accounts, policy-makers
are actively changing the rules around these penalties in response to mounting unease about
retirement security.
Previous work studying behavioral responses to these penalties has generally focused on
2
one of the two penalties in isolation, and has not been able to address welfare considerations.
In contrast, we consider both penalties simultaneously. This allows us to study the relative
magnitudes of their impacts on the timing of withdrawals, and means that our model more
accurately captures the trade-offs considered by individuals when they decide how much to
contribute or withdraw from these accounts. In addition, our structural model allows us to
explicitly consider how changing either penalty would impact welfare, tax remittances, and
IRA balances.
We also add to the nascent literature using bunching moments to identify structural
parameters via dynamic models. Using bunching moments to identify structural models is a
recent methodological development. Our setting differs from previous work using bunching
moments to estimate the EIS (Best et al., 2019; Choukhmane, 2021). Rather than making a
one-time refinancing decision (as in Best et al. (2019)), our individuals make the decision to
withdraw, or not, each period. This is similar to Einav et al. (2015), in which individuals
choose whether or not to fill a prescription each week based on a health event shock. We
estimate an EIS of 1.061. Our EIS estimate is consistent with the argument that, in general,
wealthier individuals have a higher EIS (Guvenen, 2006).
1.2 Individual Retirement Accounts
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) are tax-benefited personal savings accounts. IRAs
are defined-contribution accounts, meaning that contributions are made into individual
accounts. A third of U.S. taxpayers hold at least one IRA.
We focus on traditional IRAs, which comprise about three-quarters of all IRAs.
Contributions to traditional IRAs are deducted from taxable income, and withdrawals
from traditional IRAs are treated as taxable income at the time of withdrawal.2 Throughout
the paper, we will use the terms withdrawal and distributions to discuss “normal” withdrawals
(i.e., we do not include withdrawals due to rollovers or Roth conversions, or the death of the
account holder) unless otherwise specified.3
Traditional IRAs were introduced as part of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 to stimulate retirement saving, particularly among individuals who otherwise
would reach retirement with little saved. The key tax benefit is that returns to the principal
2In contrast, contributions to Roth IRAs are included in taxable income, but withdrawals from Roth
accounts are not subject to federal income taxation. See Appendix A.1.2 for more details on Roth IRAs.
3Funds can be “rolled over” from a different defined-contribution retirement savings account into an IRA.
For example, an individual may rollover funds from a 401(k) into an IRA, or from one IRA into another
(essentially combining their separate IRA accounts). The vast majority of IRA assets come from rolled over
defined-contribution accounts (Goodman et al., 2019). See Appendix A.1.6 for more details about what
happens when an IRA holder dies.
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are not separately taxed. There is no annual tax on accrued interest, and no capital gains tax
on withdrawals. Instead, returns are treated as regular taxable income upon withdrawal.4
There are two additional tax benefits. First, because contributions to a traditional IRA
are deducted from taxable income, an account holder’s taxable income is lower in a year
in which they make a contribution. Second, the amount of income tax ultimately due on
contributions to a traditional IRA may be lower if the subsequent withdrawal is taken in a
year when the account holder faces a lower marginal tax rate than in the year when she made
the contribution. These tax benefits provide a large incentive to contribute to traditional
IRAs.
To discourage withdrawing from IRAs before retirement, “early” withdrawals are penalized
with an additional 10% tax. This penalty, coupled with a contribution limit ($5,500 in 2015
for individuals under age 50), ensures that the tax benefits of IRAs do not extend to all
savings (particularly non-retirement savings).5 Borrowing from IRAs is not permitted.
To limit the benefits accrued by individuals who would have had sufficient retirement
savings without IRAs, a second penalty was introduced: the “excess accumulation penalty.”
At a certain age, IRA holders are required to take a minimum withdrawal each year. If an
IRA holder does not take the required withdrawal, she will owe an additional 50% tax on
the difference between the required amount and the withdrawn amount. These required
withdrawals, known as Required Minimum Distributions (RMDs), were imposed for IRAs
as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TIGTA, 2015-10-042; Mortenson et al., 2019). In
addition to ensuring that IRAs do not only amount to a generous tax break (or a tax-benefited
bequest), RMDs also minimize the tax revenue cost of IRAs and other defined-contribution
retirement savings plans.
We give additional information about the early withdrawal and excess accumulation
penalties below. Additional institutional details about traditional IRAs are provided in
Appendix A.1.
1.2.1 The early withdrawal penalty
Withdrawals from traditional IRAs made before age 591
2
face a penalty of 10% on the
full amount withdrawn in addition to income tax. For example, if an individual’s marginal
tax rate was 15% and she made an early withdrawal of $1,000 from a traditional IRA, she
would owe both $150 in income tax as well as a $100 penalty (10% of the amount withdrawn
early). In 2016, an estimated 1.2 million individual tax returns reported over $1.5 billion
in penalties due because of early withdrawals from retirement accounts (Internal Revenue
4See Appendix A.1.1 for a simple algebraic example of this benefit.
5See Appendix A.1.4 for more details about IRA contribution limits.
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Service, 2016). Goodman et al. (2019) estimate that 20% of individual contributions made to
IRAs and 401(k)s by individuals below the age of 48 leave the accounts within 8 years of the
contribution.
In some circumstances, early withdrawals from an IRA are exempt from the penalty. IRA
holders may receive an exemption to pay for qualified medical or higher education expenses.
First-time home-buyers may take a withdrawal of up to $10,000 from an IRA without penalty.
Individuals who agree to take “substantially equal” withdrawals for a fixed period of time of
at least five years may also be exempt from the penalty. Argento et al. (2015) report that,
for individuals under age 55, 21% of withdrawals from retirement accounts were penalized.
Previous work on early withdrawals has focused on the circumstances that lead account
holders to incur the penalty. This research has consistently found that penalized withdrawals
are substantially more likely for individuals that experience adverse shocks such as job loss
and divorce, especially among individuals with lower levels of non-retirement assets (see, e.g.,
Amromin and Smith (2003), Butrica et al. (2010), and Argento et al. (2015)). One recent
attempt to quantify the causal effect of these penalties is Goda et al. (2018), who use exact
timing of birth to estimate how withdrawals from IRAs respond to the early withdrawal
penalty. They find that average withdrawals increase approximately 80% after account
holders cross the 591
2
threshold, and that the response is largely due to first-time withdrawals.
1.2.2 The excess accumulation penalty and Required Minimum Distributions
Starting in the tax year that a traditional IRA holder turns a certain age, she is required
to take a Required Minimum Distribution (RMD) every year. Because we consider a period
before 2019 in our empirical analysis, we use 701
2
as the base policy age threshold for RMDs
and the excess accumulation penalty throughout the paper.6 The first RMD tax payment
is due by April 1 of the calendar year following the year in which the account holder turns
701
2
(i.e., the calendar year in which they turn 711
2
); subsequent payments must be made
by December 31 of each calendar year.7 More than 15,000 traditional IRA holders reported
owing the 50% excess accumulation penalty in 2016, resulting in $7.3 million in additional
payments to the IRS (Internal Revenue Service, 2016).
The amount of the RMD is based on the balance of the account on December 31 of the
previous tax year and life expectancy tables (see Appendix A.1.5). The penalty for failing to
take a required withdrawal is called the “excess accumulation penalty” and is equal to 50% of
6The Setting Every Community Up for Retirement Enhancement (SECURE) Act of 2019 raised the age
at which traditional IRA holders are subject to RMDs from 70 12 to 72.
7 If a traditional IRA holder waits to submit her first RMD payment until April 1 of the calendar year
after the year in which she turns 7012 , she will have two RMDs included in her taxable income in the first
year she makes an RMD payment.
5
the required amount not withdrawn. Consider again our individual with a marginal income
tax rate of 15%. If she failed to take a required withdrawal of $1,000 from a traditional IRA,
she would owe $150 in income tax and a $500 penalty (50% of the money not withdrawn).
We discuss how RMDs work in the event of the account holder’s death in Appendix A.1.6.
The empirical literature on RMDs has centered around the “RMD Holiday” in 2009,
which suspended the RMD rules for the 2009 tax year. Brown et al. (2017) find that a third
of traditional IRA holders subject to RMD rules in 2008 did not take a withdrawal in 2009.
Mortenson et al. (2019) use year-over-year variation in addition to the RMD Holiday and
estimate that over half of traditional IRA holders are constrained by the RMD rule and
would take less than their required withdrawal (or none at all) if not for the RMD rules.
The literature studying the role of these penalties has usually considered them separately.
The exception is Sabelhaus (2000), who finds that while these policies change withdrawal
timing, total projected taxable withdrawals do not change much if the age for penalty-free
withdrawals is lowered to 551
2
, or the age for required withdrawals is raised to 751
2
. We take
a substantively different approach by estimating a structural model, which allows us to focus
on the welfare implications of changing the age thresholds in addition to the behavioral
responses. We also consider changes to the penalty rates in addition to changing the age
threshold.
1.3 Administrative tax data
We use de-identified administrative tax data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
We create a panel based on a 5% random sample of individuals with Social Security numbers
and aged 18 or older in 1999. We follow these individuals through 2015. The 17-year panel is
balanced apart from exit due to death and emigration.
We limit our sample to individuals who have an IRA account. We identify individuals as
“IRA holders” if we ever observe them making a contribution to an IRA (including rollovers),
taking a normal distribution from an IRA,8 or having an outstanding IRA balance. Our final
sample of IRA holders comprises 3,913,401 unique individuals. We focus on traditional IRA
holders in our analysis. We observe that 72.2% of IRA accounts are traditional IRAs.9
We focus on IRAs because we can cleanly identify contributions to and withdrawals from
8Normal distributions do not include withdrawals due to rollovers or Roth conversions, or the death of
the account holder.
9In our sample, 27.8% of IRAs are Roth IRAs. We find that 15.7% of IRA holders hold both kinds of
accounts. There are two additional types of IRAs: SIMPLE IRAs and SEP IRAs. These plans make up a
small fraction of IRA activity (see Appendix A.1.3). As these plans face the same tax benefits and penalties
as traditional IRAs, we follow Mortenson et al. (2019) and count contributions toward (and withdrawals from)
a SEP or SIMPLE IRA as contributions toward (and withdrawals from) a traditional IRA for our analysis.
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IRAs in the administrative tax data, as well as the end-of-year fair market values of IRA
accounts. In contrast, we do not separately observe 401(k)s and other employer-sponsored
defined-contribution accounts which are subject to the same penalties.10 Of the $17 trillion
dollars saved in IRAs or other defined-contribution accounts in 2017, $9.2 trillion (54%) was
in IRAs (Investment Company Institute, 2019). There are two facts that suggest our results
likely apply to holders of 401(k)s and other employer-sponsored defined-contribution accounts.
First, of households that have an IRA, over 80% also have an employer-sponsored retirement
plan.11 Unless households that only have a 401(k) are systematically different from those
that have both an IRA and an employer-sponsored account, we will capture behavior from
many 401(k) holders in our analysis. Second, many 401(k)s are ultimately rolled over into
IRAs when individuals separate from the employers who offered the 401(k).
We supplement our IRA data with information from individual income tax returns such
as adjusted gross income, wage and self-employment income, and other sources of retirement
income such as Social Security and employer-sponsored defined benefit plans (such as pensions)
and defined-contribution plans (such as 401(k)s). We also include data on additional taxes
owed due to early withdrawals, non-qualified withdrawals, or failing to take a minimum
required withdrawal. We discuss in detail which IRS forms we use, the relevant sample
restrictions, and the construction of key variables in Appendix A.2.
1.4 Bunching evidence and reduced-form estimates
Measuring bunching around kinks and notches in budget sets has become an increasingly
popular tool for estimating behavioral responses to various incentives.12 This approach was
developed by Chetty et al. (2011) for budget set kinks and extended to notches by Kleven
and Waseem (2013).
In this section, we adapt the standard approach in order to estimate the number of
traditional IRA holders who changed the timing of their withdrawals in response to these
penalties, and the amount of money shifted. We estimate four outcomes: the number of
individuals who shift the timing of their first withdrawal from a traditional IRA (and the
amount of money impacted), and the number of individuals who shift the timing of any
10While information about 401(k)s is captured in survey data, there are limitations to how that data
could be used. IRAs and employer-sponsored retirement savings accounts are vastly underreported in both
the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and the Current Population Survey (CPS) when
compared to IRS records (Bee and Mitchell, 2017). Larrimore et al. (2019) show that, in 2010, the CPS was
missing half a billion dollars in income from pensions, annuities, and IRA withdrawals.
11Authors’ calculations using Figure 8.7 of Investment Company Institute (2019). Note that, in this figure,
employer-sponsored retirement plans include both defined-contribution and defined-benefit plans.
12Kleven (2016) provides a recent review of this literature.
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withdrawal from a traditional IRA (and the amount of money impacted).
1.4.1 Reduced-form estimation strategy
We fit a flexible polynomial to the empirical distributions of our outcomes. This polynomial
excludes data in a region around the age thresholds (the “excluded ranges”), as shown in








γk · I[ak = aj] +
a70.5,+∑
k=a70.5,−
δk · I[ak = aj] + υj, (1.4.1)
where cj is the value of the outcome at age j, [a59.5,−, a59.5+] is the excluded region around the
early withdrawal penalty, [a70.5,−, a70.5+] is the excluded range around the excess accumulation
penalty, and p is the order of the polynomial. The β coefficients capture the distribution
without the withdrawal penalties (the “counterfactual” distribution), while the γ and δ
coefficients represent the difference from the counterfactual distribution brought on by the
withdrawal penalties.
We estimate the counterfactual distribution of the outcome using the predicted values






To determine the excluded range for the early withdrawal penalty, we iterate over all possible
combinations of a59.5,− and a59.5+ to minimize Equation 1.4.3:
14,15
{a59.5,−, a59.5,+} = arg min








Throughout this section, we will refer to B̂59.5 as the “excess mass” or the “bunching mass,”
and M̂59.5 as the “missing mass.” The excess mass is defined as the difference between the
13We do not allow the counterfactual levels to drop below 0.
14This method differs slightly from Kleven and Waseem (2013), who visually determine the equivalent of
a59.5+ and then iterate over a59.5,− to minimize Equation 1.4.3. We chose our method because there was not
an obvious visual cue for a59.5+. Both approaches assume no extensive margin responses.









Because our bin size is fixed to 1, we are not able to exactly obtain B̂59.5 = M̂59.5. Appendix A.4 shows the
value of Equation 1.4.3 for all combinations of a59.5,− and a59.5+.
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empirical and the counterfactual distributions on the low-tax side of the age threshold (in
our case, the portion of the excluded range to the right of the age threshold for the early
withdrawal penalty). Similarly, the missing mass is the difference between the empirical and
the counterfactual distributions on the high-tax side of the age threshold.
The excess accumulation penalty is unusual as a notch because all traditional IRA holders
must take withdrawals out at age 701
2
. This means that, if there are individuals who would
rather take their first withdrawal after age 701
2
, we should see a spike at age 701
2
as the age
of first withdrawal (which we do), and little to no observations after that (which we also
do). This is because we would expect individuals who would rather take the first withdrawal
after age 701
2
to push the timing of their first withdrawal as late as possible without being
penalized. Unlike the case of standard notches, where individuals have an incentive not to
cross the threshold, most individuals in our setting will cross the threshold eventually (unless
the individual dies before age 701
2
or withdraws all of the funds in their IRA before age 701
2
).
The individual has no incentive to deviate from their optimal behavior before age 701
2
. We
can therefore assume that traditional IRA holders who take their first withdrawal in the few
years preceding 701
2
are behaving optimally. As a result, we simply call age 701
2
the excluded
range for the excess accumulation penalty.16 The “excess mass” associated with the excess
accumulation penalty, shown in Equation 1.4.4, is calculated similarly to that for the early
withdrawal penalty, except that we do not estimate an upper bound for the excluded region:17
B̂70.5 = c70.5 − ĉ70.5 (1.4.4)
We estimate the magnitude of the bunching responses using Equation 1.4.5, which
considers the difference in the cumulative densities above the early withdrawal threshold
(below the excess accumulation threshold) compared to the total quantity of the outcome in
16In other words, a70.5,− = a70.5,+ = 70
1
2 .
17The spike in the number of individuals who take their first withdrawal at 70 12 (and the corresponding
total value of those withdrawals) is so large that we are unable to fully distribute that amount under our
counterfactual distribution. For the number of individuals withdrawing, the percentage of traditional IRA
holders taking their first withdrawal at or above age 70 12 that we are not able to account for with the
counterfactual distribution is 38.3%. Similarly, the percentage of total first withdrawals taken at or above
age 70 12 is 3.6%. We believe the tail of the true counterfactual distribution actually extends well past age
80 12 . We observe age of first withdrawal for Roth IRA accounts well into the 90s. This is consistent with the
idea that traditional IRA holders who are forced to take withdrawals from their IRAs because of the RMD
rules would otherwise hold on to those funds, allowing them to enjoy more years of tax-benefited growth,
until they would then be included in a bequest. See Appendix A.1.6 for more information about the rules
around inheriting an IRA.
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, j ∈ {59.5, 70.5} (1.4.5)
magj is an estimate for the percentage of the outcome impacted by these thresholds.
18
We present two pieces of evidence that some traditional IRA holders are responding to
these age thresholds. First, we show the distribution of the age at which traditional IRA
holders took their first withdrawal, and the total amount withdrawn at each age of first
withdrawal. Second, we present the proportion of traditional IRA holders taking withdrawals
at each age, and the total amount withdrawn at each age, in a single year. We focus on
traditional IRA holders for two reasons: the majority of IRAs are traditional IRAs, and
because the tax-benefited in our structural model is designed as a traditional IRA. We present
the equivalent figures for Roth accounts in Appendix A.3.2.
1.4.2 Bunching by age of first withdrawal
We define the age of first withdrawal as the age at which we first observe an individual
making a withdrawal, excluding early withdrawals (before age 591
2
) with known, qualifying
exceptions. This definition is an upper bound on the actual first year of withdrawals, because
some individuals may have begun taking withdrawals before our sample period. For this
analysis, we exclude individuals who are older than 65 in the first year of our sample so that
we do not overestimate the number of individuals taking their “first” withdrawal over age 701
2
.
We also exclude data from 2009. Traditional IRA holders were not subject to the same age
thresholds in 2009 as in all other years in our sample as a result of the one-year suspension
of the RMD rules included in the Worker, Retiree, and Employer Recovery Act of 2008.
We consider two outcomes by age of first withdrawal: the number of individuals who
took their first observed withdrawal at each age, and the amount of money distributed at
first withdrawal at each age. Figure 1.1 shows the empirical distribution (as bars) and our
estimated counterfactuals from Equation 1.4.1 (as dotted lines) for both outcomes. Figure
1.1a shows the number of individuals taking their first withdrawal at each age in our sample,
while Figure 1.1b shows the total amount withdrawn by those individuals. In each panel of
Figure 1.1, the two dotted vertical lines show our estimated values for a59.5,− and a59.5,+. For
these outcomes, we use p = 6 to fit the counterfactual.
It is clear in Figure 1.1 that traditional IRA holders change their behavior in response
18For example, consider the question of “what percentage of IRA holders changing the timing of their
withdrawals?” If we estimated that B̂j = 100 individuals, and there were N = 1,000 individuals in the
relevant analysis, we would conclude that 10% of individuals were altering their withdrawal timing.
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Figure 1.1: Bunching by age of first withdrawal
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Notes : Figure 1.1a: N = 1,536,392 unique individuals. Figure 1.1b based on $25,967,606,263 total withdrawals,
inflated to 2015 values. Excludes individuals older than age 65 at the beginning of our sample period, and
all data from 2009. We define the age of first withdrawal as the age at which we first observe an individual
making a withdrawal, excluding early withdrawals with known, qualifying exceptions. This definition is
an upper bound on the actual first year of withdrawals, because some individuals may have begun taking
withdrawals before our sample period. Figure 1.1a shows the number of individuals in our sample we observe
taking their first withdrawal from a traditional IRA at each age and the estimated counterfactual distribution.
Figure 1.1b shows the total amount distributed in the first withdrawal by traditional IRA holders who took
their first withdrawal at each age and the estimated counterfactual distribution. Withdrawal amounts are
inflated to 2015 values. For both figures, the bars show the empirical distribution, and the the dotted lines
represent our estimated counterfactual distribution.
to these penalties. There is a dramatic increase in the number of individuals taking their
first withdrawal at both age thresholds, and in the amount of money withdrawn in first
distributions. The number taking their first withdrawal at age 701
2
is significantly higher
than the number taking their first withdrawal at age 591
2
, but the total amount withdrawn at
age 591
2
is greater than the total amount withdrawn at age 701
2
. In other words, the average
first withdrawal amount for those taking their first withdrawal at age 701
2
is considerably less
than for those taking their first withdrawal at age 591
2
, as shown in Figure 1.2.
There are a small number of individuals whom we observe taking their first withdrawal
after age 701
2
. The vast majority of these cases show the individual taking the withdrawal
at age 711
2
. This is not surprising, given that the first RMD payment is actually due to
the IRS by April 1 of the calendar year after the year in which the individual turns 701
2
(that is, the calendar year in which they turn 711
2
).19 There are two likely explanations for
the small number of traditional IRA holders we observe taking their first withdrawal after
age 711
2
. These individuals may have rolled a 401(k) into an IRA after age 701
2
. These
individuals would not necessarily have held an IRA before the rollover. Another possibility is
19See Section 1.2.2 for more details.
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30.5 40.5 50.5 59.5 70.5
Age of first withdrawal
Notes: Based on 1,536,392 unique individuals and $25,967,606,263 total withdrawals, inflated to 2015 values.
Excludes individuals older than age 65 at the beginning of our sample period, and all data from 2009. We
define the age of first withdrawal as the age at which we first observe an individual making a withdrawal,
excluding early withdrawals (before age 59 12 ) with known, qualifying exceptions. This definition is an upper
bound on the actual first year of withdrawals, because some individuals may have begun taking withdrawals
before our sample period. Figure shows the average amount withdrawn in the first withdrawal from a
traditional IRA by c who took their first withdrawal at each age. Withdrawal amounts are inflated to 2015
values.
that these traditional IRA holders may not have fully understood the RMD rules. While
these individuals should in theory remit the excess accumulation penalty, the IRS may waive
the penalty if the individual can prove that they did not make the required payment as a
result of reasonable error and undertook steps to correct their mistake. Mortenson et al.
(2019) report that only 2 to 3% of individuals who fail to make an RMD payment violate the
RMD rules the following year.
Our estimates for a59.5,−, a59.5,+, B̂59.5, and B̂70.5, as well as bootstrapped standard errors,
are given in Table 1.1.20 Table 1.1 also includes estimates of mag59.5, mag70.5, and the implied
20Standard errors for a59.5,−, a59.5,+, B̂59.5, and B̂70.5 are calculated using a bootstrap procedure (see
Chetty et al. (2011) and Kleven and Waseem (2013)). We generate alternative data by randomly sampling
(with replacement) the residuals produced by Equation 1.4.1 and adding those on to the predicted values
for each age. Although we force our counterfactual values to be at least 0, we keep the original residual
terms from Equation 1.4.1. Unlike when calculating the counterfactual distribution, the predicted values






γ̂i · I[a = i] +
∑a70.5,+
i=a70.5,−
δ̂i · I[a = i]. We then re-calculate
a59.5,−, a59.5,+, B̂59.5, and B̂70.5 using the simulated data as if it were our original data. We repeat this
procedure 1,000 times to obtain a distribution for each estimated variable. We define the standard error for
each variable as the standard deviation of the bootstrapped values of that variable. While one benefit of our
setting is that we do not have to estimate bin size, the drawback is that we have very few bins (and even
fewer after removing the estimated excluded region) and therefore few standard errors to sample for our
bootstrap procedure. This means that there are a small number of residuals being used for the bootstrap
procedure and, ultimately, to determine our standard errors.
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Table 1.1: Changes in first withdrawals from traditional IRAs












U.S. total in 2015 201 million $277 billion
Proportion holding a traditional IRA 23.6% n/a
First withdrawal proportion 4.5% 34.7%
Relevant population for scaling 2.1 million $94.5 billion
In response to early withdrawal penalty:
mag59.5 4.7% 5.2%
Scaled to U.S., annual 99,566 $4.9 billion
In response to excess accumulation penalty:
mag70.5 7.9% 3.1%
Scaled to U.S., annual 168,920 $2.9 billion
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors given in parentheses. Our preferred estimate of a59.5,+ minimize the
difference between B̂59.5 and M̂59.5 given a59.5,+ = 49
1
2 (see Appendix A.4). Scaled amounts are calculated
by multiplying the relevant U.S. population in 2015 by the appropriate magnitude estimate. Estimate of
number of taxpayers in the U.S. in 2015 based on authors’ internal calculations. We multiply this value by the
percentage of our sample that hold traditional IRAs to estimate the number of individuals with traditional
IRAs, and then by the average proportion of traditional IRA holders that take their first withdrawal each
year. Total amount withdrawn from traditional IRAs in 2015 taken from Statistics of Incomes Tax Stats:
Accumulation and Distribution of Individual Retirement Arrangements (IRA) Table 1 (2015), available at
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/15in01ira.xls. We multiply this value by the average amount of withdrawals
from traditional IRAs that are part of first withdrawals.
number of individuals and amount of money impacted by these age thresholds when scaled
to the full population of taxpayers of the United States in 2015.
When considering the number of individuals that change when they take their first
withdrawal from an IRA, we find a59.5,− = 54.5 and a59.5,+ = 61.5.
21 We estimate that 4.7%
of the individuals included in the analysis changed when they took their first withdrawal
in response to the early withdrawal penalty, and 7.9% changed when they took their first
21The difference between B̂59.5 and M̂59.5 equals 1,412 individuals at these values of a59.5,− and a59.5,−.
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withdrawal in response to the excess accumulation penalty. These estimates translate into
approximately 99,600 and 168,900 individuals changing when they take their first withdrawal
due to these penalties each year.
We find similar values for a59.5,− and a59.5,+ when we look at the total amount of withdrawn
by age of first withdrawal (55.5 and 61.5, respectively). We have more faith in our value for
a59.5,− based on the number of individuals rather than the amount of money, because we are
not able to identify those exact individuals changing their behavior around first withdrawal
(and therefore cannot know precisely which withdrawals were shifted). As this excluded
range is smaller than that estimated for the number of individuals who shifted their behavior,
the results from this exercise will be conservative relative to the exercise where we used
the excluded range estimated for the number of individuals shifting the timing of their first
withdrawal.
We estimate that 5.2% of gross first withdrawals are moved as a result of the early
withdrawal penalty, and 3.1% of gross first withdrawals are moved as a result of the excess
accumulation penalty. If we convert these percentages to annual dollar amounts, we find
that $4.9 billion worth of withdrawals is shifted up to seven years as a result of the early
withdrawal penalty, and $2.9 billion is withdrawn earlier than would have been without the
excess accumulation penalty.
These magnitude estimates should be considered lower bounds on the number of individuals
who change their behavior in response to these penalties, and the dollar amount of withdrawals
shifted, for four reasons. First, we are focused on traditional IRAs. Roth IRA holders are
also subject to the early withdrawal penalty for withdrawals larger than the size of the
principal investment. Second, our analysis is focused on individuals who hold IRAs, but the
same penalties exist for 401(ks) and other traditional defined-contribution retirement savings
accounts. The early withdrawal penalty also applies to a particular type of defined-benefit
account: cash balance plans. Third, we focus on the first withdrawal, whereas traditional





). The timing of individuals’ second, third, fourth, etc. withdrawals could also be
impacted by these penalties. Finally, for both populations (IRA and 401(k) holders), these
estimates do not take into account the extent to which they affect the extensive margin. In
other words, there may be individuals who do not contribute to a retirement savings plan
because of these age thresholds.
1.4.3 Bunching within a single year
In this section, we apply a similar methodology to estimate the impact these penalties
have on the withdrawal behavior of traditional IRA holders in the cross-section. This allows
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Figure 1.3: IRA withdrawal behavior in 2005
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Notes : Figure 1.3a: N = 1,449,868 unique individuals. Figure 1.3b: based on $6,483,125,796 total withdrawals,
inflated to 2015 values. Excludes early withdrawals (before age 59 12 ) with a known, qualifying exception.
Limited to individuals with a positive traditional IRA balance in 2004 or 2005. Figure 1.3a shows the
proportion of account holders taking a withdrawal in 2005 and the estimated counterfactual distribution.
Figure 1.3b shows the average amount withdrawn by age in 2005 and the estimated counterfactual distribution.
Average withdrawal amounts are inflated to 2015 values. For both figures, the bars show the empirical
distribution, and the the dotted lines represent our estimated counterfactual distribution.
us to estimate the magnitude of the effect on all traditional IRA holders, not just those
considering their first withdrawal. We focus on a single year to ensure that, as in our previous
analysis, each individual appears only once. We picked 2005 because the youngest individuals
in our sample were 18 in 1999. We anticipate that the majority who attended college would
have graduated within 6 years. We limit this analysis to individuals in our sample who had a
non-zero balance in a traditional IRA at the end of 2004 or 2005.
We consider both the proportion of IRA holders who take a withdrawal as well as the
average size of withdrawals. Figure 1.3 shows the empirical distribution and our estimated
counterfactuals for both outcomes. The response at the age thresholds is striking. The





(an increase of 10.0 percentage points). Even more dramatic is the jump at age
701
2
: the percentage of account holders who take withdrawals increases from from 32.4% at
age 691
2
to 87.3% at age 701
2
(an increase of 54.9 percentage points).22
Our cross-sectional analysis differs from that in Section 1.4.2 in several respects. For
22There are two likely explanations for why the proportion of account holders taking withdrawals jump
to exactly 100% at age 70 12 . First, our data are pre-audit, and therefore some initial noncompliance could
be embedded. Second, it’s possible our definition of “who is an IRA holder in 2005” is over-inclusive, and
therefore we are including more individuals in the denominator than we should. The withdrawal pattern we
observe after age 70 12 is very similar to Figure 6 in Mortenson et al. (2019), including the fact that we don’t
observe 100% of traditional IRA holders taking a withdrawal after age 70 12 .
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these outcomes, we use a fitted first-degree polynomial (p = 1) rather than the sixth-order
polynomial we used in Section 1.4.2. This is based on the observation that both trends in
Figure 1.3 appear to be linear before they drop ahead of the early withdrawal penalty. We
also exclude the region above 701
2
for these estimates. Finally, we visually determine the
value of a59.5,− to be 49
1
2
and iterate over possible values of a59.5,+ to minimize the difference
between B̂59.5 and M̂59.5, rather than iterating over all possible combinations of a59.5,− and
a59.5,+ as we did in Section 1.4.2. We make this change because it is visually clear where the
proportion of traditional IRA holders taking a withdrawal in the cross section begins to fall
ahead of the early withdrawal penalty. The dotted vertical lines in Figure 1.3 show a59.5,−
(491
2
for this analysis) and our estimated values for a59.5,+.
Our estimates for a59.5,+ and scaled values for B̂59.5 and B̂70.5, as well as bootstrapped




Table 1.2 also includes estimates of mag59.5, mag70.5, and the implied number of individuals
and amount of money impacted by these age thresholds each year when scaled to the full
population of taxpayers of the United States in 2015.
We estimate that, in a single year, 1.4% of our sample of traditional IRA holders changes
the timing of their withdrawals in response to the early withdrawal penalty. This translates
into approximately 648,400 traditional IRA holders in the U.S. changing their withdrawal
behavior each year. This is considerably larger than our estimate of the number of individuals
who change the timing of their first withdrawal each year (about 99,600), which underscores
our point that our estimates based on the timing of first withdrawal are likely lower bounds.
We estimate that approximately $12.6 billion is not withdrawn from traditional IRAs each
year as a result of the early withdrawal penalty.
Our estimates are even larger for the excess accumulation penalty. We find that 16.2%
of our sample of traditional IRA holders change the timing of their withdrawals because of
RMDs (about 7.7 million individuals, compared with the 168,900 estimated to change the
timing of their first withdrawal each year). We estimate that about $45.3 billion is withdrawn
from traditional IRAs earlier than it would have been without the excess accumulation
penalty.
The true counterfactual distribution over age 701
2
could be higher or lower than what
we estimate. Our results for the excess accumulation penalty rely on a strong assumption:
that the linear counterfactual distribution is correct past age 701
2
. If traditional IRA holders
become increasingly likely to take withdrawals as they age, our estimates would be lower
than the true distribution (i.e., we would overstate the number of individuals impacted).
23Tables A.7 and A.8 in Appendix A.4 show the difference between B̂59.5 and M̂59.5 for every possible
combination of a59.5,− and a59.5,+.
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Table 1.2: Changes in withdrawals from traditional IRAs in a single year






B̂59.5 (scaled by N) 19,746 $295,103,584
(2,035) (29,284,054)
B̂70.5 (scaled by N) 234,677 $1,060,085,440
(4,080) (66,206,502)
Magnitude estimates
U.S. total in 2015 201 million $277 billion
Proportion holding a traditional IRA 23.6% n/a
Relevant population for scaling 47.6 million $277 billion
In response to early withdrawal penalty:
mag59.5 1.4% 4.6%
Scaled to U.S., annual 648,385 $12.6 billion
In response to excess accumulation penalty:
mag70.5 16.2% 16.4%
Scaled to U.S., annual 7,706,011 $45.3 billion
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors given in parentheses. Our preferred estimate of a59.5,+ minimize the
difference between B̂59.5 and M̂59.5 given a59.5,+ = 49
1
2 (see Appendix A.4). Scaled amounts are calculated
by multiplying the relevant U.S. population in 2015 by the appropriate magnitude estimate. Estimate of
number of taxpayers in the U.S. in 2015 based on authors’ internal calculations. We multiply this value by
the percentage of our sample that hold traditional IRAs to estimate the number of taxpayers with traditional
IRAs. Total amount withdrawn from traditional IRAs in 2015 taken from Statistics of Incomes Tax Stats:
Accumulation and Distribution of Individual Retirement Arrangements (IRA) Table 1 (2015), available at
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/15in01ira.xls.





steeper slope than the linear trend below age 591
2
. If some individuals who haven’t taken a
withdrawal by age, say, 75 would never take a withdrawal, the counterfactual distribution
would flatten at some point and our counterfactual estimates would be higher than the true
distribution (i.e., we would understate the number of individuals impacted).
There are other reasons to believe these estimates are lower bounds. We do not include
Roth IRAs, which are also subject to the early withdrawal penalty,24 or 401(k)s and other
24Figure A.5 in Appendix A.3.2 shows withdrawal behavior in 2005 for Roth IRAs. The proportion of
Roth IRA holders taking a withdrawal at any age is always under 0.015, and drops over time. While we
observe a small spike at age 59 12 , the proportion of Roth IRA holders taking a withdrawal continues to fall
after that.
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traditional defined-contribution retirement savings accounts, which are subject to both of
these penalties. As with our estimates based on the age of first observed withdrawal, these
estimates do not take into account the extent to which they affect the extensive margin. In
other words, there may be individuals who do not contribute to a retirement savings plan as
a result of these age thresholds.25
1.4.4 Threats to reduced-form identification
There are two primary threats to identification in our setting. The first threat to
identification is the size of the excluded region. The reduced-form bunching approach outlined
in this section is less reliable as an estimation strategy when the distortions created by the
kink(s) or notch(es) are not very local. While our excluded region is relatively narrow when
considering changes to the age of first withdrawal, the excluded range is quite large when we
consider the proportion of IRA holders in a single year who are changing the timing of their
withdrawals.
The second threat to identification concerns the shape of the estimated counterfactual
distribution. A key assumption of our reduced-form analysis is that the counterfactual
distribution is smooth through the excluded range. We would worry that the counterfactual
distribution might not be smooth if there are other related policies with the same age
thresholds. We conduct two diagnostic tests to test the assumption that our observed
bunching is specifically due to the age thresholds for penalties related to IRA withdrawals
and not other changes in the traditional IRA holders’ financial environments. First, we plot
the proportion of IRA holders receiving Social Security and receiving a wage, by age. We
do not observe bunching at the age threshold for either penalty. Second, we compare the
proportion of account holders taking a withdrawal at each age by the half of the year in
which their birthday falls. We observe bunching at ages 59 and 70 for individuals whose half
birthday is in the same calendar year as their birthday (e.g., individuals who turn 591
2
in the
same calendar of the year as 59), but at 60 and 71 for individuals whose half birthday is in
the calendar year after their birthday. These diagnostics support our assumption that the
bunching we observe is in fact due to the age thresholds related to withdrawal penalties (see
Appendix A.3.1 for more details).
The assumption that the counterfactual distribution is smooth is also problematic if
individuals use the age thresholds as reference points. In our setting, this would be true if
traditional IRA holders consider the age thresholds as suggestions that they should start
taking out withdrawals at those ages. There is a hint of this occurring for Roth accounts.
25It is worth noting that if these penalties resulted in fewer contributions to traditional IRAs, this would
(likely) reduce the amount of consumption that is deferred to age 59 12 or later.
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Figure A.5a in Appendix A.3.2 shows a small increase in the proportion of individuals taking
withdrawals from Roth IRAs at age 701
2
even though the RMD rules do not apply for Roth
accounts. In Figure A.6, we show that IRA holders with both types of accounts may be more
likely to take normal withdrawals from a Roth account at age 701
2
than IRA holders who only
have a Roth account. That is, we believe individuals who hold both types of accounts may
not understand that the RMD rules do not apply to their Roth account as well (or choose to
impose a similar heuristic to their Roth account), and therefore begin taking withdrawals at
age 701
2
from both accounts. The primary concern with reference points in bunching analyses
is that it is impossible to disentangle the reference point response from the response to the
financial incentive. This means any estimated elasticities will overstate the true structural
elasticities. Even if these individuals do use the age thresholds for these penalties as reference
points, however, it should not be a problem for our reduced-form results because we estimate
the magnitude of the behavioral response rather than underlying behavioral elasticities.
1.5 The dynamic life-cycle model
Section 1.4 presented strong evidence of a behavioral reaction to the penalties for early
withdrawal and excess accumulation. While our reduced-form results help us answer the
question of how many people are shifting the timing of their IRA withdrawals in response
to these penalties, we are not able to use our reduced-form estimates to understand the
potential welfare and tax revenue impact of changes to these penalties. In order to evaluate
counterfactual policies, we develop and estimate a dynamic life-cycle model. The estimated
model gives us a framework in which we are able to change these penalties and analyze the
impact on savings behavior, welfare, and tax remittances.
The key features of the model are as follows. Every period, individuals choose consumption
and how much to save (or dissave) in two different assets: a standard savings account and a
tax-benefited account. Dissaving from the tax-benefited account is penalized before period
t < te, and required after period t > trmd. Individuals receive exogenous labor income and,
at period tP , begin receiving an annual pension. Individuals receive utility from consumption
and from a bequest motive.
Section 1.5.1 provides details about the model, and Section 1.5.2 sets up the individual’s
problem. A complete list of the parameters used in the model is given in Appendix A.6.
1.5.1 Model set-up
Lifespan and survival probabilities Individuals live for no more than T periods. The
conditional probability of living to period t conditional on surviving to period t− 1 is πt. We
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adopt the norm that the t subscript refers to the beginning of the period.
Exogenous income The log of labor income yt is determined by two components: a
deterministic component that is a function of the period, and a stochastic component:
ln yt = g(t,X) + ε
y
t . (1.5.1)
The stochastic component, εyt , follows an AR(1) process with normally distributed errors
with mean 0 and variance σ2ε :
εyt = ηε
y





Formally modelling labor supply decisions is outside the scope of the model. Instead,
individuals receive exogenous labor income in each period, and decreasing labor supply over
the lifespan is captured in decreased labor income. Individuals receive a Social Security-style
pension at an exogenously given age, tp, which is known in advance. The value of the pension
income is a function of the period at which the individual begins to receive it. Total income,
zt, is the sum of labor income and the annual pension:
zt = yt + P · I[t ≥ tP ] (1.5.3)
Savings Individuals have access to two types of savings accounts: a standard savings
account (S) and a tax-benefited account (A). At the beginning of period t, the stock of
assets in the standard savings account is denoted as St and in the tax-benefited account
as At. The individual chooses how much to (dis)save in both accounts: st in the standard
savings account and at in the tax-benefited account. st > 0 indicates savings; st < 0 indicates
withdrawals. The same is true for at.
The two accounts follow similar laws of motion, which are summarized in Equations 1.5.4
and 1.5.5. After the individual has chosen her (dis)saving amounts st and at for period t, the
amount is added from the account balance at the beginning of the period. The stock of assets
in each type of savings account at the start of the next period is equal to the balance at the
end of the previous period after interest. The two savings accounts face different pre-tax
rates of return, with rS < rA. There is no borrowing.
St+1 = (1 + rS)(St + st) (1.5.4)
At+1 = (1 + rA)(At + at) (1.5.5)
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Contributions to the tax-benefited account are deducted from taxable income, while
withdrawals from the tax-benefited account are added to taxable income. Contributions are
capped at a period-dependent level, at. Withdrawals from the tax-benefited account before
period te are penalized at rate pe. Minimum withdrawals, at,rmd, are required after period
trmd, with failure to withdraw penalized at rate prmd. The cost of saving in the tax-benefited
account is reduced liquidity before period te. This is relevant given uncertainty in the earnings
process.
The individual faces two potential penalties for withdrawals from the tax-benefited
account. The early withdrawal penalty is given by τe in Equation 1.5.6. If at < 0 (indicating
a withdrawal) and t < te, the individual owes an additional pe · |at| in taxes.
τe = pe · |at| · I[at < 0, t < te] (1.5.6)
Starting in period trmd, individuals are required to take Required Minimum Distributions
from their tax-benefited savings account. Required Minimum Distributions are a function of
the beginning-of-period account balance and the period:
at,rmd = f(At, t)
Failure to take the minimum amount required triggers the excess accumulation penalty,
represented by τrmd in Equation 1.5.7. If |at| < at,rmd and t ≥ trmd, the individual owes an
additional prmd · (at,rmd − |at|) in taxes.
τrmd = prmd · (at,rmd − |at|) · I[at < at,rmd, t ≥ trmd] (1.5.7)
Taxation The individual owes income tax in each period. Income tax owed is determined
by a function τy(·) with its argument equal to the sum of total income zt and withdrawals
from the tax-benefited savings account. Total taxes owed are equal to income tax plus any
penalties due to early withdrawals or failure to take a Required Minimum Distribution:




+ τe + τrmd. (1.5.8)








where σ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
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Bequest motive Individuals value end-of-life wealth W via the warm-glow bequest motive










where Wt+1 = (1 + rS)St+1 + (1 + rA)At+1. That is, if an individual dies between periods t
and t+ 1, the value of her bequest is equal to what would have been her total starting wealth
in period t+ 1. The specification of the bequest motive follows that used in Jakobsen et al.
(2019). The individual does not owe any taxes on B(Wt+1).
1.5.2 The individual’s maximization problem
An individual starts period t knowing the following state variables: the period (t), her
exogenous labor income shock (εyt ), the level of assets in both savings accounts (St and At),
the period when she will receive her annual pension (tP ), and what will be the value of her
annual pension (P ). We collectively describe these state variables as Ωt = {t, εyt , St, At, tP ,
P}.
Knowing the state variables, individuals make two choices each period to maximize
expected lifetime utility: how much to (dis)save in both savings accounts (st and at). This
decision implies post-tax consumption (ct) and what would be left in a bequest.
The individual’s problem in recursive form is to pick {ct, st, at} to maximize the Bellman
equation given by Equation 1.5.11:









subject to the following constraints:







No borrowing constraint: St+1 ≥ 0, At+1 ≥ 0 (1.5.13)
as well as the savings laws of motion (Equations 1.5.4 and 1.5.5).26
Vt is the present value of expected lifetime utility at period t. The model is governed
by four preference parameters: β is the discount factor, σ is the elasticity of intertemporal
26In general, individuals are not allowed to borrow against IRAs. In 2020, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief,
and Economic Security (CARES) Act allowed individuals to take early withdrawals without penalty to pay
for specific COVID-19-related expenses, and to repay the withdrawal if the repayment is within three years
of the withdrawal.
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substitution, α is the bequest elasticity, and θ is the weight put on the bequest motive.
Individuals save both to protect against bad labor income draws and to finance additional
consumption later in life when labor income is low. The exogenous discontinuities in the
budget constraint caused by the two penalties mean there is not a closed form solution to
the model. We provide details on how we solved the problem numerically in Appendix A.7.
1.6 Model results
We estimate the model in two steps. In the first step, we set the value of parameters that
can be cleanly estimated outside of the model (e.g., survival probabilities) or are institutional
in nature (e.g., the income tax schedule). In the second step, we use the Simulated Method
of Moments (SMM) to estimate the preference parameters of the model: the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution (EIS), the discount factor, and the two parameters governing the
bequest motive. This two-step process is standard in the estimation of life-cycle models (see,
e.g., French (2005)).
We present the first-step parameter estimates in Section 1.6.1 and the second-step
parameter estimates in Section 1.6.2. We describe the estimation procedure in Section 1.6.2.1,
the variation that identifies the four preference parameters in Section 1.6.2.2, the preference
parameter estimates in 1.6.2.3, and model fit in Section 1.6.2.4.
1.6.1 First step estimates
1.6.1.1 Survival probabilities and tax policy parameters
Lifespan and survival probabilities We model individuals starting at age t = 401
2
and
set T = 851
2
.27 Survival probabilities for each age are calculated using the U.S. Social Security
Actuarial Life Tables for 2010. We normalize the survival parameters so that the probability
of death at age 851
2
is 1.28 The probabilities are given separately for men and women; we use
the average of the two.
Tax-benefited savings account We set the parameters specifying the age and penalty
levels for the early withdrawal and excess accumulation penalties equal to the statutory levels
for traditional IRAs: withdrawals before age 591
2
are subject to an additional pe = 10% tax
due on the amount withdrawn, while minimum withdrawals must be taken after age 701
2
27In the 2010 U.S. Social Security Actuarial Life Tables, about 10% of individuals survive past age 85.
28See Table 6 of Life Tables for the United States Social Security Area 1900-2100, available at https:
//www.ssa.gov/OACT/NOTES/as120/LifeTables Tbl 6 2010.html. We use the survival probability to age 85




or be subject to an additional penalty of prmd = 50% on the amount not withdrawn. The
required distribution schedule is modeled after the true schedule and discussed in Appendix
A.1.5.
Contributions to the tax-benefited savings account are capped. Because all dollar values
in the model are inflated to their 2015 equivalents, we use the contribution limits from 2015:
the contribution limit was $5,500 for individuals under age 50 and $6,500 for individuals aged
50 or older. For more on contribution limits, see Appendix A.1.
Income tax schedule Income is taxed according to the U.S. 2015 single-filer income tax
brackets, given in Table 1.3. We assign all individuals the standard deduction value for
single-filers in 2015 ($6,300).









$0 10.0% $189,300 33.0%
$9,225 15.0% $411,500 35.0%
$37,450 25.0% $413,200 39.6%
$90,750 28.0%
1.6.1.2 First step parameters estimated from the data
We describe below how we determine initial asset holdings, effective rates of return to
the two savings accounts, the labor income process parameters, and pension receipt in the
structural model. We make three sample restrictions to our main panel to generate the
sample used to estimate the first step parameters (hereafter referred to as the “model input
sample”). These restrictions ensure that the model input sample and our model set-up are
internally consistent. First, we only include individuals who were never married during our
sample period. This means that all of the first step parameters are estimated on individuals
rather than households. Second, we limit the sample to individuals who had non-missing
income in all periods. Third, we keep individuals who were born between 1920 and 1968.
This restricts the sample to individuals who were between the ages of 30 and 79 in 1999.
This yields a balanced panel with 60,615 unique individuals.
Initial asset holdings To determine initial balances in both the regular savings account and
the tax-benefited savings account, we fit lognormal distributions to the empirical distributions
at age 40 using maximum likelihood estimation. We estimate the initial empirical distribution
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of the regular savings account balance using information from IRS Form 1099-INT. We use the
fair market value of end-of-year traditional IRA balances reported on Form 5498, winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentiles, to obtain the empirical distribution of the tax-benefited savings
account. We find that the mean of the lognormal distribution of initial tax-benefited assets is
lower than that of regular savings (5.433 versus 9.277), but that the standard deviation is
larger (3.530 versus 1.765). Our simulated individuals receive one draw from the distribution
for regular savings and one from the distribution for tax-benefited savings.29
Rates of return We calibrate the values of 1 + rS and 1 + rA to be 1.02 and 1.05,
respectively. Having a sufficient wedge in the rate of return for the standard savings
account and tax-benefited saving account is critical for the model simulations to fit the data.
Investments in tax-benefited accounts enjoy abnormally high real after-tax rates of return for
multiple reasons. The predominant reason is that returns to tax-benefited accounts are not
subject to annual taxation. Instead, returns accumulate tax-free and are subject to tax upon
withdrawal, a treatment that effectively permits investors to obtain compounded returns
on deferred tax liabilities. Any positive inflation rate increases nominal returns and affects
the effective tax rate on investments outside of tax-preferred accounts, further increasing
the difference between real after-tax rates of return in taxable and tax-benefited accounts
(Feldstein, 1976; Feldstein et al., 1978). In addition, IRAs tend to be heavily invested in
equities, whereas assets in non-IRAs are often more diversified. The equity premium is a
long-standing puzzle in economics (see, e.g., Mehra and Prescott (1985); Benartzi and Thaler
(1995)).
We estimate 1 + rA directly from our data. We limit the model input sample to
account-years when the account holder did not not take a withdrawal or make a contribution
or rollover, and when the observed growth was between 0% and 15%. After accounting for
inflation, the average observed growth rate is 5.1%. The value of 1 + rS = 1.02 corresponds
to the long-term real interest rate assumed by the 2020 OASDI Trustees Report.30
Labor income We estimate the deterministic component of exogenous labor income g(t,X)
using a fixed effects model that is cubic in age with year-of-birth fixed effects, as shown in
Equation 1.6.1. Labor income is defined as the sum of wage income and self-employment
29See Appendix A.2.1 for additional details about the initial distribution of the regular savings account.
30The long-range annual real interest rate assumed by the 2020 Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance
(OASDI) report was 1.8% in the high-cost scenario, 2.3% in the intermediate-cost scenario, and 2.8% in the
low-cost scenario. As the assumed real interest rates used in the annual OASDI Trustees report have been
slowly falling over the past decade, we err on the low side and use 2% (OASDI, 2020).
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income.
ln yit = ρ0 + ρ1t+ ρ2t
2 + ρ3t
3 + Y OBi + ε
y
it (1.6.1)
The constant is estimated as the average of the year-of-birth fixed effects. We set the fixed
effect equal to 0 in our simulations as there is only one cohort.
The residuals from Equation 1.6.1 follow an AR(1) process, as given in Equation 1.6.2:
εyit = ηε
y





We estimate the labor income process using the sum of wage income and self-employment
income. The results of this exercise are given in Table 1.4:
Table 1.4: Exogenous labor income process parameter estimates
Deterministic component AR(1) Parameters
ρ̂0 ρ̂1 ρ̂2 ∗ 100 ρ̂3 ∗ 1000 η̂ σ̂2ζ
7.682 0.143 -0.185 0.0036 0.829 0.267
Notes: N = 60,615.
Our estimate of the persistence parameter η is within the range of previous estimates.
For example, Laibson et al. (1998) finds a persistence parameter of 0.511 for high school
drop-outs and 0.688 and 0.686 for high-school graduates and college graduates, respectively,
while Laibson et al. (2018) estimates a persistence parameter of 0.782 and Choukhmane
(2021) reports a persistence parameter of 0.974.
Annual pension Individuals are exogenously assigned the age at which they begin receiving
the Social Security-style pension. The probability of claiming the pension at a given age is
determined by the proportion of individuals in our data that we observe first receiving Social
Security at each age between 62 and 70. Simulated individuals receive the average value of
(non-zero) Social Security received by the individuals in the model input sample whom we
first observe claiming Social Security at that age.31 Figure 1.4 summarizes the probability
that an individual claims the pension at each age (shown by the solid lines) and the value of
the pension when claimed at each age (given by the bars).
31We calculate these averages using the amount received one year older than the claiming age to ensure
that we capture a full year of Social Security receipt.
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62 64 66 68 70
Age
Annual Social Security amount ($1,000)
Probability of claiming
Notes: N = 3,460 individuals. Includes individuals aged 55-60 in 1999 whom we observe first receiving
non-zero Social Security between the ages of 62 and 70, inclusive. The probability that an individual claimed
at each age is given by the solid lines. The average amount of Social Security given at each age is shown by
the bars. Social Security amounts are inflated to 2015 values.
1.6.2 Second step preference parameter estimates
1.6.2.1 Estimation procedure: Simulated Method of Moments
As our dynamic model does not have a closed-form solution, we solve the model
computationally using the Simulated Method of Moments (SMM). The estimation routine is
as follows. We set an initial guess for the four preference parameters, Φ0: the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution (σ0), the discount factor (β0), the bequest elasticity (α0), and the
weight on the bequest motive (σ0). Using backwards iteration, we solve the model using Φ0
and the output from the first step estimates described in Section 1.6.1.
We use the model solution to generate S sets of simulated data. For each simulated
dataset ms(Φ) (s = {1, 2, ..., S}), we calculate a series of moments denoted h(ms(Φ)). Note
that the simulated data, and therefore the value of h(ms(Φ)), are a function of the structural
parameters Φ used to solve the model.
We compare the average of these simulated moment vectors to the values of the same
moments calculated from the administrative tax data, h(w) (where w represents the true
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empirical data). Specifically, we calculate Equation 1.6.3:





Our SMM estimator Φ̂SMM is then defined as the solution to the following minimization
problem:
Φ̂SMM = arg min
Φ
Z(Φ, n) ≡ g(w,Φ)′Ŵng(w,Φ), (1.6.4)
where Ŵn is a positive definite weighting matrix. We set Ŵn to be the identity matrix. Using
the identity matrix places more weight on the moments that are largest in absolute value,
whereas the optimal weighting matrix (i.e., the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix
of the empirically estimated moments) places more weight on the moments that are most
precisely estimated. As is shown in Table 1.6, some of our moments are estimated with a
considerably larger sample size than others, which mechanically makes them more precisely
estimated. This results in a model fit that quantitatively distorts our counterfactual exercises
by providing a better fit for some age groups than for others. As our moments are generally
of the same magnitude, we find that using the identity matrix yields better model fit overall
relative to the optimal weighting matrix.
We minimize Z(Φ, n) using Nelder-Mead optimization. We generate 10,000 individuals
for each simulation. More details about the numerical solution method are given in Appendix
A.7.
1.6.2.2 Estimation moments and identification
We jointly estimate the four preference parameters of the model. Because all four
parameters govern savings decisions, we cannot rely on the shape of the savings profile
alone to separately identify these parameters. Instead, we take advantage of the bunching
moments generated by the early withdrawal and excess accumulation penalties. Matching
on bunching and other quasi-experimental moments provides more credible variation for
identifying preference parameters in structural models.
We use 25 moments in our estimation procedure: the average value of IRA withdrawals




. We show in a simple, highly-stylized, model that bunching
in our setting can be used to identify the EIS and the discount factor in Appendix A.5. In
our model, individuals face uncertain survival and receive utility from the ability to leave a
bequest. The expected utility from leaving a bequest impacts consumption and, subsequently,
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withdrawal decisions. As a result, average withdrawal sizes enable us to identify the two
bequest parameters of the model.
1.6.2.3 Preference parameter estimates
The preference parameter estimates are given in Table 1.5:








1.061 0.920 2.660 1.069 307
(0.157) (0.00857) (0.461) (0.157) d.f. = 307
Notes: This table show the estimated preference parameters of the
structural model described in Section 1.5. Standard errors are shown in
parentheses. The optimal weight matrix used to calculate the standard
errors is generated via bootstrap.






































30.5 40.5 50.5 59.5 70.5 80.5
Age
Trad. IRA Acct. Holder
Non−trad. IRA Acct. Holder
Notes: N = 60,615 unique individuals. Adjusted gross income winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Adjusted gross income amounts are inflated to 2015 values.
We estimate an EIS of 1.061. This is considerably higher than that estimated by both Best
et al. (2019) and Choukhmane (2021), who estimate the EIS equal to about 0.1 and 0.4,
respectively, but not inconsistent with the upper-end of the range of estimates found in the
literature.32 Chetty (2006) notes that, in models where the EIS is equal to the inverse of the
32For example, Gourinchas and Parker (2002) report a value for the coefficient of relative risk aversion
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CRRA, it is unreasonable to find an EIS less than 1, as it would require an uncompensated
wage elasticity lower than any value previously estimated. Guvenen (2006) argues that, in
general, wealthier individuals have a higher EIS. Figure 1.5 compares average adjusted gross
income for IRA holders and non-IRA holders at each age. IRA holders have considerably
higher average income at every age, implying that they are very likely wealthier and one
would expect a higher EIS estimate for this population.
The model is formally rejected by a χ2 overidentification test. This is primarily driven by
the fact that the estimation procedure does not incorporate the variance of the parameters
estimated in the first step (e.g., the income process parameters).33
We present t-statistics on the moment conditions in Table 1.6. We find large t-statistics
on many of the moment conditions. This is in part the result of the fact that the model is
highly stylized, and that many of the moments are estimated on samples with thousands (if
not tens of thousands) of observations.










50 1,578 860 13.97 63 4,654 4,502 1.75
51 1,620 937 13.00 64 4,525 5,325 −4.11
52 1,731 1,031 13.37 65 4,595 6,293 −8.90
53 1,721 1,161 11.18 66 4,306 2,393 10.27
54 1,747 1,316 8.93 67 3,847 2,873 6.92
55 1,876 1,508 9.09 68 3,542 3,461 0.96
56 2,022 1,725 6.41 69 3,613 3,992 −0.95
57 1,972 1,976 3.81 70 6,994 7,436 −1.34
58 1,794 2,287 −0.56 71 8,025 7,489 2.13
59 3,356 3,297 1.03 72 7,583 7,562 0.26
60 4,265 3,919 5.10 73 7,787 7,500 0.40
61 4,438 4,673 −0.40 74 7,670 7,454 0.32
62 4,697 3,888 5.72
Notes: Empirical moments show the average withdrawal value at that age, conditional on
having a non-0 account balance in the IRA, as estimated in the model input sample. The
simulated moments are the average withdrawal value at that age, conditional on having a
non-0 account balance in the IRA, as estimated in our simulated data (N = 10,000).
(CRRA) of 0.514 when using their robust weighting matrix, which implies an EIS of 1/0.514 = 1.95 in their
framework. Best et al. (2019) use Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences to separately estimate the EIS and the CRRA,
which could explain some of the disparity in our estimates.
33Our standard errors are likely understated for the same reason.
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1.6.2.4 Model fit for matched moments
Figure 1.6 compares the simulated data moments to the empirical moments. The figure
shows the average withdrawal from a traditional IRA taken at each age, conditional on having
a non-0 traditional IRA balance at the beginning of the period. The solid lines represent the
moments from the empirical data; the dashed lines show the moments from the simulated
data. The shaded regions include moments that are not targeted in the estimation procedure.





. This is important because our counterfactual policy analysis will involve changing the
two tax penalties that cause the observed bunching.





ages when the majority of our simulated individuals begin claiming their annual pension.
Just over 10% of our sample starts claiming their pension at age 621
2
, after which we observe
a dip in average IRA withdrawals at that age (see Figure 1.4 in Section 1.6.1). By age 661
2
,
90% of our sample are receiving their annual pension, which aligns with the second dip in
average withdrawal value.





























Notes: N = 60,615 unique individuals. We simulated 10,000 individuals. The figure shows the average
withdrawal from a traditional IRA taken at each age, conditional on having a non-0 IRA balance at the
beginning of the period. The solid lines represent the moments from the empirical data; the dashed lines
show the moments from the simulated data. The shaded regions include moments that are not targeted in
the estimation procedure.
31
1.6.2.5 Model fit for unmatched moments
We compare the empirical and simulated moments for two additional measures of IRA
behavior to further validate our model: average balance by age, and the proportion of account
holders taking a withdrawal at each age. We consider the averages for each value conditional
on having a non-0 traditional IRA balance at the beginning of the period.
Figure 1.7 shows the results of this exercise. The solid lines represent the moments from
the empirical data; the dashed lines show the moments from the simulated data. Figure
1.7a compares average balance values. We match the empirical moments well until age 591
2
,
after which we mirror the shape but are a bit lower in levels. This is in part due to the fact
that we do not have rollovers in the model, which would pull up average empirical account
balances. After age 701
2
, average balances are influenced by the value of the required minimum
withdrawals, which are themselves a function of average balances. It’s not a surprise that our
average simulated values remain below the average empirical values in this region.
Figure 1.7b shows the proportion of individuals taking a withdrawal at each age. We are
able to capture the magnitude of bunching even in this out of sample exercise.
Figure 1.7: Comparing unmatched moments from the empirical and simulated data










































































Notes: N = 60,615 unique individuals. We simulate 10,000 individuals. Panel (a) shows the average IRA
balance, by age. Panel (b) shows the proportion of traditional IRA holders taking a withdrawal, by age.
The solid lines represent the moments from the empirical data; the dashed lines show the moments from the
simulated data.
1.7 Counterfactual policy analysis
These penalties have been changed to achieve policy goals. For example, the SECURE Act
increased the age at which RMDs kick in from 701
2
to 72. This change was made with little
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understanding about what the long term impact would be on welfare and tax remittances. In
fact, there is no evidence about whether these penalties do or do not achieve their purported
goals of increasing retirement consumption while limiting the tax cost. In this section, we
estimate the impact of the change to the age threshold for RMDs from the SECURE Act
before considering more broadly a large number of combinations of age thresholds and penalty
rates.34






































Notes: Each iteration includes 10,000 unique simulated individuals. The figure shows the difference in
average IRA withdrawals and consumption from the base policy after we raise the age for Required Minimum
Distributions from 70 12 to 72
1
2 . A positive number means the value is greater under the counterfactual policy;
a negative number means the value is lower under the counterfactual policy. The solid lines show average
IRA withdrawals, and the dashed lines show average consumption levels.
The SECURE Act raised the RMD age to 72, allowing for longer accumulation in
tax-benefited accounts. We examine the impact on IRA withdrawal behavior after changing




.35 Figure 1.8 shows the changes in average withdrawal
34Lawmakers have also changed these penalties during the last two major financial crises. RMDs were
suspended in 2009 as part of the Worker, Retiree, and Employer Recovery Act of 2008. In March 2020, the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) waived the early withdrawal penalty for
withdrawals due to COVID-19-related financial hardships and suspended RMDs for 2020.
35We solve the model in whole periods and therefore can only consider changes in whole years. Because we
consider a slightly bigger change than what was actually enacted in 2019, our estimates should be considered
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amounts and consumption at each age relative to the current policy. A positive number
means the value is greater under the counterfactual policy; a negative number means the
value is lower under the counterfactual policy. The solid lines show average IRA withdrawals,
and the dashed lines show average consumption levels.
We observe that average IRA withdrawals decrease by just over $3,000 at age 701
2
after the
age for RMDs increases. The decrease at age 711
2
is nearly as large. Average consumption also




. When individuals are required to take
withdrawals from their account, they can choose to use the withdrawal to finance consumption
or save the withdrawal at the standard savings rate. In contrast, when individuals are not
required to take withdrawals, their decision is to take a withdrawal for consumption or
continue to save that money in the tax-preferred account. Our results imply that the optimal
consumption choice under those two scenarios is not the same.
Average IRA withdrawals are both higher at age 721
2
relative to the current policy, and at
every age thereafter. This must be true mechanically if average IRA balances are higher due




. We also see elevated levels of consumption at
age 721
2
, and for the rest of the simulated lifespan, relative to the level under the current
policy.
There is essentially no change in withdrawals before age 651
2
. There is similarly no change
in consumption, suggesting that increasing this tax benefit may not induce people to increase
their contributions to IRAs from the base level. This means that the additional tax benefit
may not be sufficient to encourage individuals to save more in IRAs at the expense of current
consumption or other types of precautionary savings. We observe slight changes in both





We compare four additional outcomes under the current policy and after raising the age
for Required Minimum Distributions to 721
2
. The first is a measure of equivalent variation,
which we use to estimate the welfare consequences of raising the age for required withdrawals.
To estimate this measure, we calculate the average present discounted value of lifetime utility
under both the base policy and the counterfactual policy as shown in Equation 1.7.1. Let
uit be the utility in period t for individual i under the original policy and u
′
it be the utility
in period t under the counterfactual policy. The present discounted value of lifetime utility
for individual i under the base policy is calculated by discounting the value of uit back
to age 411
2




.36 We then take the
average of this value to determine the average present discounted value of lifetime utility.
upper bounds.
36We discount to age 41 12 rather than age 40
1
2 because starting at age 41
1
2 , less than 2% of our simulated
individuals are constrained by our highest grid value. See Appendix A.7 for more details.
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Once we have determined uPDV,base and uPDV,cf , we use our policy functions from solving
the model under the base policy to determine how much income we would need to give to (or
take away from) our simulated individuals in the first period so that uPDV,base = uPDV,cf . A
positive number indicates that our simulated individuals are better off under the counterfactual
policy, while a negative number indicates that our simulated individuals are better off under
the base policy.
In addition to our measure of equivalent variation, we also calculate the difference in the
present discounted value of lifetime tax remittances,37 average IRA balance at age 651
2
, and
average bequeathed IRA balance (i.e., average IRA balance at age 851
2
).
Table 1.7 shows the results of these four outcomes. As with our measure of equivalent
variation, a positive number indicates a higher value in the counterfactual policy, while a
negative number indicates a lower value in the counterfactual policy. We find that increasing




yields marginally higher welfare
and slightly lower tax remittances. Bequeathed IRA balances are more than 6% larger after
the change. The average IRA balance at age 651
2
is slightly lower, which is consistent with













Levels ($) 339 -81 -186 4,283
Percent change 0.0017% -0.0254% -0.1908% 6.6%
Notes : Each iteration includes 10,000 unique simulated individuals. The table shows (1)
our measure of equivalent variation, (2) the present discounted value of lifetime taxes
remitted, (3) the value of average IRA balances at age 65 12 , and (4) the value of the
bequeathed IRA at age 8512 for the base policy and the counterfactual policy where we
raise the age for Required Minimum Distributions from 70 12 to 72
1
2 .
37We use Equation 1.7.1 to calculate the present discounted value of total taxes remitted, with one change:
instead of discounting by the discount factor β, we discount by the rate of return for the non-tax-benefited
savings account: 11.01 , where 1% is an estimate of the government’s borrowing rate.
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As shown in Table 1.8, the decrease in tax revenue is driven by reduced excess accumulation
penalty payments. As we’ll discuss in Section 1.7.2, there are good reasons to believe that the
relevant measure with the excess accumulation penalty is actually the change in income taxes
remitted. In that case, we observe that both welfare and tax remittances increase relative to
the base policy in the world where we raise the age for required withdrawals to 721
2
.









RMD age = 7212 317,720.09
Total change -80.66
Change in income taxes 27.25
Change in early withdrawal penalties -0.26
Change in excess accumulation penalties -107.61
Notes : Each iteration includes 10,000 unique simulated individuals.
This table shows the average total taxes remitted under the original
policy and under the counterfactual policy, the difference between
the total, and how changes in the three sources of tax revenue
contribute to that difference.
Although we do not account for redistribution in our model, the fact that this policy
increases both welfare and lifetime income tax remittances suggests that there are changes to
these tax penalties that could yield better outcomes than what we have now. At the very
least, we could give individuals a lump sum transfer in the last period of their lives (thereby
avoiding potential distortionary effects from redistribution), and they would be strictly better
off. In the next two sections, we calculate our measure of equivalent variation and the impact
on lifetime tax remittances and IRA balances for a large number of changes to both tax
penalties. For these estimates, we change both the penalty rate, and the age at which the
penalty applies.
1.7.2 Changing the excess accumulation penalty
In the previous section, we considered one specific change to the early accumulation





. We considered this particular change because it most closely mirrored the change
implemented in 2019, but there is no reason to believe that this change led us to the optimal
policy, conditional on the existence of these penalties.
To consider a more exhaustive set of counterfactual policies, we compare the base policy
for the excess accumulation penalty (age threshold = 701
2
, penalty rate = 50%) with every
36




and penalty rates 40% to 70% (in increments of
10%). The results are given in Figure 1.9; Table A.10 in Appendix A.8 gives these results
both in levels (as shown below) and as percent changes from the base policy.
Figure 1.9a gives the results for equivalent variation. Each point shows the amount of
additional income we would need to give our simulated individuals for the average present
discounted value of lifetime utility in the base policy to be equal to that in the counterfactual
policy. The straight horizontal line at 0 indicates where there is no difference from the base
policy; the base policy is indicated by the black square on the 0 line. Points above the 0 line
indicate a positive value relative to the base policy (i.e., the individual is better off under the
counterfactual policy), while points below the 0 line indicate a negative value relative to the
base policy (i.e., the individual is worse off under the counterfactual policy).
Raising the age for required withdrawals increases welfare. This is not surprising, because
raising the age is equivalent to loosening a constraint and we are modeling rational agents
with exponential discounting. We find a positive value for all penalty rates considered for
every age threshold above the base policy. The observed increases are small in magnitude,
with the largest change being an increase of income of just under $600. The rate of change
of the equivalent variation value decreases as the age threshold rises. All of the observed
differences result from changing the age threshold; there is essentially no difference if we
change the penalty rate.
While there is no explicit government budget constraint in the model, we can consider
whether or not the policy changes we consider would be tax-revenue neutral (or tax-revenue
increasing). The results for the present discounted value of total lifetime tax remittances
are shown in Figure 1.9b. Raising the age for required withdrawals has a mixed impact on





, but then decrease as the age threshold rises. Total tax remittances are













for a penalty rate of
50%. As with equivalent variation, the changes are modest in magnitude, with the largest
increase falling just over $100.
The decreases in total tax remittances are largely driven by changes in remittances of the
excess accumulation penalty. Mortenson et al. (2019) find that less than 1% of traditional
IRA holders who do not comply with the RMD rules file the required Form 5329 to remit
the excess accumulation penalty. As most individuals do comply with the RMD rules, this
does not amount to a large number of individuals not paying the penalty. It does, however,
suggest that including changes in excess accumulation penalty payments may not be the most
accurate measure of changes in tax remittances if we change the age threshold and penalty
37
rate for the excess accumulation penalty, because our simulated individuals are forced to pay
the penalty.38
Figure 1.9c shows the change in total lifetime income tax remittances. In this case, we
observe positive differences from the base policy at all age thresholds through for 761
2
a
penalty rate of 70%, and at all age thresholds except for 751
2
for a penalty rate of 60%. At a








All of the counterfactual policies with age thresholds at 711
2
or higher that resulted in
higher total lifetime tax remittances also had positive equivalent variation values. This means
that there are numerous combinations of age threshold and penalty rate that are both welfare
improving while also resulting in increased tax revenue.
An important caveat to the results for taxes remitted is that we do not account for taxes
paid on inherited IRAs. The rules for what happens to an inherited IRA are complicated. The
amount of tax due, and when, depends on who is the beneficiary (e.g., spouse or non-spouse),
the age of the beneficiary, and whether or not the original account holder had started taking
RMDs (see Appendix A.1.6 for more details). While modeling these rules is not the goal of
this project, we can roughly estimate whether taxes collected on inherited IRAs will increase
or decrease simply by looking at whether average IRA account balances increase or decrease
in the final period relative to the base policy.
Figure 1.9d shows the difference in the amount chosen to leave in the IRA as part of the
bequest in the last period relative to the base policy. Inherited IRAs increase in size as the
penalty rate decreases for a given age threshold, and increase in size as the age threshold
increases for a given penalty rate. As with equivalent variation and tax remittances, the
variation in age threshold has a much bigger impact on the average inherited IRA balance
than variation in the penalty rate. Most importantly, average bequeathed IRA balances
are higher for nearly every combination of age threshold and penalty rate that also yielded
increased welfare and income tax remittances (the exception being an age threshold of 711
2
with a penalty rate of 70%).
1.7.3 Changing the early withdrawal penalty
We conduct the same exercise for the early withdrawal penalty. We compare our outcomes





rates of 5%, 10%, 20%, and 30%. The results are given in Figure 1.10; Table A.11 in Appendix
38Over 75% of our simulated individual-years have no excess accumulation penalty. All of our simulated
individual-years with a positive excess accumulation penalty value took a positive withdrawal. About 75%
of those face the penalty on a value that is less than 10% of the amount withdrawn. This suggests our
overestimate of the amount of excess accumulation penalties is in part due to simulation error.
38
Figure 1.9: Changing the excess accumulation penalty






































68.5 70.5 72.5 74.5 76.5 78.5
Age for required withdrawals








































68.5 70.5 72.5 74.5 76.5 78.5
Age for required withdrawals
Notes : Each iteration includes 10,000 unique simulated individuals. The figure compares various counterfactual
policies for the excess accumulation penalty to the base policy (age threshold = 70 12 , penalty rate = 50%).
Figure 1.9a shows our measure of equivalent variation. Figure 1.9b shows the change in the PDV of lifetime
tax remittances. Figure 1.9c shows the change in the PDV of lifetime income tax remittances. Figure 1.9d
shows the change in bequeathed IRA balances. In all panels, the base policy is indicated by a black square
on the 0 line.
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Figure 1.9: Changing the excess accumulation penalty, continued





































68.5 70.5 72.5 74.5 76.5 78.5
Age for required withdrawals






































68.5 70.5 72.5 74.5 76.5 78.5
Age for required withdrawals
Notes : Each iteration includes 10,000 unique simulated individuals. The figure compares various counterfactual
policies for the excess accumulation penalty to the base policy (age threshold = 70 12 , penalty rate = 50%).
Figure 1.9a shows our measure of equivalent variation. Figure 1.9b shows the change in the PDV of lifetime
tax remittances. Figure 1.9c shows the change in the PDV of lifetime income tax remittances. Figure 1.9d
shows the change in bequeathed IRA balances. In all panels, the base policy is indicated by a black square
on the 0 line.
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A.8 gives these results both in levels (as shown below) and as percent changes from the
base policy. As with Figure 1.9, the straight horizontal line at 0 indicates where there is no
difference from the base policy; the base policy is marked by the black square on the 0 line.
Points above the 0 line indicate a positive amount relative to the base policy, while points
below the 0 line indicate a negative amount relative to the base policy.
As shown in Figure 1.10a, our equivalent variation measure decreases both as the age
threshold increases and as the penalty rate increases. This follows from the fact that, for
rational agents with exponential discounting, raising either the age threshold or the penalty
rate tightens the lifetime budget constraint. As a result, our simulated individuals ought
to be worse off in expectation. Unlike the excess accumulation penalty, where varying the
age threshold had the biggest impact on welfare, changing the age threshold for the early
withdrawal penalty has a smaller impact on welfare than changing the penalty rate.
The impact of changing the early withdrawal penalty on lifetime tax remittances is shown
in Figure 1.10b. Increasing the penalty rate and the age threshold both lead to increased
lifetime tax remittances. Increasing the age threshold has an increasingly large impact on
lifetime tax remittances.
There are four age threshold-penalty rate combinations that lead to increases in both




. The increases in both measures are modest: the equivalent variation measure ranges
from $1,486 to $2,004, while the change in lifetime tax remittances ranges from $41 to $412.
We present the results for lifetime income tax remittances in Figure 1.10c. We observe
that income tax remittances decrease with age threshold, and with the penalty rate. There
are increased income tax remittances relative to the base policy at all age thresholds facing a
5% penalty, and for all age thresholds below 591
2
facing a 10% penalty. These are the same
age threshold and penalty rate combinations that led to increased welfare. As we observe
individuals paying the early withdrawal penalty in the tax data, we believe that the correct
measure of changes in tax remittances are total changes in tax remittances when considering
the early withdrawal penalty.
Because the purported goal of the early withdrawal penalty is to improve financial security
later in life, we consider the change in IRA balances at age 651
2
in Figure 1.10d. IRA balances
at age 651
2
decrease with age thresholds until an age threshold of 581
2
, and then increase until
an age threshold of 651
2
. Generally speaking, a higher penalty rate results in a higher IRA
balance at age 651
2
, though the higher the age threshold, the bigger the difference between
penalty rates. There are numerous combinations of age threshold and penalty rate that lead
to higher IRA balances at age 651
2
relative to the base policy. Most relevant to us, all three
of our counterfactual policies that lead to increased welfare and total tax remittances also
41
result in higher IRA balances at age 651
2
.
1.7.4 Discussion of counterfactual exercises
We study how welfare and tax remittances change if we alter the age threshold and
penalty rate for the excess accumulation penalty and the early withdrawal penalty. We







, with a penalty rate of 50% or higher, increases both welfare and the present
discounted value of lifetime income tax remittances, suggesting that the increase in income
taxes remitted from higher account balances may be worth the delayed tax revenue. There
may be additional increases in taxes that we do not account for as a result of taxes remitted
when IRAs are inherited, because bequeathed IRA balances also increase when the age for
Required Minimum Distributions increases.





while lowering the penalty rate to 5%, increases both welfare and lifetime total tax revenue.
Average IRA balances at age 651
2
are also higher at these age thresholds and penalty rates.
The intuition for this finding is as follows: conditional on having these penalties in place,
there are benefits to encouraging individuals to keep their money in these accounts as long as
possible. However, if individuals need to take early withdrawals as the result of an unexpected
income shock, they can do so with minimal sanction.
There are four things worth mentioning when considering these results. First, we have
only changed one policy at a time. Our analysis of changes to the excess accumulation penalty
were done keeping the base policy for the early withdrawal as is, and vice versa. There may
be policies that involve changes to both penalties that yield even bigger changes in welfare
and lifetime tax remittances.
Second, we have only altered two of the policy levers associated with IRAs: the two
withdrawal penalties. There is a third policy lever that we have not changed: the contribution
limit. The contribution limit increased substantially over the course of our sample period, from
$2,000 in 1999 to $5,500 in 2015. Increasing the contribution limit would allow individuals to
grow their IRA balances faster, but at the cost of putting more of their savings out of reach
in the event of an unexpected income shock. Considering the role of the contribution limit is
a direction for future work.
Third, these are partial equilibrium effects. Our model does not account for redistribution
of tax revenue. Redistributing tax revenue would have an income effect, which could impact
consumption and savings decisions. We also do not model endogenous labor supply choices.
Reaching age 591
2
does not change our simulated individuals’ labor income, but it’s possible
that individuals reduce their labor supply in response to having penalty-free access to savings
42
Figure 1.10: Changing the early withdrawal penalty









































55.5 57.5 59.5 61.5 63.5 65.5
Age for penalty−free withdrawals





































55.5 57.5 59.5 61.5 63.5 65.5
Age for penalty−free withdrawals
Notes : Each iteration includes 10,000 unique simulated individuals. The figure compares various counterfactual
policies for the early withdrawal penalty to the base policy (age threshold = 59 12 , penalty rate = 10%). Figure
1.10a shows our measure of equivalent variation. Figure 1.10b shows the change in the PDV of lifetime tax
remittances. Figure 1.10c shows the change in the PDV of lifetime income tax remittances. Figure 1.10d
shows the change in IRA balances at age 65 12 . In all panels, the base policy is indicated by a black square on
the 0 line.
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Figure 1.10: Changing the early withdrawal penalty, continued















































55.5 57.5 59.5 61.5 63.5 65.5
Age for penalty−free withdrawals







































55.5 57.5 59.5 61.5 63.5 65.5
Age for penalty−free withdrawals
Notes : Each iteration includes 10,000 unique simulated individuals. The figure compares various counterfactual
policies for the early withdrawal penalty to the base policy (age threshold = 59 12 , penalty rate = 10%). Figure
1.10a shows our measure of equivalent variation. Figure 1.10b shows the change in the PDV of lifetime tax
remittances. Figure 1.10c shows the change in the PDV of lifetime income tax remittances. Figure 1.10d
shows the change in IRA balances at age 65 12 . In all panels, the base policy is indicated by a black square on
the 0 line.
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in their IRAs. There could also be general equilibrium shifts in the interest rate as a result
of policy-induced changes in the supply of savings.
Finally, we do not model alternative ways that individuals may finance their consumption
in the face of an income shock. For example, we do not account for the scenario where an
increase in the penalty rate for early withdrawals drives individuals with few other liquid
savings to take on additional debt, perhaps at a high interest rate. Our results suggest that
discouraging early withdrawals from retirement accounts through lower penalties that are
in place for a longer period of time, and finding other policies to help individuals through
unexpected financial hardship before the age of penalty-free withdrawals, may ultimately
increase overall welfare.
1.8 Conclusion
We provide empirical evidence that traditional IRA holders respond to both the early
withdrawal penalty and the excess accumulation penalty. We use the observed bunching
response to estimate the magnitude of the response. We find that, every year, approximately
1.4% of traditional IRA holders (about 648,400 individuals) change the timing of withdrawals
as a result of the early withdrawal penalty, and 16.2% of traditional IRA holders (about 7.7
million individuals) change the timing of withdrawals in response to the excess accumulation
penalty. These shifts impact at least $57.9 billion in withdrawals each year. We believe these
estimates should be considered lower bounds of the number of people whose behavior changes
as a result of these penalties.
After estimating our model, we consider an array of counterfactual policies in which we
alter the age threshold and penalty rate for the two penalties. We find that increasing the




, while lowering the penalty rate
to 5%, increases both welfare and tax revenue as well as IRA balances at age 651
2
. Similarly,





, with a penalty rate of 50% or higher, increases both welfare and the present discounted
value of lifetime income tax remittances.
Our results have three important implications for policy makers considering using these
penalties as policy levers to increase retirement savings. First, there are combinations of age
threshold and penalty rate for these penalties that increase both average welfare and tax
remittances.
Second, encouraging individuals to keep their money in retirement savings accounts as
long as possible increases welfare, as long as the penalty for early withdrawal isn’t too
high. Alternative strategies to assist individuals facing unexpected financial shocks before
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retirement should be considered in lieu of policies that make it easier for individuals to take
early withdrawals from their retirement accounts.
Finally, the people who react to the early withdrawal penalty may differ from those who
only take withdrawals because of Required Minimum Distributions. Intuitively, the early
withdrawal penalty affects people who are trying to access their savings earlier in life, whereas
the excess accumulation penalty affects individuals who want to enjoy the tax benefits for as
long as possible. In addition, IRA holders have, on average, considerably higher incomes than
non-IRA holders. If we want to create policy to help people save for retirement and we are
worried that people with lower income might be more at risk for not having enough savings,
then changing the policy levers associated with these accounts may not get us far enough.
Incorporating extensive margin decisions into the model is a direction for future work.
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CHAPTER II
Does Giving Tax Debtors a Break Improve Compliance
and Income? Evidence from Quasi-Random
Assignment of IRS Revenue Officers
(with William C. Boning, Joel Slemrod, and Alex Turk)
2.1 Introduction
Millions of U.S. taxpayers do not fully remit their taxes each year, resulting in billions of
dollars of uncollected tax debt. Attempts to collect this debt loom large in taxpayers’ lives.
If collecting debts from taxpayers whose economic resources are insufficient to meet basic
living expenses reduces their incentive to work or invest, postponing collection could reap
higher future repayments.
On the other hand, collecting tax debts deters tax evasion by increasing the effective
penalties for failing to report taxes. Taking into account whether tax debts are collected
adds nuance to the classic Allingham and Sandmo (1972a) model of tax evasion. While the
original model assumes all debts are collected, this is not true in practice. If not all debts are
collected, then changes in the collection rate affect both the expected present value of the tax
remitted per dollar of reported income, and of the penalties remitted per dollar of unreported
income uncovered in an audit. Taxpayers choose both how much income to report and how
much tax to remit (and when), given penalties both for underreporting and underpayment.
There is little evidence about the consequences of collection attempts writ large, including
on how pursuing or forgoing collection affects taxpayers’ future compliance and income. One
exception is Miller et al. (2014), who find that, conditional on a later suspension of collection,
assigning a case to an IRS field collection agent (“Revenue Officer”) earlier in the collections
process is associated with larger amounts collected. Other work on tax debt collection finds
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that much smaller interventions, such as letters highlighting financial penalties (Cranor et al.
(2020)) or potential social stigma (Perez-Truglia and Troiano (2018)), modestly increase
payments. Miller et al. (2016) find that selling property tax liens to investors prompts higher
payments, but less so in times of economic distress.
In this paper, we exploit an institutional feature of the debt collection process to provide
evidence of the causal effects of tax collection on taxpayers’ subsequent behavior. To provide
causal evidence, we leverage the fact that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) pauses collection
when it determines that a taxpayer’s income and assets are insufficient to meet basic living
expenses, and designates their debt currently not collectible (CNC). The extent to which
the IRS should grant such hardship designations is an open policy question. The National
Taxpayer Advocate listed among 2018’s most serious tax administration problems the IRS’s
failure to use available data to proactively designate additional cases CNC.
Because debt collection is suspended primarily on the basis of economic hardship, it
is difficult to separate the effects of suspending collection efforts from the consequences of
the economic hardship that qualifies a taxpayer’s case for suspension. We use variation in
IRS Revenue Officers’ propensities to designate similar cases CNC to study how suspending
collection affects taxpayer behavior. Our approach is a version of the examiner assignment
design developed in Doyle (2007) and Doyle (2008), which used quasi-random appointment
of child protection investigators to cases in order identify the causal effects of foster care
placement.1 To our knowledge, this is the first time an examiner assignment design has been
applied to study the causal impact of a tax enforcement policy.
Our empirical strategy takes advantage of plausibly exogenous experience of tax debt relief
resulting from the quasi-random assignment of delinquent cases to Revenue Officers. The
process of determining whether a case should receive a CNC designation inherently requires the
Revenue Officer to use their judgment. We gauge a Revenue Officer’s propensity to designate
a case CNC using a residualized “leave-one-out” measure based on the proportion of cases
the Revenue Officer has determined to be CNC, adjusted for any observable characteristics of
the case that could alter whether a CNC designation is appropriate.2 This measure functions
as an instrument for whether or not a case was actually deemed CNC. Tests of random
assignment suggest that our instrument removes much, but not all, of the bias in naive OLS
estimates. Our instrument is correlated with some pre-treatment covariates, suggesting that
1Examiner assignment designs have since been used to estimate local average treatment effects for a wide
variety of policy interventions, including receipt of Social Security Disability Insurance (Maestas et al., 2013),
bankruptcy protection (Dobbie and Song, 2015; Dobbie et al., 2017), incarceration (Kling, 2006; Loeffler,
2013; Mueller-Smith, 2015), pre-trial detention (Dobbie et al., 2018), and eviction (Humphries et al., 2019).
2Our definition of a CNC case includes any case in which some portion of the tax debt is designated CNC.
There is little variation in the fraction of tax debt designated CNC: in more than 75% of cases in which any
debt was designated CNC, the designation was applied to the entire debt.
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the exclusion restriction may be violated. The imbalance is small relative to OLS estimates,
but because even a small imbalance is cause for concern when interpreting the results of any
instrumental variables approach, we adopt an instrumented difference-in-differences approach
to address the remaining imbalance. As we do not observe trends in the instrumented
difference-in-difference estimates in periods before treatment, we believe these estimates
provide causal evidence of the effect of suspending collection efforts due to hardship on
taxpayer compliance and income.
We analyze de-identified administrative data linking over 123,000 tax debt cases to
information about taxpayers’ incomes, tax return filings, and contemporaneous information
about the Revenue Officers who worked each case. We track three measures of income
(adjusted gross income, wages, and self-employment income) as well as payments to the IRS
and future tax return filing. We estimate local average treatment effects of tax collection
suspensions due to hardship stemming from variation in Revenue Officer assignment. In other
words, we compare cases where Revenue Officers who differ in their inherent leniency might
disagree on whether the taxpayer’s hardship warranted the CNC designation.
We find that suspending collection due to hardship causes taxpayers to report larger
adjusted gross income in future years. The increase in income is driven by an increase in wages
earned by the spouse of the taxpayer with whom the case is associated. These results contrast
with simple difference-in-difference estimates, which are subject to bias due to differential
trends over time for taxpayers undergoing hardship. In those simple difference-in-difference
estimates, hardship designations are associated with declines in debt repayment, payment
of future years’ tax liability, tax return filing, wages, and self-employment income. The
instrumented estimates are less precise than the un-instrumented estimates, however, and in
some cases confidence intervals for the instrumented estimates include the un-instrumented
point estimates. While naive OLS estimates, which are subject to selection bias, indicate
that a CNC designation is associated with a lower likelihood of filing a tax return, lower
wages, and less other income, in our examiner assignment design we do not find significant
effects of pausing collection on these outcomes. The IV point estimates for these outcomes
are generally similar to the OLS point estimates, but larger standard errors from the IV
approach eliminate any statistical significance.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the
collections process. Section 2.3 outlines our data and sample frame. Section 2.4 describes our
identification strategy and research design. Section 2.5 presents the results, and Section 2.6
concludes.
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2.2 The collections process
2.2.1 Delinquency designation
The IRS sends taxpayers who fail to file or to remit their known tax liability a bill
notifying the taxpayer of their outstanding debt.3 These notices are the beginning of the
collection process.4 Some taxpayers contact the IRS after receiving a notice in order to pay
off some or all of the debt, to dispute it, or to explain that they are unable to pay. The IRS
may negotiate an installment agreement or extend the due date for a taxpayer, depending
on the taxpayer’s circumstances. A small fraction of taxpayers settle their outstanding tax
debt for less than the amount they owe through the Offer in Compromise (OIC) program or
through “partial pay” installment agreements.5
When taxpayers do not respond to the initial (or subsequent) notices, their accounts are
considered delinquent. At the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2017,6 there were approximately 14
million delinquent accounts with a total of over $131 billion owed in taxes, penalties, and
interest (Internal Revenue Service (2017), Table 16). Delinquent accounts may be handled
either by a call site (via the Automated Collection System (ACS)) or by a field office. In the
first case, ACS personnel will try to contact the taxpayer by correspondence and by phone to
negotiate a payment solution.7 In the second case, a Revenue Officer from a local collection
field office will work with the taxpayer to try to resolve the outstanding debt. Cases that are
assigned to ACS may ultimately be transferred to a field office if its attempts to resolve the
debt are unsuccessful.
2.2.2 Revenue Officer assignment
Our understanding of the process by which cases are assigned to Revenue Officers is
based on the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM), which specifies IRS administrative procedures,
as well as discussions with two group managers and a former Revenue Officer. These
conversations highlighted that many factors play a role in case assignment, including some
3Third-party information reports provide information on the income of taxpayers who fail to file.
4This process is outlined at https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/the-collection-process and in Appendix B.1.
5In 2017, taxpayers made about 62,000 Offers in Compromise, of which the IRS accepted only 25,000
(Internal Revenue Service (2017), Table 16). These 62,000 offers are less than one half of one percent of all
delinquent cases at the beginning of 2017. One condition of the IRS accepting less than the outstanding tax
liability is that the taxpayer must remain compliant. “Partial pay” installment agreements occur when the
taxpayer reaches an installment agreement with the IRS where the 10-year statute of limitations will run out
on some of the debt before the taxpayer remits it. After the statute of limitations expires, the taxpayer is no
longer responsible for the debt.
6The fiscal year for the IRS is the same as the United States federal government: Oct. 1 - Sept. 30.
7The IRS does not contact taxpayers by phone without first attempting to contact them by mail. See
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/phony-irs-calls-increase-during-filing-season.
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based on professional judgment, despite the fact that the Internal Revenue Manual (1.4.50.10
9) explicitly states that “[p]rofessional judgment should play a limited role in case selection.”
A delinquent case is assigned to the local collection field office geographically closest to the
taxpayer. The group manager of the office then assigns the case to a Revenue Officer. The
first factor in case assignment is the grade of the case (9, 11, 12, or 13), which reflects the
expected difficulty of closing the case. The case’s priority is another factor in case assignment.
Group managers are required to assign high priority cases before lower priority cases. High
priority cases include those with particularly high balances, or where the statute of limitations
for the debt is about to run out. Revenue Officers are more likely to receive new cases in zip
codes where they already have active cases.8 The group manager also has access to other
aspects of the case that may impact assignment. These include the taxpayer’s history of
interacting with the IRS and factors influencing how likely the individual will be able to
remit the debt (e.g., older taxpayers have fewer working years ahead of them and therefore
may have lower potential earnings).
Case assignment also depends on the General Schedule (GS) grade of the Revenue Officer
and the current inventory of the Revenue Officer.9 Generally speaking, grade 09 cases are
assigned to GS grade 09 Revenue Officers, grade 11 cases are assigned to GS grade 11 Revenue
Officers, and so on. Revenue Officers with fewer workload-adjusted cases in their current
inventories are more likely to receive new cases. Average caseload varies with GS grade.
GS grade 09 Revenue Officers have an average case inventory of 72 cases. For GS grade 11
Revenue Officers, the average inventory is 61 cases. GS grade 12 and 13 Revenue Officers
have average caseloads of 39 and 37 cases, respectively.
Once a case is assigned to a Revenue Officer, the Revenue Officer contacts the taxpayer,
conducts research to ascertain the taxpayer’s ability to make payments toward their
outstanding debt, and takes steps to close the case. Depending on IRS guidelines and
the Revenue Officer’s judgement, possible steps range from seizures, liens, and levies to
full payments, agreements in which the taxpayer will repay the debt in installments, and
designating the case CNC, which suspends collection efforts. More than two-thirds of cases
close through full payment, an installment agreement, or a CNC designation, as Table 2.1
shows. Cases may be deemed CNC for a variety of reasons, including hardship and inability
to locate the taxpayer. In some cases, a taxpayer may pay off some portion of their debt and
8Instances when professional judgment is appropriate in case selection include efficiently allocating the
resources of the Service (e.g., geographically clustering cases to minimize Revenue Officer driving time) and
addressing “the developmental needs of the Revenue Officer” (i.e., making sure the officer is exposed to a
variety of case types to develop expertise in order to meet standards for promotion).
9The General Schedule (GS) Pay Scale is a wage schedule for federal employees. Revenue Officers may
have a GS grade of 05, 07, 09, 11, 12, or 13. Grades 05 and 07 are related to training. Starting in 2017, the
IRS discontinued use of the GS 09 grade for Revenue Officers.
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the remaining debt may be deemed CNC, for example, due to hardship.
Table 2.1: Distribution of how cases were closed
Description Number of cases Percent of cases
Installment agreement 49,041 34.1%
CNC 43,783 30.5%
Other 40,396 28.1%
Full pay 10,443 7.3%
Total 123,396 100.0%
Notes: Includes all cases that meet our sample restriction criteria
(discussed in Section 2.3) between November 2014 and December 2018.
Other ways a case might be closed include Offers in Compromise,
abatement, payment tracer (which resolves situations of missing and
misapplied payment issues), and being flagged for handling outside of
the usual system and procedures.
2.2.3 Currently Not Collectible (CNC)
The vast majority of CNC cases for individual taxpayers are either “hardship” (49%) or
“unable to locate” (39%). Per the Internal Revenue Manual, “[a] hardship exists if a taxpayer
is unable to pay reasonable basic living expenses” (IRM 5.16.1.2.9(1)). Outstanding tax
liability that is designated CNC is still legally owed to the United States government.10 When
a taxpayer’s debt is deemed CNC, the IRS sends the taxpayer a letter notifying them of the
change in status and reminding them that the taxpayer must pay future tax liability. Changes
in the taxpayer’s circumstances may cause the IRS to re-evaluate whether a CNC designation
is appropriate.11 For example, when taxpayers with unpaid tax that is designated CNC file
returns, the designation may be rescinded if the taxpayer’s income becomes sufficiently large.
Interest and penalties continue to accrue on the outstanding balance while collection efforts
are suspended. If the taxpayer is owed a refund on a future tax return, the IRS will retain
the refund to offset the tax debt in CNC status. Even if a taxpayer has outstanding tax debt
in CNC status, new unpaid tax undergoes the notification process described in Section 2.2.1.
A priori reasoning does not lead to clear predictions about the direction of changes in tax
compliance behavior by those whose debt is designated CNC. A CNC designation suspends
10The statute of limitations on unremitted debt is ten years, after which the IRS may no longer pursue
the debt.
11Receipt of future returns from the taxpayer automatically initiates a review to see whether the taxpayer’s
circumstances have changed (e.g., a change in address, income, a new levy source). If there has been a change,
the case can be re-activated and the CNC status may be revoked. When this happens, the case will either be
sent back to ACS or directly to a group manager’s queue. The taxpayer is not directly informed that their
case has been re-activated, but the taxpayer may receive, e.g., a letter from ACS or a notice of a levy, which
would indicate that the IRS has resumed pursuit of the outstanding balance.
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efforts to collect some or all outstanding tax debt, such as attempts to garnish wages and
assets, and thereby reduces the incentive for the taxpayer to voluntarily repay outstanding
debt. In addition, a CNC designation signals that the IRS can be lenient, and might lead the
taxpayer to conclude that future noncompliance will also be met with leniency. This reduction
in the expected costs of noncompliance has a negative effect on compliance. In contrast,
maintaining a CNC designation requires that a taxpayer comply with the requirements to
file tax returns and remit tax payments for new tax years liability. Failure to comply with
these requirements leads to the resumption of active collection, resulting in a positive effect
on compliance from a CNC designation.
The effect of a CNC designation on the incentive to earn income is also theoretically
unclear. Having some or all tax debt designated CNC provides a positive wealth effect,
as it reduces the expected present value of tax liability. A permanent CNC designation
would reduce the taxpayers expected tax rate, because future earnings and assets will not
be garnished to meet the tax debt. However, a CNC designation is not permanent (unless
the 10-year statute of limitations is reached), and the IRS retains the right, if the taxpayers
financial situation improves sufficiently, to put the debt back in active collection status. Thus,
a taxpayer may perceive that his or her marginal tax rate is reduced by the CNC designation
for future incomes up to some unknown level that triggers the CNC status revocation, above
which the marginal tax rate absent the CNC designation is restored. The combination of a
negative effect on future earnings from the wealth effect and a generally positive substitution
effect means that the net effect on earnings is of indeterminate sign.
Consequently, both the magnitude and the sign of the impact of a CNC designation on
future behavior can only be determined via empirical analysis. We turn next to this task.
2.3 Data and sample frame
To assess the effects of decisions made during the collection process, we combine
information from the collection case management system with caseload information about
Revenue Officers and administrative taxpayer information, including a history of filing status
(i.e., whether or not the taxpayer filed a return), monthly data on unpaid tax liability, and
information from individual tax returns. Data on Revenue Officers include their GS grades,
inventory levels at the end of each month, and their decisions in past collection cases. We
supplement the taxpayer data with information about local allowable living expenses and
whether they live in an urban or rural area.12
We focus on individual taxpayer cases and therefore exclude business entities other than
12Appendix B.2 explains the construction of these variables and the outcome variables in detail.
53
sole proprietorships. We begin with about 283,000 individual taxpayer cases. Approximately
123,000 taxpayers remain after excluding cases where we suspect case assignment may not
have been random,13 cases designated CNC because the Revenue Officer was unable to locate
the taxpayer, and cases worked by Revenue Officers who handled fewer than 20 cases between
November 2014 and December 2018.14 We perform this final exclusion to ensure that we
observe sufficient decisions made by each Revenue Officer to obtain a reliable estimate of
their tendency to designate a case CNC. Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of the number of
cases closed by a Revenue Officer between November 2014 and December 2018. Out of 4,808
Revenue Officers included, 2,345 (49%) meet our sample restriction criteria.
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Notes: 4, 808. Includes all Revenue Officers that meet our sample
restriction criteria between November 2014 and December 2018.
2.3.1 Field data
To assemble our sample for analysis, we begin with the universe of cases with an assessed
balance due assigned to a field collection Revenue Officer between November 2014 and
December 2018. The data include the numeric ID of the Revenue Officer who worked each
13We discuss situations when case assignment may not be random in Section 2.3.1.
14The mean (standard deviation) fraction of cases designated CNC is 0.24 (0.24) among Revenue Officers
who worked fewer than 20 that meet our selection criteria, and 0.30 (0.12) among Revenue Officers who
worked at least 20 cases that meet our selection criteria. As a robustness check, we repeat our analysis using
alternative cut-offs of 10 cases and 30 cases, and the results are qualitatively unchanged. Appendix B.3 shows
the IV results for cut-offs of 10, 20, and 30 cases.
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case, the date the case was assigned to field, the date the case was assigned to the Revenue
Officer, and the date the case was closed. We drop cases where it appears that the Revenue
Officer reported working zero hours, cases that were not closed, cases where the taxpayer
lives outside of the United States or on a military base, and cases flagged as handled outside
the usual system and procedures. Because we are ultimately interested in the impact of a
CNC designation on future outcomes, we drop cases designated CNC because the Revenue
Officer was unable to locate the taxpayer.
In addition, we exclude certain categories of cases in which the Revenue Officer’s manager
might exercise deliberate discretion in the assignment process. These categories were identified
based on interviews about the case assignment process with field collection group managers
and an individual who worked for several years as a Revenue Officer. Cases where the
statute of limitations is close to expiration are dropped,15 as these cases may be assigned
to a Revenue Officer who works quickly. We use only the first time we observe a case being
assigned within a given group, which eliminates cases where there is already an existing
case involving the same taxpayer. New cases in a group manager’s queue that involve the
relevant taxpayer in an ongoing case are usually assigned to the Revenue Officer working the
existing case. This also removes cases that have been returned to the group’s queue. The
group manager is better able to anticipate the type of work the case will require when cases
return to the group’s queue, particularly if the case is an installment agreement default or a
review of a previous CNC decision, which may influence the assignment decision.16 Finally,
we exclude cases that are reassigned to a different Revenue Officer within the group (or in
a different group), as reassignment may reflect unobserved characteristics of the case. In
contrast, the group manager assigns cases that the group has not seen before on the basis of
limited information about the case and the group’s Revenue Officers that is observable in
administrative databases.
2.3.2 Revenue Officer data
The Revenue Officer data includes monthly-level information about factors used to
determine the workload to assign to the Revenue Officer, including the Revenue Officer’s
GS grade, monthly inventory and inventory by case grade, and the fraction of the Revenue
Officer’s case load that is above their GS grade level. We match this data to the field data
using the Revenue Officer id number and relevant month: if a case in the field data was
15We consider the statute of limitations close to expiration if the expiration date is within a year.
16As is standard in literature using examiner assignment to identify causal estimates, we do not exclude
individuals who appear more than once in our data but are assigned to a different local IRS office, or “group,”
who, because they are in a different location, may not have a previous history with the taxpayer. Less than
3% of our sample appear in the data more than once.
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assigned to a Revenue Officer in, e.g., May 2017, we match the Revenue Officer’s information
from the previous month.
We make two additional exclusions from the data based on the Revenue Officer data.
First, we exclude Revenue Officers whose GS grade is listed 5 or 7, which are training grades.
Second, we exclude group-month combinations when only a single Revenue Officer in the
group is assigned any cases. This second exclusion is necessary because there will be no
variation in proclivity to designate a case CNC in that group during that month.
2.3.3 Taxpayer data
Our taxpayer panel spans January 2009 to December 2018. This panel contains the
taxpayer’s year of birth, outstanding tax debt and payments, information from annual
tax returns, and information about the taxpayer’s and spouse’s income from third-party
information reports. We measure behavior at the level of the taxpaying unit, combining the
third-party-reported values for the taxpayer and, if the taxpayer filed a joint tax return in
the year the case closed, the spouse listed on that return. The measures of tax compliance
we construct are payments toward outstanding tax debt, payments toward current-year tax
liability (including withholding from wages reported on Form W-2, quarterly estimated tax
payments, and payments remitted with the tax return), an indicator for remitting all of
the current year’s tax liability, and an indicator for filing a return conditional on having
third-party-reported wages. Our measures of income are adjusted gross income, total W-2
wages, W-2 wages broken out by whether the taxpayer or their spouse was the earner, and
self-employment income. We take the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of each of our
measures of income. We then merge this panel with the field and Revenue Officer data
described above.
2.4 Identification strategy
The fundamental challenge in assessing the causal effect of a CNC designation on taxpayer
outcomes is disentangling the effect of the CNC designation from the effects of the hardships
that might lead to such a designation. For example, a sole proprietorship might become
unprofitable, fail to pay taxes on the prior year’s income, and then close, leaving the
proprietor with substantial tax debt and little income. In this example, determining the effect
of a subsequent CNC designation is complicated by the effect of the business failure itself.
Taxpayers whose cases are designated CNC face substantially larger decreases in adjusted
gross income in the years leading up to their cases being closed (shown in Figure 2.2). This
means that taxpayers whose cases are not designated CNC are, as a whole, a poor comparison
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Figure 2.2: IHS(adjusted gross income) over time (relative to year case closed)
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Notes: N = 138,452. Panel (a) shows the mean of the inverse hyperbolic sine (a transformation similar to
the natural logarithm) of adjusted gross income over time across two subgroups: tax units whose cases were
designated CNC in dashed red and tax units whose cases were not designated CNC in solid blue. The x-axis
indicates the year relative to when each case closed, e.g., −1 is the year before the taxpayer’s case closed.
Panel (b) shows cumulative percentage changes in this measure relative to the value three years before the
case closed. Adjusted gross income adjusted for inflation to 2017 values.
group for taxpayers receiving a CNC designation.
We first attempt to address this sample selection issue with an instrumental variable. As
described in Section 2.4.1, we use variation in the propensity of the Revenue Officer assigned
to a case to designate other cases CNC as an instrument for CNC designation. We test
the exogeneity of this instrument by examining whether pre-treatment characteristics are
balanced across cases with high and low values of the instrument. We find that even when
using the instrument, some imbalance remains. We address this remaining imbalance and
related concerns about instrument exogeneity with a difference-in-differences instrumental
variables approach, discussed in Section 2.4.2.
2.4.1 Source of variation and instrument
Variation in CNC status across otherwise similar cases comes from randomness in which
Revenue Officer is assigned to a case, combined with differences in Revenue Officers’ propensity
to designate cases CNC. An intuitive method for estimating Revenue Officer j’s propensity
to designate cases CNC would be to determine what proportion of cases Revenue Officer j
designated CNC. Simply using this measure to predict whether Revenue Officer j designated
case i as CNC would be biased, however, since case i would have been included in the
calculation. To avoid this bias, we construct a case-specific instrument using a “leave-one-out”
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k=1 CNCkj − CNCij
nj − 1
. (2.4.1)
The numerator of this expression is the number of cases designated CNC by Revenue Officer
j, less one if case i was designated CNC (i.e., CNCij = 1). The denominator is the total
number of cases handled by Revenue Officer j less one.
As described previously, case assignment is not always random. Cases are assigned to
Revenue Officers based on case grade, case priority, taxpayer characteristics, and geographic
considerations. For example, if higher grade cases are less likely to receive a CNC designation,
then failing to control for case grade and Revenue Officer grade would make it seem like
higher GS grade Revenue Officers were stricter. We follow Dobbie et al. (2018) and develop a
residualized leave-one-out measure of the propensity to designate a case CNC that removes
variation from our instrument that is driven by observable determinants of case assignment
that may also impact CNC designation. As a result, our instrument is a measure of the
Revenue Officer’s tendencies rather than features of the case that may be correlated with
a CNC designation. We discuss the empirical importance of residualization and potential
pitfalls in Section 2.4.1.1.
We calculate the residualized leave-one-out instrument as follows. First, we regress true
CNC status for each case on Revenue Officer and case characteristics that may impact case
assignment:
CNCij = β0 + βX ij + ui, (2.4.2)
where X ij includes an indicator for whether or not the case is high priority, case grade fixed
effects, and case characteristics (the taxpayer’s year of birth, estimated ability to pay,18 an
indicator of whether the taxpayer has had their case “in the field” since 2009, and indicator
variables for whether the oldest debt associated with the case is more than 12 months old or
more than 36 months old.)19
We include fixed effects for the group of the assigned Revenue Officer.20 To see why this
17This method is used in, e.g., Doyle, Jr. (2007), Doyle, Jr. (2008); Maestas et al. (2013); Dobbie and Song
(2015); Dobbie et al. (2017). Other approaches to eliminating this bias include Jackknife IV (Angrist et al.,
1999), split-sample two-stage IV (Angrist and Krueger, 1995), and limited-information maximum likelihood.
18“Estimated ability to pay’ is the ratio of an estimated future income based on their previous adjusted
gross income and age, and their outstanding balance with the IRS.
19Appendix B.2 explains how we derived the specific variables used in our analysis and provides sample
statistics by CNC status.
20Groups are assigned cases from particular ZIP Codes in their local area. We are unable to control
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might matter, consider two groups. Group A works cases in affluent Township A whereas
Group B works cases in low-income Village B. We might expect that the cases in Village B
are more likely to face a true financial hardship, and therefore more likely be given a CNC
designation. We want to make sure the residual propensity to designate a case CNC reflects
characteristics of the Revenue Officer rather than characteristics of the taxpayers who live
where the Revenue Officer’s cases take place. We also control for two relevant geographic
variables: allowable living expenses and an urban indicator. In robustness checks we include
total inventory and case grade by Revenue Officer GS grade fixed effects, which does not
qualitatively change the results.
We then use the results of estimating Equation 2.4.2 to predict CNC status:
ĈNCij = β̂0 + β̂X ij, (2.4.3)
and calculate the residual value of CNCRi by subtracting ĈNCij from CNCi:
CNCRij = CNCij − ĈNCij. (2.4.4)
The case-specific, residualized leave-one-out measure of Revenue Officer j’s propensity to








The numerator of this expression is equal to the sum of the residualized CNC designation
for all cases covered by Revenue Officer j less the residualized CNC designation for case i.
The denominator is equal to the total number of cases handled by Revenue Officer j less one.
Intuitively, this measure indicates Revenue Officer j’s residual propensity to designate cases
as CNC (excluding case i), holding constant observed characteristics of the case. Conditional
on observable characteristics and assuming conditional random assignment, ZRij should be
correlated with the decision in case i only if Revenue Officer j has a threshold level of leniency
specific to case i.
The distributions of the simple leave-one-out instrument, ZSij, and the residualized
leave-one-out instrument, ZRij , are different; crucially, the distribution of the residualized
instrument is less dispersed. Our residualized leave-one-out instrument has an average value
of 0.0002 and a standard deviation of 0.0826, while the simple leave-one-out instrument has
a mean of 0.3024 and a standard deviation of 0.1119. This is illustrated in Figure 2.3, where
directly for ZIP Code fixed effects because there are two few cases per zip code.
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of the fraction of cases designated CNC by Revenue Officer
(a) Distribution of the fraction of cases
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(b) Adjusted distribution of the fraction of cases
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Notes: Unique at the Revenue Officer level (N = 2, 345). Constructed using all cases closed by Revenue
Officers between November 2014 and December 2018 who closed at least 20 cases that meet our sample
restriction criteria during that time period. Panel (a) shows the fraction ZS∗ij of cases designated CNC by
each Revenue Officer, where ZS∗ij is defined in Equation 2.4.6. Panel (b) shows the adjusted fraction R
S∗
ij of
cases designated CNC after accounting for residualization, as defined in Equation 2.4.7.
Panel (a) shows how much more variation there is in the value of the simple leave-one-out
instrument compared to the residualized leave-one-out instrument in Panel (b). The figure
plots a slightly adjusted version of the instrument to include each Revenue Officer only once.21
2.4.1.1 Tests of instrument exogeneity
Using Revenue Officer assignment to instrument for CNC status relies on the assumption
that Revenue Officer assignment is uncorrelated with future outcomes, conditional on included
covariates. This assumption allows for assignment of Revenue Officers based on certain







ZS∗j is equivalent to Z
S
ij (calculated in Equation 2.4.1) without omitting case i. Similarly, Panel (b) shows
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CNCRkj to facilitate a visual comparison: the resulting object has the same mean as
true CNC status, as is illustrated by the vertical lines in the figure.
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observable characteristics (such as case grade) but, once those observable characteristics
are controlled for, Revenue Officer assignment should be random. As mentioned previously,
group managers are explicitly instructed that “[p]rofessional judgment should play a limited
role in case selection” (IRM 1.4.50.10 9).
Our discussions with group managers underlined certain aspects of cases that might
result in group manager professional expertise playing a larger role in case assignment. Some
of these factors are not included in the case data and therefore cannot be included in the
creation of our instrument, raising the concern that the instrument may not be uncorrelated
with future outcomes. We test whether Revenue Officer assignment is conditionally random
by comparing pre-assignment case and taxpayer characteristics across Revenue Officers with
high and low values of the instrument. We regress pre-assignment characteristics on, in turn,
an indicator for CNC designation, the simple instrument (ZSij, defined in Equation 2.4.1),
and the residualized instrument (ZRij , defined in Equation 2.4.5), following Equation 2.4.8:
Yi = η0 + ηZi + ui, (2.4.8)
where Yi is the pre-assignment outcome for taxpayer i and Zi is the value of the relevant
CNC indicator or instrument.
We test for balance using five pre-assignment characteristics of the case:22 model score
(an estimate of how likely the taxpayer is to remit their outstanding liability), the taxpayer’s
average wages (from Forms W-2 provided by employers), an indicator for whether the taxpayer
filed a return in the year before their case was assigned to a Revenue Officer, and, if the
taxpayer did file a return, the adjusted gross income reported.23 We transform W-2 wages
and adjusted gross income by taking the inverse hyperbolic sine, which can be interpreted
like a log transformation and enables us to include non-positive values.
As one would expect, cases that were designated not collectible had lower model scores
(indicating a lower estimated probability of collection), lower wages, lower adjusted gross
income, and were less likely to file before assignment. These associations, shown in Table 2.2,
are statistically significant at the 0.1% level.
The simple leave-one-out average of Revenue Officer CNC designations does not solve our
22We cannot use the variables included in the creation of our residualized leave-one-out instrument, all of
which were chosen based on our reading of the Internal Revenue Manual and our conversations with group
managers and an ex-Revenue Officer.
23One potential concern arises with using average adjusted gross income to calculate our estimate of the
taxpayer’s ability to pay off their balance, one of the variables used in the residualization process. This
means that adjusted gross income appears on both the left- and right-hand sides of the regression for two of
our balance tests. Any bias this step in the residualization might introduce is of minimal concern because
the coefficient on these outcomes is statistically insignificant regardless of whether or not we residualize the
instrument.
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OLS -0.065∗∗∗ -1.913∗∗∗ -1.505∗∗∗ -2.096∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗∗
SE (0.001) (0.037) (0.030) (0.037) (0.003)
F-stat 2,263.104 2,744.591 2,527.897 3,264.277 2,369.145
IV (Simple) -0.161∗∗∗ -2.057∗∗∗ -1.245∗∗∗ -1.727∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗
SE (0.012) (0.225) (0.240) (0.265) (0.018)
F-stat 188.746 83.554 26.858 42.613 89.157
IV (Resid.) -0.033∗ -0.822∗∗ -0.372 -0.569∗ -0.040
SE (0.014) (0.274) (0.224) (0.256) (0.024)
F-stat 5.679 9.022 2.767 4.925 2.853
N 91,112 120,753 117,289 116,803 120,754
Notes: Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the Revenue Officer level. Includes all cases that
meet our sample restriction criteria between November 2014 and December 2018. Limited to cases worked by
Revenue Officers who closed at least 20 cases that met our sample restriction criteria between November
2014 and December 2018. Variables are defined in Appendix B.2. Values for average wages, average adjusted
gross income, and and adjusted gross income in the year before case assignment are given using the inverse
hyperbolic sine transformation. We measure adjusted gross income and W-2 wages at the level of the
taxpaying unit: if a taxpayer filed a joint tax return during the year in which their case was closed, we add
the value for the taxpayer’s spouse to the taxpayer’s own value. If the taxpayer did not file a joint tax return
in that year, the outcome value is equal to the value for the taxpayer alone.
*** Significant at the 0.1% level; ** significant at the 1% level; * significant at the 5% level.
sample selection problem. All of the coefficients continue to be significant at the 0.1% level,
and the magnitude of the coefficients hardly change (the exception being the coefficient on
model score, for which the magnitude of the coefficient increased substantially).
The residualized Revenue Officer instrument reduces the imbalance but does not fully
correct it. The magnitudes of the coefficients for all five pre-treatment characteristics shrink
considerably. The coefficients between the residualized instrument and model score, and
between the residualized instrument and pre-assignment adjusted gross income, are only
statistically significant at the 5% level. The coefficient between the residualized instrument
and average wages is statistically significant at the 1% level. While any violation of the
exclusion restriction is cause for concern, these coefficients are small in economic terms.
Assignment to a Revenue Officer whose value of the instrument is one standard deviation
higher is associated with a model score that is, on average, 0.0027 lower, 6.7% lower wages,
and 4.7% lower adjusted gross income.24 As the signs of the correlations with the residualized
24The standard deviation of our residualized instrument is 0.082 and the coefficient on average wages in
the balance test is −0.822: −0.822 x 0.082 = −0.067 log points, about 6.7%. Similarly, the coefficient on
adjusted gross income before assignment is −0.569 (−0.569 x 0.082 = −0.047), and the coefficient on model
score is −0.033 (−0.033 x 0.082 = −0.0027).
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instrument are the same as the signs of the correlations with CNC status, one would expect
any bias in the IV results to be toward the OLS estimates. Concerns about the remaining
imbalance motivate our use of the difference-in-differences instrumental variables design
detailed in Section 2.4.2.
2.4.2 Difference-in-differences instrumental variables design
We employ a difference-in-differences specification in which we instrument for CNC status
with the residualized Revenue Officer assignment instrument.25 We adopt the event-study
version of difference-in-differences, where coefficients on treatment are estimated separately






ij + γkX it + δk] + ζi + ηit, (2.4.9)
where CNCit is equal to one if the case is ever designated CNC and zero otherwise,
26 k
indexes years relative to case closing, ZRij is the residualized Revenue Officer instrument, X it
are case-specific variables that may influence Revenue Officer assignment, and ηit is the error
term. This equation instruments for CNC status with the Revenue Officer instrument on a
per-period basis, producing one instrument and one instrumented value of CNC for each year
relative to case closing.
Table 2.3: First stage results
(1)
Residualized Revenue Officer instrument 0.509∗∗∗
(0.018)
Controls * Year FE Yes
N 936,839
F-Statistic 756
Notes: Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the Revenue Officer level. Includes all cases that
meet our sample restriction criteria between November 2014 and December 2018. Limited to cases worked by
Revenue Officers who closed at least 20 cases that met our sample restriction criteria between November
2014 and December 2018. Descriptions of the outcome variables and variables included in residualization
are included in Appendix B.2. Controls include a high priority indicator, case grade fixed effects, an urban
indicator, an estimate of ability to pay, year of birth, an indicator for previously assigned to field, indicators
for debt older than 12 and 36 months, and group fixed effects, all of which are interacted with a full set of
indicators for year relative to case closing.
*** Significant at the 0.1% level; ** significant at the 1% level; * significant at the 5% level.
25This approach is similar in spirit to, among others, Duflo (2001).
26While CNCit is not time varying, the continuous predicted value we construct, ĈNCit, can vary by
time within i due to the effect of changes in X it.
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To generate our estimates of the effect of suspending tax debt collection due to hardship,




1(t = k)[πkCNCit + θkX it + µk] + κi + εit, (2.4.10)
where Yit is the outcome variable, µk are event-time fixed effects, and εit is the error term. We
replace CNCit with the predicted values ĈNCit from Equation 2.4.9. The resulting second




1(t = k)[φkĈNCit + τkX it + νk] + ιi + eit. (2.4.11)
This design relaxes the instrumental variables conditional exogeneity assumption, replacing
it with exogeneity conditional on case and event-year fixed effects and interactions between
the pre-treatment control variables and event-year fixed effects. While relying on this weaker
assumption has the potential to address the imbalances described above in Section 2.4.1.1
(which invalidate the simple instrumental variables assumption), there is no guarantee that
we are able to control for all of the time-varying factors associated with the instrument that
could affect the outcome. We test whether this alternative exogeneity assumption holds by
including periods before case closing in our regressions. If the assumption holds, coefficients
on the instrumented value of CNC should be zero before case closing. While this test is
informative, it cannot guarantee that similar relationships would have held after case closing
absent CNC status.27,28
27Another possible violation of the conditional exogeneity assumption would occur if Revenue Officers
who are more or less lenient in their propensity to designate cases CNC also systematically differ in their
approach to cases in other ways, for example in their attempts to collect tax debts prior to making a CNC
determination. Such differences would likely arise prior to case closing, so our test of trends before closing is
also informative about this potential confounding treatment.
28The additional assumptions in an instrumental variables specification are relevance, monotonicity, and
the exclusion restriction. Relevance means that Revenue Officer assignment must be correlated with CNC
designation (formally, Cov[CNCij , Zij ] 6= 0). The correlation between CNC status and the residualized
leave-one-out instrument is 0.1702. In our setting, monotonicity means that cases designated CNC by
low-propensity (high-σj) Revenue Officers would always have also been designated CNC by high-propensity
(low-σj) Revenue Officers. Similarly, cases that were not deemed CNC by high-propensity (low-σj) Revenue
Officers would also not have been deemed CNC by high-propensity (low-σj) Revenue Officers. This assumption
would be violated if, e.g., some Revenue Officers were more likely to designate cases as CNC if the taxpayers
were older, while some Revenue Officers were more inclined to designate cases as CNC if the taxpayer were
younger. Finally, the exclusion restriction means Revenue Officer propensity to designate a case CNC must
only affect taxpayer outcomes through the variation in having a case designated CNC, that is, Cov[Zi, hi] = 0.
This assumption would be violated if Revenue Officer propensity to designate a case CNC is correlated with
unobservable determinants of future taxpayer outcomes. This assumption is also violated if Revenue Officer
propensity to designate a case CNC impacts future taxpayer outcomes through means other than CNC
designation (e.g., if Revenue Officers that are more willing to deem a case CNC are also more likely to provide
information to help a taxpayer avoid being in this situation in the future, or make more intense attempts to
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2.5 Effects of Suspending Tax Debt Collection Due to
Hardship
We next consider how suspending tax debt collection affects measures of taxpayer
compliance and income. We measure behavior at the level of the taxpaying unit: if a
taxpayer filed a joint tax return during the year in which their case was closed, we add the
value for the taxpayer’s spouse to the taxpayer’s own value. If the taxpayer did not file a
joint tax return in that year, the outcome value is equal to the value for the taxpayer alone.
We show the results from both an uninstrumented difference-in-differences regression
and from difference-in-differences regressions instrumenting for treatment with the Revenue
Officer instrument. We include cases worked by Revenue Officers who closed at least 20 cases
during our sample period.29 The IV difference-in-difference results show the effect of a CNC
designation on cases for which the CNC designation hinged on the Revenue Officer assigned.
Despite a strong first-stage relationship between the Revenue Officer instrument and CNC
status, these estimates are far less precise than simple difference-in-difference results because
only a fraction of cases hinge on the instrument, removing much of the effective sample size.
We set the year before the year in which the case closed as Year 0. Coefficients are
reported relative to Year 0. This ensures that all behavioral changes due to CNC status
are properly included in the post period. For example, if a case closed in January of Year
T, it may impact whether the taxpayer filed their Year T-1 tax return by April of Year T.
One consequence of this approach is that behavioral responses may appear delayed: if a case
closes in December, only a small fraction of Year 1 is post-case closing, and the first full year
in which CNC status can affect behavior is Year 2.
We estimate effects for years from two years before Year 0 (Year -2) to four years after
Year 0 (Year 4). Years -2 and -1 allow us to visually assess whether or not the parallel
trends assumption holds before treatment. Coefficients in the years before treatment are not
statistically significant, except for in Year -1 for two related outcomes discussed in Section
2.5.1.2 below.
collect unpaid tax before designating a case CNC). Although the exclusion restriction is ultimately untestable,
it is reasonable to assume that Revenue Officers are not systematically differentially interacting with taxpayers
whose cases they may or may not ultimately designate CNC.
29There is a critical trade-off in choosing this threshold. As shown in Figure 2.1, the number of Revenue
Officers excluded from our analysis quickly increases as we raise the case count threshold. This reduction in
sample size reduces the power of the estimates. Lowering the case count threshold means that we include
Revenue Officers for whom we have a less precise measure of their latent tendency to designate cases CNC.
Results are similar if we use alternative case count thresholds of 10 or 30 cases, though standard errors are
slightly different.
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2.5.1 Effects on compliance
If taxpayers whose cases are deemed CNC come to believe that their tax compliance is
subject to less scrutiny than they had previously thought, they may be less compliant in
the future. This reduced compliance could take the form of reduced payments to the IRS,
or a lower probability of filing a tax return. On the other hand, if taxpayers try to avoid
jeopardizing their CNC status and triggering renewed attempts to collect, they may be more
compliant in the future.
In this section, we show the effect on marginal cases of a CNC designation for three
measures of compliance: payments toward outstanding tax debt (i.e., the debt that caused
the taxpayer’s case to be assigned to a Revenue Officer), payments toward the current tax
year’s tax liability, and whether or not the taxpayer filed a return conditional on receiving
W-2 wages. We find that a CNC designation leads to increased withholding from wages, but
has no discernible effect on other, more voluntary payments to the IRS for either past or
current tax liability and no effect on tax filing.
2.5.1.1 Payments toward outstanding tax debt
Figure 2.4 shows changes in the dollar value of payments against outstanding tax debt
made by taxpayers whose cases are designated CNC compared to taxpayers whose cases are
not.30 A standard difference-in-differences regression implies that payments from taxpayers
whose cases are designated CNC fall substantially relative to other taxpayers with a decline
that is largest in Year 2 before recovering partially. The IV regression results display a similar
pattern in their point estimates but have 95% confidence intervals that include zero in each
year, and are thus uninformative about whether payments towards outstanding tax debt
decline following a CNC designation.
2.5.1.2 Payments toward current tax liability
Next, we consider the dollar value of various payments toward the current year’s tax
liability: withholding from wages, quarterly estimated tax payments, and remittances
submitted with a tax return.
Figure 2.5 shows that a CNC designation results in a substantial increase in withholding
from wages reported on Form W-2, which peaks at around $30,000 three years after the
case closed. This point estimate and the slightly smaller point estimate four years after
the case closed are both statistically significant, with 95% confidence intervals that exclude
zero. Income tax withheld from wages on Forms W-2 dips considerably in Year 0 relative to
30This measure does not include payments against tax debt accrued after the case closed.
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Notes: Number of cases is 139,246 for difference-in-differences and 121,923 for the IV specification. Includes
cases worked by all Revenue Officers that meet our sample restriction criteria between November 2014 and
December 2018. Coefficients are shown in thousands. Payment values adjusted for inflation to 2017 values.
both the years before and after, which is puzzling given that there is not a corresponding
decrease in W-2 wages (see Section 2.5.2.2) or in the likelihood that the taxpayer or their
spouse receives a W-2. This dip, which results in a statistically significant positive effect on
withholding in the year before the case closed, is a concern for the validity of the identification
strategy for the W-2 withholding estimates.
In contrast, there is no effect on either quarterly estimated tax payments or remittances
with returns, with relatively tight confidence intervals in the post periods that exclude changes
of more than a few thousand dollars in the quarterly estimated tax payments and of more
than a few tens of dollars in the remittances with returns.
We also consider whether or not the taxpayer fully paid the current year’s tax liability.
Figure 2.6 shows the instrumented effect of a CNC designation on the probability taxpayers
remit their entire tax liability for a given year. As with W-2 withholding, which is one
substantial input into whether the taxpayer paid in full, the coefficient in Year -1 is positive
and statistically significant, raising concerns about the validity of the estimation strategy.
After treatment, there is no statistically significant effect, though the standard errors are
large, and a ten percentage point change is often within the 95% confidence intervals.
2.5.1.3 Filing tax returns
We also study the effect of a CNC designation on tax compliance as measured by filing a
tax return. Taxpayers whose cases are assigned to the field for collection often have incomes
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Notes: Number of cases is 139,246 for W-2 withholding difference-in-differences and 121,923 for the IV
specification, 139,246 and 121,923 for quarterly estimated tax payments, and 139,246 and 121,923 for
remittances with returns. Includes cases worked by all Revenue Officers that meet our sample restriction
criteria between November 2014 and December 2018. Coefficients are shown in thousands. All payment
variables adjusted for inflation to 2017 values.
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Figure 2.6: Effect of a CNC designation on whether or not the taxpayer remitted their













−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
Years After Case Closed








−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
Years After Case Closed
Notes: Number of cases is 123,541 for difference-in-differences and 104,139 for the IV specification. Includes
cases worked by all Revenue Officers that meet our sample restriction criteria between November 2014 and
December 2018.
below the threshold at which they would be required to file.31 As a result, we examine filing
behavior among those with wage income reported on Form W-2, who are both more likely to
be required to file and more likely to be detected if they fail to file.
The filing results are shown in Figure 2.7. While the standard difference-in-differences
results suggest that a CNC designation leads to a reduced likelihood of filing, the IV results
show that taxpayers who received a CNC designation were no less likely to file a return in
the following years.
2.5.2 Effects on income
Suspending collection efforts due to hardship does not imply that a taxpayer’s debt is
forgiven. Taxpayers whose cases are given a CNC designation may use the relief to make
investments to increase their future wage or self-employment income, or increase labor supply
with the expectation that the income they earn is less likely to go toward tax debts. On the
other hand, a CNC designation could reduce labor supply through an income effect, as more
of taxpayers’ income becomes available for uses other than tax debt repayment.
We examine how a CNC designation affects adjusted gross income, wages reported on
Form W-2, and self-employment income reported on Form 1040 Schedule C. We take the
inverse hyperbolic sine of each of these measures of income.32
31For example, we observe that, even among households receiving wages reported on Form W-2, about
40% had wage income below the filing threshold.




2 ). This is approximately equal to
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Notes: Number of cases is 139,246 for difference-in-differences and 121,923 for the IV specification. Includes
cases worked by all Revenue Officers that meet our sample restriction criteria between November 2014 and
December 2018.
In standard difference-in-differences results CNC status is associated with large, lasting,
and statistically significant decreases in adjusted gross income, wages, and self-employment
income. Our instrumental variables difference-in-difference approach finds statistically
significant increases in adjusted gross income and wages as a result of a CNC designation.
This increase is driven by an increase in W-2 wages earned by the spouses of married taxpayers
in years three and four after the case closes. We do not observe a statistically significant
change in self-employment income.
2.5.2.1 Adjusted gross income
We construct a version of adjusted gross income (AGI) that combines adjusted gross
income reported on tax returns with third-party reported income of non-filers. Figure
2.8 shows that, in a standard difference-in-differences regression, a CNC designation has
a significant negative effect on household income, implying that receiving hardship relief
decreases household income by as much as 60% two years after Year 0. In contrast, the
instrumented difference-in-differences specification suggests that a CNC designation leads
to statistically significant increases in adjusted gross income, which more than doubles
three years after Year 0. The stark difference between the two approaches arises because
ln(2xi) = ln(2) + ln(xi) = 0.69 + ln(xi) ≈ ln(xi) except for small values of ln(xi). As a result, coefficients
on these variables can be interpreted as we would for standard logarithmic dependent variables, but allows
for the transformation of values equal to 0 and negative values. To transform the coefficients back into
meaningful values, we use the approximation % change ≈ (exp(β)− 1) ∗ 100 (see Bellemare and Wichman
(2020) for more information about the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation).
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Notes: Number of cases is 138,842 for difference-in-differences and 121,208 for the IV specification. Includes
cases worked by all Revenue Officers that meet our sample restriction criteria between November 2014 and
December 2018. Values given are the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the outcome values. Adjusted
gross income adjusted for inflation to 2017 values.
CNC designations reflect selection on past income and expectations of low future income,
which differencing does not remove, while instrumenting effectively restricts to taxpayers
whose circumstances are similar at the time of the CNC decision. In spite of the statistical
imprecision of our estimates, among taxpayers on the margin of a CNC designation, those
given a CNC designation have much higher income in the following years.
2.5.2.2 W-2 wages
Figure 2.9 shows the effects of CNC designation on the sum of the taxpayer’s and their
spouse’s wages reported on Form W-2. The patterns in these results closely resemble the
patterns for adjusted gross income: the standard difference-in-differences specification shows
wage decreases after Year 0, while the instrumented difference-in-differences specification
shows large increases in W-2 wages. The increase in Year 3 is statistically significant at the
95% level.
To examine the source of the large rise in income, we split household wages into the
taxpayers’ own wages and taxpayers’ spouses’ wages. The increase is attributable to taxpayers’
spouses. Figure 2.10 shows that in the instrumented specification wages do not rise for the
individual whose case is designated CNC (Figure 2.10b), but there is a substantial increase
in the wages received by the spouses of married taxpayers (Figure 2.10d), which more than
double 3 and 4 years after the case closed. There is a similar pattern in the standard
difference-in-differences specification for spouses’ wages, although for individuals’ own wages
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Notes: Number of cases is 139,246 for difference-in-differences and 121,923 for the IV specification. Includes
cases worked by all Revenue Officers that meet our sample restriction criteria between November 2014 and
December 2018. Values given are the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the outcome values. W-2
income adjusted for inflation to 2017 values.
the standard difference-in-differences shows a decline that begins well in advance of treatment.
2.5.2.3 Self-employment income
Finally, we consider self-employment income, the sum of all Schedule C profits and losses
reported with a taxpayer’s tax return.
The impact of a CNC designation on self-employment income is shown in Figure 2.11.
A standard difference-in-differences regression shows self-employment income falling after a
CNC designation, while the coefficients of the instrumented specification hover around zero
and are imprecisely estimated.
2.5.3 Summary
Suspending debt collection due to inability to pay basic living expenses leads to a large
proportional increase in the taxpayer’s spouse’s (but not the taxpayer’s own) W-2 wages
three and four years after the case closed, accompanied by a rise in tax withheld from those
wages and reported on Form W-2. This increase in income is consistent with the incentives
a CNC designation provides by reducing the effective marginal tax rate (at least over the
range where additional income does not trigger the revocation of the CNC designation), and
suggests that the increased keep rate on higher earnings has a greater effect on income than
the wealth effect from setting debt aside. The married taxpayers in our sample are mostly
male. If we assume their spouses are more likely to be female, our results are consistent
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Figure 2.10: Effect of a CNC designation on W-2 Wages (IHS): Taxpayer vs. Spouse
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Notes: Number of cases for W-2 wages is 139,246 for difference-in-differences and 121,923 for the IV
specification, and the case numbers for the spouse’s W-2 wages are 139,246 and 121,923. Includes cases
worked by all Revenue Officers that meet our sample restriction criteria between November 2014 and December
2018. Values given are the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the outcome values. Spouses include
individuals married to taxpayers in the year in which their case was closed. W-2 income adjusted for inflation
to 2017 values.
73












−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
Years After Case Closed







−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
Years After Case Closed
Notes: The number of cases is 123,412 for difference-in-differences and 103,795 for the IV specification.
Includes cases worked by all Revenue Officers that meet our sample restriction criteria between November
2014 and December 2018. Values given are the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the outcome values.
Self employment income adjusted for inflation to 2017 values.
with the standard finding that married women’s labor supply is more elastic than men’s
labor supply (Keane, 2011). An alternative explanation for the increase in spouse’s wages is
through a liquidity channel: by enabling investments that facilitate working (e.g. a second
car or child care), the positive wealth shock from a CNC designation could increase labor
supply in this population of taxpayers. Given the rise in income, the increase in tax withheld
on Form W-2 is largely mechanical rather than the result of an active change in voluntary
compliance, as default withholding rates generally align with tax liability and taxpayers
rarely set withholding rates near zero.
A CNC designation does not detectably change payments toward outstanding debt, tax
filing, quarterly estimated tax payments, remittances with returns, whether the taxpayer
remits all current year tax liability, or self-employment income. The lack of significant
estimated effects on tax compliance could result from the imprecise nature of the IV
estimates, from an offset between the increase in compliance stemming from the potential for
debt suspension to be revoked and the decrease in compliance due to the perception that
enforcement is lenient, or from an absence of such effects.
2.6 Conclusion
Random and quasi-random assignment of cases to administrative officers provides an
opportunity to study the causal effects of policy interventions when administrative officers’
discretion can determine who receives treatment. This paper uses such an approach to assess
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the effects of suspending attempts to collect a taxpayer’s unpaid taxes. Variation comes
from assignment of cases to Revenue Officers of differing “leniency,” the inherent tendency to
designate cases currently not collectible due to taxpayer hardship. To our knowledge, this is
the first application of this research design to issues of tax enforcement.
The effects of tax debt collection policies on taxpayer behavior are of interest to economic
researchers and policymakers. This paper provides the first causal estimates of the impact of
suspending efforts to collect tax debt on future taxpayer behavior, and addresses the challenge
posed by the selected sample of taxpayers subject to such action. We find that, following
the suspension of collection efforts, taxpayers have higher incomes, driven by increases
in their spouses’ wages. Unlike naive difference-in-difference results, in which suspending
collection is strongly associated with declines in debt repayment, tax filing, and both wage
and self-employment income, we find that these behaviors either increase or do not decline
detectably.
In this setting, the ability of an examiner assignment design to elicit a causal effect of debt
forgiveness not polluted by sample selection bias is tempered by the fact that the assignment
of case managers to cases is only conditionally random and the average number of cases per
Revenue Officer is not very large. But, because quasi-random assignment of tax officers to
cases is widespread, and the research availability of administrative data is growing rapidly, the
potential for this research design to provide insight into the causal effects of tax enforcement
actions is substantial, and we look forward to it being applied to other settings where the
empirical caveats are less severe.
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CHAPTER III
Tax Preparers and High Income Earners (with
Giacomo Brusco, Yeliz Kaçamak, and Mark Payne)
3.1 Introduction
The top of the income distribution has become a point of increased interest for both
economic researchers and policy makers. As income inequality has increased over the past
several decades, so too has the interest in understanding the economic behavior of this
population. A recent point of focus in this conversation is the extent to which this population
avoids and evades its tax liability. Concurrently, there has been a resurgence of attempts to
understand the role of paid tax professionals in tax compliance.
Although both topics have been analyzed separately in the economics literature, the role
paid tax professionals play in noncompliance of the rich has not been explicitly studied. Given
that over 90% of individuals in the top 1% of the income distribution use a paid tax preparer,
understanding the role professional tax preparation services play in the tax compliance (or
noncompliance) of the very rich is a critical piece of the puzzle.
This paper bridges the gap between the literature on top income earners (and, in particular,
the tax compliance of top income earners) and the literature on tax preparers. We use
administrative tax data from random audits to provide novel descriptive statistics documenting
how paid-prepared returns compare to self-prepared returns across the income distribution.
Our data include both the originally reported amounts and the post-audit corrected amounts
at the line-item level. We find that, among the bottom 99% of the income distribution,
self-prepared returns have smaller post-audit corrections relative to total income, but among
the top 1%, paid-prepared returns experience smaller corrections relative to self-prepared
returns.
We then investigate why not all individuals in the top 1% use paid tax preparation services
given that they tend to have smaller post-audit corrections. We find that individuals in
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the top 1% who are themselves an accountant or other type of financial advisor, but who
self-prepare their own returns, experience the same smaller corrections as do paid-prepared
returns among the top 1%. We also find that individuals in the top 1% who have a higher
proportion of their total income from third-party reported income (e.g., wages) are less
likely to use tax preparation services. This suggests that there are both supply and demand
considerations at play.
We provide a brief overview of the literatures on tax preparers and on income and wealth
inequality in the U.S. in Section 3.2. These literatures have highlighted how tax systems can
contribute to or hinder the secular increase of economic inequality, not just through tax rates
but also through decisions on tax bases and enforcement. This underlines the importance
of examining paid tax preparer usage by top earners. Unlike the use of tax preparation
software, which has seen large increases for low- and middle-income taxpayers over the past
two decades, tax preparer usage has remained more or less constant, with much higher usage
among high income individuals than the rest of the population.
We use administrative data from the National Research Program (NRP) of the U.S.
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to explore what distinguishes the use of tax preparers among
the very rich from their use in the rest of the population. These data provide the original
and corrected values, by line-item, for a stratified random sample of the population that were
selected for a full audit of their tax return.
The results of this descriptive analysis are given in Section 3.3. We find that paid preparer
use increases with income, particularly so among the top 1%. We document trends about
which types of income are associated with greater paid preparer usage across the income
distribution, and conclude that self-employment income plays a bigger role for the bottom
99%, but income from capital gains, dividends, and partnerships and S-corporations play
a bigger role for the top 1%. We find that post-NRP audit corrections are smaller among
self-prepared returns in the bottom 99%, but smaller among paid-prepared returns in the top
1%.
We also document trends among paid-preparer users across the income distribution. In
particular, the top 1% are considerably more likely to hire Certified Public Accountants
(CPAs) and attorneys as tax preparers relative to the bottom 99%, while the bottom 99%
are more likely to hire Enrolled Agents or Supervised Registered Tax Preparers. The top 1%
also tend to pay dramatically more for tax preparer services in levels, but dramatically less
for tax preparation services as a proportion of income.
Given that we observe smaller post-NRP audit corrections among top 1% returns prepared
a paid preparer, the natural follow-up question is why does anyone in the top 1% not use a
paid preparer? How do the 10% of the top 1% who self-prepare their returns differ from the
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rest of the top 1%? To investigate this question, we develop a simple, stylized model in the
style of Allingham and Sandmo (1972b) in Section 3.4. The model provides some intuition
and justification for our empirical approach, which yields evidence for two potential answers
to this question: the effect of a specialized occupation, and the effect of having income subject
to third-party reported information. To test the former, we examine how the relative size
of post-NRP audit corrections experienced by the top 1% who use preparers compare to
self-prepared returns among the top 1% who have occupations in accounting or financial
planning. We find that these populations experience the same relative size of corrections.
To test the second answer to our question, we consider whether individuals in different
income groups are more or less likely to have hired a tax preparer based on the proportion of
their income stemming from seven different income types: wages, self-employment income,
capital gains, ordinary dividends, income from partnerships and S-corporations, rental income,
and other income not reported elsewhere on the tax return. We find that, for the top 1%,
the proportion of income coming from wages–a third-party reported income source–is the
only statistically significant predictor of this type for whether or not someone in the top 1%
hired a professional tax preparer (and that having a great proportion of total income coming
from wages is associated with a lower probability of hiring a tax preparer).
We provide some concluding discussion, caveats, and thoughts for future research on this
topic in Section 3.5.
3.2 Background and data
3.2.1 The role of paid tax preparers in tax compliance
Individual taxpayers in the United States generally either prepare their tax returns
themselves (“self-prepared” returns) or hire professionals to help them (“paid-prepared”
returns). More than half of individual taxpayers (and nearly all corporations) in the United
States receive paid professional assistance in filing their taxes.
Despite their ubiquity, the role of tax preparers in tax compliance is not well understood.
There are two intuitive reasons why an individual might seek professional help in preparing
their taxes. If taxpayers are worried about making mistakes on their returns, they may hire
professionals to improve the accuracy of their returns. On the other hand, taxpayers may
pay professional tax preparers to help them learn about additional avenues for tax avoidance
and evasion.
The empirical evidence documents a negative correlation between tax preparer usage
and reported income conditional on observable characteristics (Klepper and Nagin, 1989;
Long and Caudill, 1987; Erard, 1993, 1997). However, inferring a causal relationship between
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tax compliance and tax preparers is a difficult task because of the potential selection bias.
It is reasonable to believe that taxpayers who use tax preparers are substantially different
than taxpayers who do not. In fact, previous works in the literature suggest that the use of
professional tax services is positively correlated with income, self-employment, the complexity
of tax return, and age (Slemrod and Sorum, 1984; Long and Caudill, 1987; Slemrod, 1989;
Dubin et al., 1992), which are characteristics that also are correlated with tax compliance.1
Despite the selection bias challenge, many researchers have attempted to investigate the
possible causal relationship between the tax preparer usage and tax compliance. One strategy
in the accounting literature has been to attempt to compare compliance on more or less
legally ambiguous line items (Klepper and Nagin, 1989; Hite and McGill, 1992; Fleischman
and Stephenson, 2012). Another approach was to analyze the effects of regulation on tax
preparer aggressiveness (Ayres et al., 1989; Hansen and White, 2012). These experimental
studies yielded mixed results and, due to the hypothetical decision context and low sample
size, may have limited external validity.
There has been a recent resurgence in attempts to estimate the causal impact of tax
preparers on tax compliance. Battaglini et al. (2019) use a seven-year panel of Italian
administrative tax records to study potential “social spillovers” through the use of tax
preparers by sole-proprietors. They find that a taxpayer’s level of under-reported income is
strongly correlated to the other clients of his or her accountant, and that this relationship
holds even if the taxpayer changes tax preparers (that is, a taxpayer’s under-reported income
at time t− 1 is correlated with under-reported income of their tax preparer’s other clients
at time t). They explore two mechanisms through which these social spillovers may occur:
self-sorting by tolerance for noncompliance, and information externalities.
Yuskavage et al. (2019) use the density of tax preparation services in a zip code as
an instrument for tax preparer use to address endogenous selection into tax preparer use.
Controlling for zip-code, income, and complexity of the tax return, they find that returns
filed with the help of a paid tax preparer have larger adjustments upon audit. This effect
is not present with the Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA) for similar tax returns,
which implies that variance in tax preparer motives may affect tax compliance outcomes.
The density of tax preparation services is potentially problematic as an instrument, however:
the density of tax preparers could be the result of demand for tax preparation services (and
therefore also a function of unobservables associated with hiring a tax preparer), rather than
demand being higher as a result of greater supply.
1Paid tax preparation service use is also correlated with characteristics of low-income individuals, such as
claiming the EITC. For example, Masken et al. (2008) find that tax preparers can facilitate access to bank
products such as Refund Anticipation Loans (RALs) and Refund Anticipation Checks/Cards (RACs), which
give taxpayers quicker access to their refunds.
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3.2.2 The distribution of income and wealth in the United States and the role
of the tax system
There is a long-standing literature that documents an increase in the top 1% share of
(pre-tax and pre-transfer) income, especially in the English-speaking world.2 There are several
potential explanations for this phenomenon. Perhaps most prominent among these is the
idea that small differences in skill at the top could be getting magnified into much bigger
differences in salary, and that this phenomenon has become more widespread in the past few
decades thanks to technological developments (Rosen, 1981; Berman et al., 1998).
The public economics literature has recently been concerned with how tax systems have
reacted and contributed to these changes in income distribution. Alvaredo et al. (2013)
point out that, in the English-speaking world, top income tax rates have been moving in the
opposite direction as the share of income accrued to the top 1% of the distribution. They
argue that this tendency might have operated in conjunction with other factors to contribute
to the increase in inequality. Others, like Scheuer and Slemrod (2020), have stressed the
importance of thinking about tax rates in conjunction with other aspects of the tax system,
such as the tax base and resources for enforcement, both of which influence the extent to
which changes in tax rate end up impacting government revenue.
Concerns over the erosion of the tax base, particularly among the top of the income
distribution, have been highly prominent in the recent public economics literature. Alstadsæter
et al. (2018), for instance, suggest that about 10% of global GDP is held in tax heavens.
Alstadsæter et al. (2019) argue that increasing tax enforcement efforts in Norway has been
successful in raising substantially more revenue from top income earners as a result of
newly disclosed offshore assets. Guyton et al. (2021) estimate that accounting for previously
undetected offshore accounts and income from pass-through businesses among the top 1%
considerably increases their share of fiscal income. Given the almost ubiquitous usage of
tax preparers among top U.S. income earners, they could potentially play a crucial role in
facilitating sophisticated methods of avoidance and evasion.
3.2.3 Data
We use data from the IRS’s National Research Program (NRP). The NRP is the IRS’s
random audit program. Starting in 2006, the IRS has chosen a stratified random sample of
the population of U.S. taxpayers each year. These taxpayers’ returns are then audited. NRP
audits cover all items on a filer’s tax return, as opposed to an operational audit, which may
only cover the specific items of interest. Populations of particular interest for tax compliance
2See Atkinson et al. (2011) for a historical perspective.
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measures are over-sampled (in particular, high-income taxpayers, or taxpayers claiming the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)). The NRP data form the base for measures of both
income under-reporting and the tax gap.
We use the 2006-2014 waves of the NRP. Each wave contains approximately 12-15 thousand
individuals. We include all individuals except those who are given 0 probability weight,3 and
those whose returns were prepared through the Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA)
program.4 Our final sample includes 117,303 taxpayers. A little over 70% of our sample filed
a return using a paid professional.
The NRP data include line-item-level information from seven tax schedules and forms,
briefly described in Table 3.1. For each included line item, we have the original amount
reported on the return and the “corrected,” post-audit amount. If no change was made, the
original and corrected amounts are equivalent. We focus on in particular on income totals
across the following categories: wage income (from W-2s), self-employment income (Schedule
C income), income from capital gains and dividends (Schedule D income), and income from
partnerships/S-Corporations and rental income (Schedule E income). We inflate dollar values
to 2014 values.5
Table 3.1: Forms and schedules included in the NRP data
Form 1040 The “U.S. Individual Income Tax Return.”
Schedule A Itemized allowable deductions, including charitable contributions. In lieu of filling
out Schedule A, taxpayers may choose to take the standard deduction.
Schedule C Income and expenses the result from self-employment.
Schedule D Documents capital gains and losses incurred throughout the tax year, as well as
income from ordinary dividends.
Schedule E Income and expenses that result from the rental of real property, royalties, or from
pass-through entities (e.g., trusts, estates, partnerships, or S Corporations)
Schedule F Income and expenses related to farming.
Form 2106 Work-related expenses for Armed Forces reservists, qualified performing artists,
fee-basis state or local government officials, or employees with impairment-related
work expenses.
3All individuals in the NRP are assigned a probability weight for re-scaling measures of income
under-reporting and of the tax gap to the full population. Having a 0 probability weight indicates that the
return was excluded from the study for one of a variety of reasons, including but not limited to disaster,
combat, or being unable to locate the individual.
4The VITA program, managed by the IRS, offers free, basic tax preparation assistance to qualified
individuals (in particular, those making less than $57,000 a year and/or individuals with disabilities and/or
individuals with limited English). Excluding VITA-prepared returns eliminates 1,203 individuals from our
sample.
5We use the CPI Inflation Calculator provided by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (available at
https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation calculator.htm). We compare December of each year to December 2014
to generate an “inflation adjustment” for each year.
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We assign each individual in our sample to a “corrected adjusted gross income (AGI)
percentile.” To do this, we use the population of taxpayers in each sample year to determine
year-specific 5% percentile cut-offs (e.g., 0-5%, 5-10%, etc.). We then assign each individual
in our sample to a percentile based on their corrected (i.e., post-audit) AGI in the relevant
year. While the choice to use a paid preparer is endogenous (and may have an impact on
reported AGI), using corrected AGI will mitigate this problem to an extent. Corrected AGI
is not able to fully eliminate the problem if, for example, paid-preparer use is associated with
different rates of under-reported income across the income distribution. Another caveat is
that even the corrected AGI variable reflects true income with noise rather than the true
income itself.
We use a variety of percentile groupings, but focus primarily on income deciles through
90%, then split the top 9% into 90-95% and 95-99%. The top 1% is divided into 99-99.5%,
99.5-99.9%, and 99.9% and above. In some figures and analyses, we group 0-99% together for
comparison against the top 1%. See Table 3.2 for subtotals by corrected AGI percentile.
In our analysis, we separate out individuals who had negative corrected AGI. As we
discuss in Section 3.3, individuals who have negative corrected AGI “look” more like the
top 1% of the income distribution than the bottom 99% along some important dimensions.
They also tend to have large adjustments as part of the audit process. If these individuals
are included at the bottom of the income distribution, both the size of adjustments and the
extent to which paid preparers are used by the bottom 99% are overstated.
We merge on additional information from other tables in the administrative tax database
to the NRP data. Before the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, tax preparation fees were tax
deductible and listed on Schedule A. We estimate tax preparation fees using information
from Schedule A.6
We include the taxpayers’ year of birth, state of residence for filing purposes, and filing
status (from which we derive marital status). We use the 3-digit occupation code from the
taxpayer’s highest grossing W-2 to create an indicator of whether or not the taxpayer works
as an accountant or financial manager.7 Finally, we include indicators of whether the tax
preparers self-identified as Certified Public Accountants (CPAs), attorneys, Enrolled Agents,
or Supervised Registered Tax Preparers (SRTPs).
It is important to note that the NRP data are not able to give a perfect measure of errors
on tax returns submitted to the IRS. First, there is no indication given as to whether the
6In particular, we subtract Line 21 (“unreimbursed employee expenses”) and Line 23 (“other expenses”)
from Line 24 (“gross deduction amount”, the sum of lines 21-23). This calculation yields Line 22 (“tax
preparation fees”) as our measure of fees paid to professional preparers.
7We assign an accountant indicator equal to 1 for occupation codes 122 (financial manager), 141
(accountant, auditor, other financial specialist), and 151 (certified public accountant).
82





Corrected AGI Percentile: 0-99 Percent
0-5 Pctl 688 691 1,379
5-10 Pctl 1,364 1,173 2,537
0-10 Pctl 2,052 1,864 3,916
10-15 Pctl 1,658 1,315 2,973
15-20 Pctl 1,972 1,291 3,263
10-20 Pctl 3,630 2,606 6,236
25-25 Pctl 2,044 1,324 3,368
25-30 Pctl 2,223 1,134 3,357
20-30 Pctl 4,267 2,458 6,725
30-35 Pctl 2,467 1,223 3,690
35-40 Pctl 2,507 1,275 3,782
30-40 Pctl 4,974 2,498 7,472
40-45 Pctl 2,565 1,362 3,927
45-50 Pctl 2,671 1,375 4,046
40-50 Pctl 5,236 2,737 7,973
50-55 Pctl 2,936 1,509 4,445
55-60 Pctl 3,078 1,516 4,594
50-60 Pctl 6,014 3,025 9,039
60-65 Pctl 3,246 1,462 4,708
65-70 Pctl 3,550 1,409 4,959
60-70 Pctl 6,796 2,871 9,667
70-75 Pctl 3,874 1,507 5,381
75-80 Pctl 4,229 1,552 5,781
70-80 Pctl 8,103 3,059 11,162
80-85 Pctl 4,542 1,715 6,257
85-90 Pctl 4,994 1,947 6,941
80-90 Pctl 9,536 3,662 13,198
90-95 Pctl 5,948 2,130 8,078
95-99 Pctl 13,669 4,124 17,793
0-99 Pctl 70,225 31,034 101,259
Corrected AGI Percentile: Top 1 Percent
99-99.5 Pctl 2,986 424 3,410
99.5− 99.9 Pctl 6,819 704 7,523
99.9+ Pctl 3,161 193 3,354
r1 14,544 1,500 16,044
Corrected AGI Percentile: Negative AGI
AGI < 0 1,578 179 1,757
Total 84,769 32,534 117,303
Notes: Includes individuals from the 2006-2014 NRP
waves with positive probability weights.
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noted mistakes were honest mistakes or attempted tax avoidance or evasion. Second, not all
corrections are themselves necessarily accurate. The auditor may fail to detect under- (or
over-) reported income, or may “correct” a line item that was originally accurate. Finally,
NRP audits may fail to detect certain types of income, such as income from undeclared
foreign bank accounts and pass-through businesses (Guyton et al., 2021). We discuss how
this limitation may affect our analysis of post-audit corrections and the role of preparers in
the relevant sections below.
3.3 The use of paid preparers across the income distribution
Figure 3.1a shows the proportion of individuals with paid-prepared versus self-prepared
returns by corrected AGI percentile. The proportion of each decile using a paid preparer
steadily increases in the bottom 99% from a little over 50% in the 0− 10 percentile group
to over 75% in the 95− 99 percentile group. There is a noticeable jump in the proportion
of individuals using a paid preparer in the top 1%: in the 99− 99.5, 99.5− 99.9, and 99.9+
percentile groups, 88%, 91%, and 94% used a paid preparer, respectively. This jump is
mirrored by individuals who had negative corrected AGI, with 90% using a paid preparer.8
The observation that the proportion of individuals using a paid tax preparer increases
with corrected AGI percentile is fairly stable over our sample period, as shown in Figure
3.1b. In particular, the considerable difference in the proportion of individuals using a paid
preparer in the bottom 99% of the income distribution compared to the top 1% does not
vary over this time period.
It is worth noting that there has been a shift in how self-prepared returns are prepared
over the sample period. Figure 3.2 shows trends in the use of tax-preparation software
among self-prepared returns by corrected AGI percentile. Figure 3.2a shows that, while
tax-preparation software use generally increases with corrected AGI percentile, the differences
are small compared with the range of paid-prepared versus self-prepared across corrected
AGI percentiles (in this case, the smallest percentage is 76% among the negative AGI group,
while the highest percentage is 91% among the 95 − 99 percentile group). The share of
self-prepared returns that are prepared using tax-preparation software has been growing over
time, however. Figure 3.2b shows that, particularly among the 0−99, 99−99.5, and 99.5−99.9
percentile groups, there has been a noticeable upward trend in tax-preparation software use.9
8The observation that individuals who had negative corrected AGI “look” more like the top 1% will hold
for some, but not all of the characteristics we consider in this section. In some cases, including individuals
with negative corrected AGI is so distorting to the figures that we do not show them. For some more thoughts
on the group of individuals with negative corrected AGI, see Appendix C.2.1.
9This is consistent with population-level trends in the use of paid preparers, self-prepared by hand, and
self-prepared using tax software. See Appendix C.2.2 for additional details.
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2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Study year
0−99 Pctl 99−99.5 Pctl 99.5−99.9 Pctl 99.9+ Pctl
Notes: N = 117,303 individuals. See Table 3.2 for subtotals by corrected AGI percentile.
While we focus on the distinction between paid-prepared and self-prepared returns, this shift
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toward increased use of tax-preparation software suggests that understanding the role of
tax-preparation software is also an increasingly important piece of the puzzle in understanding
trends in tax compliance and tax avoidance.
3.3.1 How do paid-prepared and self-prepared returns vary across the income
distribution?
We next consider how the differences between paid-prepared and self-prepared returns
vary across the income distribution. We consider the proportion of individuals itemizing
their deductions, as well as how the proportion of total income from different income sources
vary. We then turn to one of the key advantages of using the NRP data and consider the
differences in the size of corrections.
3.3.1.1 Proportion with itemized deductions
Figure 3.3 gives the proportion of paid-prepared returns and self-prepared returns with
itemized deductions by corrected AGI percentile. There is a clear difference between the top
1% and the bottom 99% of the income distribution: the vast majority of taxpayers in the top
1% itemizes, regardless of whether they hire a tax preparer or not, but individuals in the
bottom 99% who use a tax preparer are more likely to itemize than those who do not.
Across paid-prepared and self-prepared returns, the proportion itemizing increases with
corrected AGI percentile. The difference in the proportion of individuals itemizing does
not vary significantly between paid-prepared and self-prepared returns, but there are some
discernible trends. The proportion itemizing is higher among paid-prepared returns for the
corrected AGI deciles between 0− 10 and 60− 70. At that point, the trend shifts such that
the proportion of returns with itemized deductions is higher among self-prepared returns. The
difference between the proportion of returns with itemized deductions that are paid-prepared
or self-prepared is smallest for individuals in the top 1%, and largest for individuals with
negative corrected AGI.
3.3.1.2 Sources of income
Another dimension that varies across both paid-prepared and self-prepared returns, and
across the income distribution, is how many different types of income are reported on the
returns. Figure 3.4 shows average count of non-zero income from seven different sources of
income: (a) wages, (b) self-employment income, (c) income from capital gains, (d) income
from ordinary dividends, (e) income from partnerships and S-corporations, (f) rental income,
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2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Study year
0−99 Pctl 99−99.5 Pctl 99.5−99.9 Pctl 99.9+ Pctl
Notes: N = 32,534 individuals. Limited to returns that were self-prepared. See Table 3.2 for subtotals by
corrected AGI percentile.
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Notes: N = 117,303 individuals. See Table 3.2 for subtotals by corrected AGI percentile.
and (g) “other” income.10 There are two clear trends: on average, returns that are prepared
by professionals include more types of income compared to self-prepared returns, and returns
from higher in the income distribution include more types of income relative to returns from
lower in the income distribution.
In addition to the number of different types of income, the proportion of total income that
comes from these different sources varies both by preparation type, and across the income
distribution. Figure 3.5 shows the proportion of total income that comes from the seven
different types of income we consider. If a taxpayer does not report any of a specific type
of income, we assume the proportion of their total income from that type of income is 0.
Because they frequently distorted the graphs beyond readability, we do not show the 0− 10
percentile group or the negative AGI group.
There are some fascinating trends when we consider the proportion of total income made
up by various income sources, and how that varies both across the income distribution
and between self-prepared and paid-prepared returns. In Figure 3.5a, it is clear that wage
income makes up a considerably smaller proportion of total income for individuals using
paid-preparers than individuals who are self-preparing their returns. What is even more
striking is that the difference between paid-prepared and self-prepared grows as the corrected
10“Other income” is reported on Form 1040. It is the amount of any income not reported elsewhere on
Form 1040 or any attached schedules.
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Notes: N = 117,303 individuals. See Table 3.2 for subtotals by corrected AGI percentile.
AGI percentile increases. While the proportion of total income from wages decreases as the
corrected AGI percentile increases for self-prepared returns, the proportion of total income
from wages increases even more for paid-prepared returns.
In contrast, the proportion of total income from the other sources of income we consider is
almost always higher among paid-prepared returns compared to self-prepared returns. Figure
3.5b shows the relative proportions for self-employment income. While self-employment
income makes up a larger proportion of total income for paid-prepared returns across the
income distribution, the differences between paid-prepared and self-prepared are much smaller
among the top 1% than the bottom 99%. The proportion of income from self-employment
income generally decreases with corrected AGI percentile; the decrease is much starker among
paid-prepared returns than self-prepared returns. The scale for this type of income is also
considerably different than for wages: whereas the proportion of total income coming from
wages peaked at close to 80%, the proportion of total income coming from self-employment
income does not reach 25% for any income percentile.
The proportion of total income from capital gains sits on the same scale as self-employment
income, but one of the two trends is reversed from self-employment income. As shown in
Figure 3.5c, paid-prepared returns are consistently more likely to report a higher proportion
of total income from capital gains than self-prepared returns, but, unlike self-employment
income, the proportion of total income from capital gains increases with corrected AGI
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 Paid−prepared  Self−prepared
Notes: N = 111,630. See Table 3.2 for subtotals by corrected AGI percentile.
percentile (as does the difference in proportion between paid-prepared and self-prepared
returns). These trends are mirrored (and on the same scale) for the proportion of income
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from partnerships and S-corporations (see Figure 3.5e). The proportion of income from
partnerships and S-corporations may be understated: Guyton et al. (2021) suggest that
random audits often do not capture under-reported income from pass-through businesses.
The other three sources of income make up considerably smaller proportions of total income
relative to wages, self-employment income, capital gains, and partnership/S-corporation
income. The highest proportion observed for ordinary dividends, rental income, and other
income is just over 5%; the vast majority of these proportions are well under 2%. In
general, the proportion of income from ordinary dividends and rental income are higher for
paid-prepared returns versus self-prepared returns (Figures 3.5d and 3.5f, respectively). The
proportion of income from other income generally increases across the income distribution
(Figure 3.5g), but there is not a clear trend between paid-prepared and self-prepared returns.
The fact that higher proportions of total income from these sources are associated with
using a paid-preparer is consistent with the empirical evidence that more complicated tax
returns are more likely to be prepared by a tax professional (Slemrod and Sorum, 1984; Long
and Caudill, 1987). We further analyze the trends in preparer use by income source with
regression analysis in Section 3.4.3.
3.3.1.3 Differences in NRP audit corrections
One advantage of the NRP data is that we are able to see both the originally reported
amount and the corrected amount for a host of line items. Corrections could either be fixing
honest mistakes, or detecting noncompliance. While this is a huge benefit, the corrections
post-NRP audit are not a perfect measure of mistakes on tax returns, and provide no
information on whether mistakes are voluntary or not. Not all “corrections” are correct, and
some errors are easier to detect than others.
We consider how post-NRP audit corrections vary by paid-prepared and self-prepared
returns, and how those differences vary across the income distribution. First, we examine
the extent to which individuals’ corrected AGI percentile group changes after their return
is audited. We then analyze how the size of post-audit corrections varies across the income
distribution.
Figure 3.6 shows the proportion of individuals whose corrected AGI percentile group went
down (a and b), did not change (c and d), or moved up (e and f). For each possible direction
of movement, we show a figure with a y-axis that makes it easier to see any trends within a
type of movement, and a figure with a y-axis re-scaled to 1 for easier comparison across types
of movement. The x-axis of these figures is the taxpayer’s original AGI percentile group (as
opposed to their corrected AGI percentile group as is used in every other figure in this paper).
Note that it is not possible for individuals who were originally in the 0− 10 percentile group
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to move down, nor is it possible for individuals in the 99+ percentile group to move up.
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Notes: N = 114,243. See Table 3.2 for subtotals by corrected AGI percentile. Excludes individuals who
either originally reported negative AGI, or who had negative corrected AGI.
Figure 3.6 yields a few important observations. While the likelihood of a taxpayer’s
corrected AGI percentile group being lower than their original AGI percentile group generally
decreases as original AGI percentile group increases (Figure 3.6a), the overall proportion of
our sample whose corrected AGI percentile group is lower than their original AGI percentile
group is tiny: less than 3% for most original AGI percentile groups (Figure 3.6b).
In contrast, the majority of taxpayers do not change AGI percentile groups after their
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NRP audit (Figure 3.6c). The proportion of taxpayers whose AGI percentile group does not
change is consistently higher among self-prepared returns (the exception being the 99.9+
percentile group), and consistently higher as original AGI percentile group increases.
Taxpayers who used a paid preparer were consistently more likely to move up in AGI
percentile group after their NRP audit than taxpayers whose returns were self-prepared. The
differences are considerable: Among the bottom 70% of the original AGI percentiles, there
was a 10% difference in the proportion that moved up who used a paid-preparer versus those
that had self-prepared returns. More than a quarter of those in the bottom 70% who used a
paid preparer saw an increase in their AGI percentile after the NRP audit. The proportion
of taxpayers whose AGI percentile went up decreases as original AGI percentile decreases.
Unlike with downward movements, this may be mechanical: there are fewer percentile groups
to move up the higher up in the distribution one starts.
We also look at the size of corrections across overall income and different types of income.
Because the size of corrections is correlated with the size of the originally reported value, we
construct a scaled version, as shown in Equation 3.3.1:11
Scaled correction =
Corrected amount− original amount
|Average amount for corrected AGI percentile|
(3.3.1)
The larger this value in magnitude, the bigger the correction. Positive values indicate the
corrected value was higher than the original; negative values indicate the corrected value was
lower than the original. To construct the relevant denominator, we use the finest-grain AGI
percentile groups that we are able to given how our AGI percentile data are constructed: 5%
increments through 95% (i.e., 0− 5, 5− 10, 10− 15, etc.), then 95− 99, 99− 99.5, 99.5− 99.9,
and 99.9+. Finally, we winsorize this value at the 1st and 99th percentiles within the same
increments used to construct the denominator in order to avoid distortionary effects from
outliers.
We start by considering some high-level outcomes in Figure 3.7: total income, adjusted
gross income, total taxable income, and total tax liability. In these figures, we group the
bottom 99% together and separately consider the 95− 99, 99− 99.5, 99.5− 99.9, and 99.9+
percentile groups, as well as the group with negative corrected AGI.
These figures are striking. Across all four outcomes, the scale is dictated primarily by the
bottom 99%. Corrections to total income are larger for self-prepared returns in the top 1%,
11We refrain from using the Voluntary Reporting Percentage (VRP) measure used by, e.g., Klepper and




. We want to take advantage of the fact
that we have individual-level data, which Klepper and Nagin (1989) did not have. However, there are cases
where the corrected amount is 0 when the reported amount is not 0. As a result, the VRP measure cannot
be constructed at the individual level.
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but larger for paid-prepared returns in the bottom 99% (Figure 3.7a). The scaled corrections
decrease with each increasing top 1% group, with paid-prepared returns among the top 1%
experiencing less than a 5% increase in total income on average (with the value being less
than 1% for the 99.9+ percentile).
This pattern is mirrored for both AGI (Figure 3.7b) and total tax liability (Figure 3.7d),
with scaled corrections in general being much larger for the bottom 99%, and larger for
paid-prepared returns among the bottom 99%, whereas scaled corrections are larger for
self-prepared returns among the top 1%.
Scaled corrections to taxable income are given in Figure 3.7c.12 We again see that the
magnitude of scaled corrections is considerably larger among the bottom 99%, with positive
scaled corrections for paid-prepared returns but negative scaled corrections for self-prepared
returns. In contrast, scaled corrections are positive across the cuts of the top 1%, but again
larger for self-prepared returns.
The relative size of scaled corrections among the top 1% compared to the bottom 99%
may be overstated if random audits fail to detect under-reported income from sources such as
undeclared foreign bank accounts and complicated pass-through business structures (Guyton
et al., 2021). Individuals in the top 1% are more likely to have income from other sources
that are not included in post-NRP audit corrections, which would artificially reduce the size
of their scaled corrections relative to the bottom 99%. To the extent tax professionals assist
in hiding income, this would also influence the relative size of scaled corrections between
self-prepared and paid-prepared returns within the top 1% subgroups. In particular, it may
no longer be true that scaled corrections were higher for self-prepared returns (and it may
even be true that scaled corrections would be higher for paid-prepared returns).
We next consider the size of corrections across different types of income in Figure 3.8.
As above, with these figures we group the bottom 99% together and separately consider
the 95− 99, 99− 99.5, 99.5− 99.9, and 99.9+ percentile groups, as well as the group with
negative corrected AGI.
There is considerable variation in the size of scaled corrections by income type. The
largest corrections to wage income are seen by self-prepared returns in the bottom 99%, but
these are, on average, less than 0.06% scaled corrections. (Figure 3.8a). Scaled corrections to
wages are well under 0.03% within the top 1% of the income distribution, with corrections
being generally smaller among paid-prepared returns. It is not surprising that the scale
of these corrections is so small, given that wage income is subject to third-party reporting
12Figure 3.7c excludes individuals in the 0 − 5 corrected AGI percentile group from the bottom 99%
because the values were extremely distortionary. Note that there is no negative AGI group for this figure
because these individuals do not have taxable income.
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0−99 Pctl 99−99.5 Pctl 99.5−99.9 Pctl 99.9+ Pctl <0 AGI
 Paid−prepared  Self−prepared
Notes: Figure 3.7a N = 117,303. Figure 3.7b N = 117,303. Figure 3.7c N = 115,546. Figure 3.7d N
= 117,303. See Table 3.2 for subtotals by corrected AGI percentile. These figures show the mean value
for the scaled correction as calculated in Equation 3.3.1. The larger this value in magnitude, the bigger
the correction. Positive values indicate the corrected value was higher than the original; negative values
indicate the corrected value was lower than the original. The analyzes values are winsorized at the 1st and
99th percentiles within the finest-grain AGI percentile groups in our data.
through W-2s. This result is consistent with the literature, which finds that taxpayers are
generally compliant when it comes to income subject to third-party reporting (Kleven et al.,
2011; Phillips, 2014).
In contrast, there are relatively large scaled corrections made to self-employment income
(Figure 3.8b). The corrections are larger among paid-prepared returns in the bottom 99%,
and generally larger among self-prepared returns in the top 1%. As with wage income, the
size of the scaled corrections decreases as corrected AGI percentile group increases.
We next turn to Schedule D income: capital gains (Figure 3.8c) and ordinary dividends
(Figure 3.8d). The size of scaled corrections for both of these types of income is an order
of magnitude smaller than self-employment income, but 1-2 orders of magnitude greater
than scaled corrections to wage income. Capital gains is the one case where average
scaled corrections among the top 1% are higher than in the bottom 99% (in particular,
among the 99− 99.9 percentile group). There is not a huge difference in scaled corrections
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between self-prepared and paid-prepared returns among the bottom 99% and the 99− 99.5
percentile group; among the 99.5− 99.9 and 99.9+ percentile groups, the scaled corrections
among self-prepared returns are noticeably larger. In general, scaled corrections made to
paid-prepared returns are higher than for self-prepared returns for other income, except
among the 99.5− 99.9 percentile group. There are similarly very small adjustments made to
ordinary dividends as to wage income, with similar trends across the income distribution and
between self-prepared and paid-prepared returns (Figure 3.8d).
From Schedule E, we consider income from partnerships and S-corporations (Figure 3.5e)
and rental income (Figure 3.8f). There are not large discrepancies between scaled corrections
between paid-prepared and self-prepared in the top 1% for either type of income. For rental
income, there is a striking difference between the scale of corrections between the bottom
99% and the top 1%. Across the income distribution, self-prepared returns have larger scaled
corrections to rental income than paid-prepared returns.
Finally, we consider corrections to other income not reported elsewhere in the tax
return (Figure 3.8g) and changes to total deductions (Figure 3.8h). Across the income
distribution, paid-prepared returns generally have higher scaled corrections to other income,
though the magnitude is small (an order of magnitude smaller than the size of corrections
to self-employment income). In contrast, the size of the scaled deductions is larger for
self-prepared returns than for paid-prepared. As with the types of income, the magnitude
of the change indicates the size of the correction (a larger value indicates a bigger change
post-audit), though in this case, the negative values mean that the corrected deduction
amounts were, on average, lower than the original deduction amounts (i.e., total deductions
went down).
There are several key takeaways from Figures 3.7 and 3.8. The first is that scaled
corrections are larger overall for the bottom 99% than for the top 1%. This is true both across
measures of comprehensive income and individual income types, as well as total deductions.
Second, scaled corrections to comprehensive measures of income are larger for paid-prepared
returns among the bottom 99%, but smaller for paid-prepared returns among the top 1%.
This is consistent with the idea that preparers hired by the top 1% may be better at correcting
mistakes and/or hiding noncompliance. We discuss differences in trends among paid-preparers
hired across the income distribution in Section 3.3.2. Third, the scale of corrections varies
widely between different income types. In particular, the scale for corrections to wages
(which are subject to third-party reporting through the submission of W-2s) is one order of
magnitude smaller than the scale of corrections to capital gains and ordinary dividends, two
orders of magnitude smaller than corrections to income from partnerships and S-corporations,
and three orders of magnitude smaller than the scale of corrections to self-employment income
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0−99 Pctl 99−99.5 Pctl 99.5−99.9 Pctl 99.9+ Pctl <0 AGI
 Paid−prepared  Self−prepared
Notes: Figure 3.8a N = 117,303. Figure 3.8b N = 117,303. Figure 3.8c N = 117,303. Figure 3.8d N = 117,303. Figure 3.8e
N = 45,562. Figure 3.8f N = 45,562. Figure 3.8g N = 117,303. Figure 3.8h N = 117,303. See Table 3.2 for subtotals by
corrected AGI percentile. These figures show the mean value for the scaled correction as calculated in Equation 3.3.1. The
larger this value in magnitude, the bigger the correction. Positive values indicate the corrected value was higher than the
original; negative values indicate the corrected value was lower than the original. The analyzes values are winsorized at the
1st and 99th percentiles within the finest-grain AGI percentile groups in our data.
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and rental income. This has important implications for which individuals we might expect to
hire a preparer. If self-prepared returns are subject to the same very small scale corrections
for wage income, we might expect individuals with a greater proportion of their income
coming from wages to be less likely to use professional tax preparation services.
3.3.2 Conditional on using a preparer, how does preparer use vary across the
income distribution?
In addition to analyzing how the difference between paid-prepared and self-prepared returns
varies across the income distribution, we can also examine trends specific to paid-prepared
returns. We consider three dimensions along that may vary across the income distribution:
average fees paid to preparers, the average number of returns prepared by the preparers used,
and the professions held by the preparers used.
3.3.2.1 Differences in fees paid to tax preparers
Before the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, tax preparation fees were tax deductible and
listed on Schedule A of the individual tax return. The average amount of money deducted
for tax preparation fees varies widely across the income distribution, as shown in Figure 3.9.
It is important to remember that we are only able to observe preparer fees for individuals
who itemized their deductions; as we showed in Figure 3.3, many individuals in the lower end
of the income distribution do not itemize their deductions even if they use a paid preparer.
We present four alternative measures of the fees paid: (a) the average amount of tax
preparation fees deducted, (b) the average amount of tax preparation fees deducted when
limited to fees less than $50,000, (c) fees as a proportion of total deductions, and (d) fees as
a proportion of the (absolute value of) AGI.
The average amount of fees deducted increases considerably with corrected AGI percentile.
The average fees among the bottom 99% do not break $5,000 (and are generally considerably
lower than that), while the average fees are over $10,000, $25,000, and $90,000 for the
99− 99.5, 99.5− 99.9, and 99.9+ percentile groups, respectively. The group with the second
highest average fees is the negative AGI group, with average fees deducted of over $55,000.
Even when we exclude fees over $50,000 (Figure 3.9b), the average fees paid increases
dramatically in the top 1% relative to the bottom 99% of the income distribution. The
average fees paid for the 99 − 99.5 percentile group are nearly double those paid by the
95− 99 percentile group; the average fees paid by the 99.5− 99.9 and 99.9+ percentile groups
are nearly triple and quadruple those paid by the 95− 99 percentile group.
We also consider two scaled versions of the fees paid: fees as a proportion of total
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Figure 3.9: Tax preparation fees by corrected AGI percentile











































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: N = 25,753. Limited to returns with a paid preparer with greater than 0 estimated fees paid for
professional tax services. See Table 3.2 for subtotals by corrected AGI percentile.
deductions (Figure 3.9c) and fees as a proportion of (the absolute value of) AGI (Figure
3.9d). In the first case, we again see the trend that higher corrected AGI percentiles have
a higher amount of their total deductions be due to tax preparation fees (with the top 1%
attributing over 10% of their total deductions to tax preparations fees, on average).
In contrast, tax preparation fees tend to decrease as a proportion of AGI, as corrected
AGI percentile increases. Income deciles above the median tend to spend a relatively constant
proportion of their income on tax preparation fees (around 2-3%), which is half (or even
less) than that spent by income decile groups below the median.13 The proportion of income
spent on tax preparation services may be overestimated if our data do not fully capture
13This final figure excludes the 0− 10 percentile group because it distorts the graph beyond readability.
This decile group seems to spend an inordinate amount on tax preparers: 200% of their AGI on average. We
suspect this group might include a few individuals similar to those declaring negative AGI (in that they have
low AGI due to losses rather than, e.g., low wages). If true, this could artificially inflate this measure of fees
paid by pairing high fees in the numerator with low AGI at the denominator, distorting the average. The
version of the figure with the 0− 10 percentile group included is given in Figure C.3 in Appendix C.2.3.
99
under-reported income. If true, this may impact our estimates for the top 1% more than
other income groups depending on the types of undetected income.
Overall, these results highlight that spending on tax preparation fees increases quite
dramatically at top incomes. While this observation holds when considering fees as a
percentage of overall deductions, the same does not hold for fees as a percentage of AGI.
This last difference might be indicative of the fact that what is a “typical” tax return varies
throughout the income distribution.
3.3.2.2 Average number of returns prepared
Figure 3.10 shows the average number of returns signed by the preparers used in each
corrected AGI percentile group.14 As corrected AGI percentile group increases, the average
number of returns prepared by the preparers used by that percentile group generally decreases.
While there is no substantial variation in the bottom 90%, the rate of decrease in the average
number of returns prepared becomes larger in the top 10%, so that the average number of
returns prepared by a preparer used in the top 0.1% is about half that of the average number
prepared by preparers used in the middle of the income distribution.
While preparers used by the top 1% tend to prepare fewer returns on average, they also
elicit considerably higher fees (as we saw in Figure 3.9a). What is unknown is why these
professionals prepare fewer returns. It could be because the tax returns of the top 1% are
more complicated. Alternatively (or possibly in addition), it could be that the top 1% expect
more attention to be paid to their return given the amount of money they are spending on the
service. Either of these interpretations is consistent with the notion that paid tax preparation
services for the richest taxpayers may be a different product than tax preparation services
among the bottom 99%, which requires more time and specialization but yields considerably
higher pay.
3.3.2.3 Tax preparer professions
Several professions may serve as paid tax preparers: Certified Public Accountants (CPAs),
Enrolled Agents, tax attorneys, and Supervised Registered Tax Preparers (SRTPs). A CPA
holds a license to offer accounting services to the public in a particular state. Tax attorneys
are lawyers concerned with issues related to tax liability and taxation. Like CPAs, attorneys
14We exclude the handful of preparer ID numbers associated with 30,000 or more returns. We present the
same figure as Figure 3.10 with alternative cut-offs of 1,000, 5,000, and 10,000 in Appendix C.2.4. When we
use these alternative cut-offs, the trends mirror what we observe in Figure 3.10: as corrected AGI percentile
group increases, the average number of returns prepared by the preparers used by that percentile group
decreases.
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Notes: N = 83,308. See Table 3.2 for subtotals by corrected AGI percentile. Excludes preparers who are
listed as preparing 30,000 or more returns.
are licensed to practice in a particular state. Enrolled Agents are tax advisors who have
been federally authorized by the U.S. Department of the Treasury. The “Enrolled Agent”
credential is recognized in all 50 states. SRTPs do not sign tax returns themselves; instead,
they work for an organization owned by CPAs, attorneys, and/or Enrolled Agents, and are
supervised by a CPA, attorney, or Enrolled Agent with a PTIN.
Figure 3.11 shows the proportion of paid preparers that fall into each of these four
categories by income group, as well as the proportion that is not associated with any of
these four titles.15 We observe that higher income groups are considerably more likely to
hire a preparer that is a CPA (Figure 3.11a) or attorney (Figure 3.11b) relative to lower
income groups, while lower income groups are more likely to have their returns prepared by
an Enrolled Agent (Figure 3.11c) or SRTP (Figure 3.11d). Lower income groups are also
much more likely to have their return prepared by someone who does not self-report their
profession as any of these four (Figure 3.11e). These figures make it clear that different
income groups are more or less likely to hire different types of tax preparers, and reinforces
15The IRS began collecting this information through self-reporting by tax preparers in 2011. We are not
able to identify the profession of our full set of tax preparers both because our sample starts in 2006, and
because the data are self-reported.
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Notes: N = 84,769. See Table 3.2 for subtotals by corrected AGI percentile. In our data, we observe 33,849
CPAs, 838 attorneys, 6,979 Enrolled Agents, and 1,785 Supervised Registered Tax Preparers. Of the tax
preparers included in our data, 39,848 did not self-report a profession or preparer type.
our conjecture at the end of Section 3.3.2.2: tax preparation services used by the top 1%
look like a different product than that used by the bottom 99%.
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3.4 Why would someone in the top 1% not use a tax preparer?
Given that paid preparers seem to lead to smaller corrections for the top 1% (so either do
a better job at not making mistakes or at finding grey areas), why don’t we observe everyone
in the top 1% of the income distribution using a paid preparer?
In section 3.4.1, we extend the Allingham and Sandmo (1972b)-style model developed
by Guyton et al. (2021) to incorporate the decision to hire a tax preparer. We analyze this
stylized model to provide intuition and justification for the empirical findings we present in
Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3. There are two important caveats to this model. First, the model
assumes “effective concealment” is the only reason a taxpayer will hire a tax preparer. In
reality, taxpayers might have other reasons to hire a tax preparer, such as opportunity cost
or a desire to decrease compliance costs. Second, the model is silent about whether the tax
preparers “knowingly” increase noncompliance or not. As a decrease in the probability of
detection as a result of hiring a tax preparer does not have to be interpreted as “malicious
activity.”
3.4.1 Intuition from a stylized model
The set-up of the model is as follows. Individuals decide on how much of their true
exogenous income (y) to evade, where evasion is denoted by e. Individuals can take a binary
concealment action a ∈ {0, 1} which decreases the probability p of that any evasion is detected.
The concealment action has a fixed cost, κ. We interpret the concealment decision to be the
decision to hire a professional tax preparer who can help the taxpayer evade more successfully.
Our descriptive analysis suggests that the top 1% and bottom 99% of the income
distribution do not use the same type of tax preparer.16 We extend the model to include
a third action which will decrease the probability of detection further, but at a higher
cost. In other words, while choosing how much to evade the individual can also take action
a ∈ {0, 1, 2} such that p0 > p1 > p2 and κ2 > κ1 > κ0 = 0 17. We refer to the action a = 0 as
self-preparation, the action a = 1 as hiring a generalized tax preparer, and the action a = 2
as hiring a specialized tax preparer.
We make a few assumptions as part of differentiating between generalized and specialized
tax preparers. First, we assume that specialized tax preparers are better able to reduce the
probability of detection of evasion. Second, we assume that the fixed cost of hiring specialized
tax preparers is greater than that of hiring a generalized tax preparer. This assumption is
16See, e.g. Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.11.
17The assumption of κ0 = 0, can easily be relaxed and the results will be unaffected. To be consistent
with the original Allingham-Sandmo model and Guyton et al. (2021), we keep this assumption for the rest of
the model
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likely to be true if specialized tax preparers spend more time on each return they prepare,
resulting in those preparers accepting fewer clients and thus requiring higher fees for their
services.
The individual’s optimization problem is given as follows.
max
{e∈[0,y],a∈{0,1,2}}
(1− p(a))u((1− τ)y + τe− κa) + p(a)u((1− τ)y − τeθ − κa) (3.4.1)
subject to
(1− τ)y − τeθ − κa > 0 ∀a,
where τ denotes the income tax rate and θ > 0 is the penalty rate levied on the evaded tax.
u(·) is a standard utility function that is strictly increasing and concave.
Let ga(y, p) denote the optimal income evaded ratio if agent were to choose a ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
When a = 0, the model boils down to the standard Allingham-Sandmo framework. As a
result, the behavior of optimal evasion and the fraction of income evaded decisions when
a = 0 are the same as summarized in Lemma 1 of Guyton et al. (2021). Let A(c) := −u
′′(c)
u′(c)
and R(c) := − cu”(c)
u′(c)
denote the absolute and relative risk aversion. We present a generalized
version of the lemma below.
Lemma 1. The Allingham-Sandmo Tax Gap
• If the individual is risk averse, for any a ∈ {0, 1, 2}, ga is decreasing over p, ∂ga∂p < 0
• If absolute risk aversion is decreasing, A′ < 0, evasion e is increasing in true income y.




• If relative risk aversion is decreasing, R′ < 0, for any a ∈ {0, 1, 2}, ga is decreasing
over income y, ∂ga
∂y
< 0.
• If relative risk aversion is increasing, R′ > 0, for any a ∈ {0, 1, 2}, ga is increasing
over income y, ∂ga
∂y
> 0.
Proof. See Allingham and Sandmo (1972b) for the case of a = 0. However, all else constant,
a = 0 can be trivially extended to a = 1 and a = 2 cases.
In order to accommodate the third costly action we include above, we introduce the
following modified Assumption 1 and Lemma 2:
Assumption 1. As y becomes arbitrarily large, g0(y, p1) and g1(y, p2) approach strictly
positive constants respectively.
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Lemma 2. Under Assumption 1, as y becomes arbitrarily large:
• g1(y, p1)− g0(y, p1) converges to 0,
• g2(y, p2)− g1(y, p2) converges to 0.
Lemma 2 suggests that as income y increases, given a fixed detection probability, the fixed
cost of hiring a tax preparer and the additional fixed cost of hiring a “better” tax preparer
diminishes.
Further, in order to guarantee that each action will be optimal for some agent, we need to
ensure that no action is particularly “disadvantaged” with respect to the cost-benefit bundle




























We can now state the main result:
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1,
• There is a cutoff income level, y′, such that all else equal, agents with income higher
than this cutoff will prefer to hire a generalized tax preparer over self-preparation,
• There is a cutoff income level, y′′, such that all else equal, agents with income higher
than this cutoff will prefer to hire a specialized tax preparer over generalized tax preparer.
• If, additionally, Assumption 2 is satisfied, then y′′ > y′.
The first statement of the proposition is equivalent to Proposition 1 in Guyton et al.
(2021). The second statement is proved by a slight modification of the proof for the first
statement. The proofs are included in Appendix C.3. Note that Proposition 1 implies that
under Assumption 2, an individual with income y ∈ [y′, y′′] will choose to hire a generalized
tax preparer. On the other hand, the proposition does not prescribe an optimal action for
rich individuals directly. Instead, it only states that as the income of taxpayers increases they
are more likely to hire specialized taxpayers. Corollary 1 characterizes the optimal hiring
decision for the very rich:
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Corollary 1. Under Assumption 1, it is optimal for a taxpayer with income y > y′′ to hire a
specialized tax preparer, i.e., choose action a = 2.
This corollary immediately follows from the second statement of Proposition 1 and a
modification of the proof of the first statement. Intuitively, it is plausible to think that hiring
decision increases with income. In other words, if a taxpayer does not find it optimal to
self-prepare another taxpayer with higher income will also not find self-preparing optimal.
Therefore, for taxpayers with income y ≥ y′′ it is better to hire a specialized preparer over a
generalized tax preparer, which is better than self-preparing.
In the next two subsections, we further modify the model to provide a possible theoretical
rationale for why some individuals with y > y′′ will choose to self-prepare (a = 0) instead of
hiring a specialized tax preparer (a = 2) as suggested by Corollary 1.
3.4.1.1 The effect of specialized occupation: accountants
So far we have assumed that the probability of detection can only be influenced through the
action of hiring different types of tax preparers. Specifically, we assumed that all self-preparing
agents are subject to the same detection probability, p0. In reality, it is plausible that some
taxpayers might be “better” at self-preparing their tax returns compared to others. For
example, if some taxpayers are specialized accountants or tax preparers themselves they
might be subject to the same lower probability of detection without incurring the cost of
paying for services of another tax preparer.18
Let α ∈ {0, 1} be an indicator function of whether the taxpayer is a specialized accountant
or not, so α = 1 if the taxpayer is a specialized accountant and α = 0 otherwise. Suppose the
probability of detection, p, is not only a function of a, the decision of hiring a tax preparer,
but also a function of α, i.e. p(a, α).
Suppose the ranking of probability of detection is as follows:
p(0, 0) < p(1, 0) < p(2, 0) = p(2, 1) = p(0, 1) = p(1, 1).
This relationship implies that if a taxpayer is a specialized accountant themselves, they cannot
decrease the probability of detection further by hiring someone else.19 Under this assumption,
no specialized accountant will hire a tax preparer as doing so provides no benefits but results
18Here we are making a simplifying assumption that the self-preparation cost for an accountant is strictly
less than hiring an external preparer, which would follow from the presence of any transaction cost or any
asymmetric information about whether or not the tax preparer was a specialized tax preparer.
19Another way to interpret this relationship is to assume that these are not actual probabilities but beliefs
of the taxpayer. Under this interpretation, taxpayers who are accountants do not have to be specialized, but
rather believe that they are specialized and, in turn, cannot gain additional benefit by hiring a tax preparer.
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in a cost. If this is true, we should observe similar benefits to hiring a paid preparer among
the top 1% as we do for self-prepared returns in the top 1% where the individual was an
accountant. We test this hypothesis in Section 3.4.2.
3.4.1.2 The effect of the share of income subject to third-party information
The baseline model assumes that the evasion decision of the individual is bounded by the
true income y. Empirically, individuals are less likely to evade (or try to evade) income subject
to third-party reporting (see, e.g., Kleven et al. (2011); Slemrod et al. (2017)). As Guyton
et al. (2021) suggest, it is straightforward to extend the baseline model to include third-party
reporting considerations by assuming a bound on possible evasion. Specifically, one can
assume that an individual cannot evade income that is subject to third-party reporting and
not shiftable to any other category. Consequently, redefining the variable y as income that can
be evaded will yield the same results as the baseline model, but with different interpretations.
Specifically, Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 will imply that any taxpayer with income level
above y′′ not subject to third-party reporting will hire a specialized tax preparer. There are
several follow-up implications to this interpretation, which are summarized in Corollary 2:
Corollary 2. Under Assumption 1, and the case y denotes income not subject to third-party
reporting,
• A taxpayer can have a substantial total income, but will hire a generalized tax preparer
if their income not subject to third-party reporting is greater than y′ but less than y′′
• A taxpayer can have a substantial total income but will choose to self-prepare if their
income not subject to third-party reporting is less than y′
The proof of the corollary immediately follows from reinterpreting y as income not subject
to third-party reporting. This corollary predicts that individuals with a larger share of income
subject to third-party reporting are more likely to self-prepare, even if their total income
puts them in the top of the income distribution. We turn to this hypothesis in Section 3.4.3.
3.4.2 Testing extension 1: the top 1% who are also accountants
One explanation for why individuals in the top 1% of the income distribution would not
use a paid tax preparer is because they themselves are an accountant or financial planner, and
therefore expect they would be able to provide themselves with as good (or better) service
for the money than paying someone else.20
20There is, of course, the question of opportunity cost–but some people find tasks like the puzzle of their
tax returns compelling.
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We show the proportion of individuals with an occupation code in the administrative tax
data that indicates that their job concerns accountant or some type of financial planning in
Figure 3.12. It is clear that, across the income distribution, individuals who are themselves
accountants are more likely to self-prepare their returns. In addition, the proportion of
individuals who are accountants is considerably higher in the top 1% relative to the bottom
99%. Even within the top 1%, the share of individuals who are accountants increases as
corrected AGI percentile group increases, and the relative share of self-prepared returns that
are prepared by accountants increases.










































0−99 Pctl 99−99.5 Pctl 99.5−99.9 Pctl 99.9+ Pctl <0 AGI
Paid−prepared Self−prepared
Notes: N = 111,603 individuals. See Table 3.2 for subtotals by corrected AGI percentile.
We can perform the same analysis more formally. In Table 3.3, we show the results of
running Equation 3.4.3 over several sub-populations:
Paidi = α0 + α1(Accountanti = 1) + ui (3.4.3)
We find that the probability of using a paid preparer significantly decreases for individuals
with an accounting occupation code, and that this decrease in probability is smaller at higher
levels of the income distribution. At the same time, the baseline probability of using a paid
preparer (α0) increases at higher levels of the income distribution.
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We then ask whether being an accountant in the top 1% of the income distribution has
a similar effect on the size of post-NRP audit scaled corrections to various outcomes.21 In
Section 3.3.1, we found that, in general, self-prepared returns had higher corrections in the
top 1% relative to paid-prepared returns. We run the regression shown in Equation 3.4.4
over a variety of outcomes y:
yi = β0 + β1(Paidi = 1) (3.4.4)
+ β2(Paidi = 1 & Top 1% = 1)
+ β3(Paidi = 1 & < 0 AGI = 1)
+ β4(Selfi = 1 & Top 1% = 1 & Accountant = 1) + εi
We run this regression using indicators for the top 1% grouped together, and for the top 1%
split into the 99− 99.5, 99.5− 99.5, and 99.9+ percentile subgroups.
Table 3.4 shows the “overall’ results (total income, AGI, taxable income, and tax liability),
similar to Figure 3.7). While the scaled corrections to total income, AGI, and tax liability
are higher when using a paid preparer in the bottom 99%, the scaled correction is lower
for the top 1%. The coefficients on the interaction terms between “Paid” and the top 1%
percentile groups are statistically significant at the 0.1% level, and increasing (in magnitude)
as percentile increases. In other words, using a paid preparer leads to smaller corrections
among the top 1%; the higher up in the income distribution, the smaller the overall correction.
Table 3.3: Probability of using a paid preparer if have accountant occupation code
Corrected AGI percentile
Top 1% subgroups
0− 99 Top 1% 99− 99.5 99.5− 99.9 99.9+ < 0 AGI
Accountant -0.201∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗ -0.189∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.0871∗∗∗ 0.0434
(0.0123) (0.0101) (0.0270) (0.0138) (0.0166) (0.0737)
Constant 0.710∗∗∗ 0.915∗∗∗ 0.884∗∗∗ 0.915∗∗∗ 0.946∗∗∗ 0.898∗∗∗
(0.00148) (0.00249) (0.00574) (0.00345) (0.00445) (0.00727)
N 95,573 14,282 3,409 7,520 3,047 1,748
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
We can then compare how the coefficient on the interaction term between self-prepared,
top 1%, accountant compares to the coefficients on using a paid preparer in the top 1%.
These results are given in Table 3.5. Across all top 1% groupings (all grouped together,
and broken into various subgroups), we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the net effect


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.5: Size of scaled corrections, overall: testing equality of coefficients
Top 1% subgroups
Top 1% 99− 99.5 99.5− 99.9 99.9+
Total income
Difference 0.00381 0.03250 -0.00736 0.00336
F-stat 0.06391 1.20363 0.13541 0.00850
Prob > F 0.80042 0.27260 0.71289 0.92653
AGI
Difference 0.00374 0.03152 -0.00697 0.00324
F-stat 0.06130 1.13027 0.12124 0.00791
Prob > F 0.80445 0.28772 0.72769 0.92915
Taxable income
Difference 0.00143 0.03528 -0.01159 0.00110
F-stat 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Prob > F 0.99996 0.99954 0.99978 0.99999
Tax liability
Difference -0.00088 0.03528 -0.01501 -0.00083
F-stat 0.00065 0.27292 0.10827 0.00010
Prob > F 0.97961 0.60138 0.74213 0.99203
Notes: Difference is equal to β1+β2−β4, where β1 is the coefficient on “Paid,”
β2 is the coefficient on the indicator for the relevant top 1% group using
a paid preparer, and β4 is the coefficient on the indicator for the relevant
top 1% group that self-prepared their returns and also have an accounting
occupation code (see Equation 3.4.4). The reported F-stat and p-value are
on the null hypothesis that difference is equal to 0.
on the scaled corrected value of using a paid preparer in the top 1% is equal to the effect
of self-preparing as an accountant. This suggests that individuals in the top 1% who are
accountants and self-prepare their tax returns experience similarly sized scaled corrections as
individuals in the top 1% who use a paid preparer.
Table 3.6 shows the results when we run Equation 3.4.4 where the outcome of interest y
is a variety of scaled corrections by type of income (similar to Figure 3.7). The largest scaled
corrections are in self-employment income and rental income. Paid-prepared returns among
the bottom 99% generally experienced larger corrections to self-employment income relative
to self-prepared returns, whereas the top 1% had lower corrections to self-employment income
relative to self-prepared returns. Paid-prepared returns in both the bottom 99% and top
1% had lower scaled corrections to rental income compared to self-prepared returns, but the
magnitude of the decrease is considerably larger for the top 1%.
Table 3.7 gives the results of statistically testing whether the coefficients on the indicator
for a paid-prepared return in the top 1% is equal to that on the indicator for a self-prepared,


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the size of the net effect of a paid preparer in the
top 1% is the same as that for a self-prepared, top 1% accountant.
3.4.3 Testing extension 2: third-party reported income
Another explanation for why individuals in the top 1% of the income distribution would
not use a paid tax preparer is that a high proportion of their income stems from sources
subject to third-party reporting. As there is less grey area in reporting income subject to
third-party reporting, individuals who receive more income from, e.g., wages may be less
inclined to spend the money to hire a tax professional to help them prepare their tax returns.
We also expect that, among those that do hire a paid-preparer, the amount of money paid for
services may be less when there is more income from sources subject to third-party reporting.
While this reasoning holds true for any income level, we can investigate both whether we see
evidence to support these conjectures and the extent to which that evidence varies by income.
We test these hypotheses with two empirical specifications. In Section 3.4.3.1, we regress
the relevant outcomes on the proportion of total income coming from different sources. In
Section 3.4.3.2, we regress the relevant outcomes on an indicator for whether or not the
individual received 95-100% of their income from wages.
3.4.3.1 Proportion of income from different sources
Equation 3.4.5 includes the proportion of income from seven different income sources on
the right-hand side: wage income, self-employment income, capital gains, ordinary dividends,
income from partnerships and S-corporations, rental income, and other income. We run
Equation 3.4.5 over a variety of sub-populations on two outcomes z: an indicator of whether
or not the individual used a paid preparer, and (among those that use paid-preparers), the
amount of fees deducted for preparation services. We define Pj as a measure of the amount
of total income from type of income j.
zi = γ0 + γ1Pwages + γ2Pself-employment + γ3Pcapital gains (3.4.5)
+ γ4Pord. dividends + γ5Ppart/s-corps + γ6Prental + γ7Pother + ei
It is important to acknowledge the potential reverse causality here: hiring a preparer may
affect what kinds of income you report, as well as how much of each type, rather than the
other way around. We expect this direction to be less problematic for sources of income that
are subject to third-party reporting, such as wages. Consequently, and consistently with our
theoretical analysis in Section 3.4.1.2, we focus our analysis below on the findings related to
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Table 3.7: Size of scaled corrections, by type of income: testing equality of coefficients
Top 1% subgroups
Top 1% 99− 99.5 99.5− 99.9 99.9+
Wage income
Difference -0.00005 -0.00011 0.00008 -0.00037
F-stat 0.07746 0.10767 0.12255 0.73604
Prob > F 0.78077 0.74282 0.72629 0.39093
Self-employment income
Difference 0.09594 0.18439 0.07718 0.04659
F-stat 1.68922 1.61820 0.62170 0.06847
Prob > F 0.19371 0.20335 0.43042 0.79358
Capital gains
Difference -0.00062 0.00587 -0.00440 0.00366
F-stat 0.04514 1.05742 1.30586 0.27245
Prob > F 0.83174 0.30381 0.25315 0.60169
Ordinary dividends
Difference 0.00022 0.00156 -0.00032 0.00052
F-stat 0.02000 0.25765 0.02406 0.01929
Prob > F 0.88755 0.61174 0.87673 0.88955
Partnership/S-corporation income
Difference -0.00084 0.01206 -0.00603 0.00123
F-stat 0.01283 0.57737 0.39933 0.00509
Prob > F 0.90981 0.44735 0.52744 0.94314
Rental income
Difference 0.03862 0.08903 0.03125 0.01497
F-stat 0.16918 0.19482 0.06640 0.00468
Prob > F 0.68084 0.65894 0.79666 0.94548
Other income
Difference 0.00311 0.01634 -0.00396 0.00887
F-stat 0.13095 0.93767 0.12110 0.18337
Prob > F 0.71745 0.33288 0.72785 0.66849
Notes: Difference is equal to β1+β2−β4, where β1 is the coefficient on “Paid,”
β2 is the coefficient on the indicator for the relevant top 1% group using
a paid preparer, and β4 is the coefficient on the indicator for the relevant
top 1% group that self-prepared their returns and also have an accounting
occupation code (see Equation 3.4.4). The reported F-stat and p-value are
on the null hypothesis that difference is equal to 0.
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Table 3.8: Probability of using a paid preparer based on proportion of income from...
Corrected AGI percentile
Top 1% subgroups
0− 99 Top 1% 99− 99.5 99.5− 99.9 99.9+ < 0 AGI
Wages -0.0357∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗ -0.0892∗∗∗ -0.0755∗∗ -0.000367
(0.00196) (0.0141) (0.0269) (0.0209) (0.0274) (0.000619)
Self-emp. income 0.00516∗ -0.0182 -0.0397 -0.000197 -0.0209 -0.000471
(0.00236) (0.0172) (0.0320) (0.0252) (0.0369) (0.000894)
Cap. gains 0.0130∗∗∗ 0.00210 -0.0124 0.00204 -0.00725 -0.00198
(0.00210) (0.0155) (0.0322) (0.0228) (0.0292) (0.00158)
Ord. dividends 0.0428∗∗∗ 0.0147 0.0213 -0.00394 0.0164 -0.00358
(0.00533) (0.0239) (0.0487) (0.0356) (0.0413) (0.00329)
Partnerships/S-corp. -0.0304∗∗∗ 0.00811 -0.0114 0.0138 -0.00265 -0.000357
(0.00194) (0.0141) (0.0268) (0.0212) (0.0276) (0.000897)
Rental income -0.0324∗∗∗ 0.0365 0.0453 0.0527 -0.0412 0.00113
(0.00214) (0.0252) (0.0523) (0.0351) (0.0504) (0.00229)
Other income -0.0327∗∗∗ -0.0290 -0.0248 -0.0434 -0.00949 -0.000314
(0.00198) (0.0229) (0.0498) (0.0317) (0.0444) (0.000891)
Constant 0.714∗∗∗ 0.949∗∗∗ 0.955∗∗∗ 0.940∗∗∗ 0.972∗∗∗ 0.897∗∗∗
(0.00210) (0.0131) (0.0245) (0.0196) (0.0258) (0.00736)
N 101,259 14,287 3,410 7,523 3,354 1,757
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
wages. The fact that tax preparers might advise their clients to reorganize how they report
their income is an important caveat to our discussion of other types of income.
Table 3.8 shows the results when the outcome of interest is whether or not the individual
used a paid-preparer, and where Pj is the proportion of total income that comes from source
j. Across the income distribution, we find that having a higher proportion of total income
coming from wages–a type of third-party reported income–significantly reduces the likelihood
of hiring a paid tax preparer. These coefficients are significant at the 0.1% level (except for
the 99.9+ percentile groups, which is only significant at the 5% level). This effect is nearly
twice as large among the top 1% of the income distribution compared to the bottom 99%.
We test the equality of these coefficients in Table 3.9 and find that they are statistically
different from each other at the 0.1% level.
We find that a larger proportion of total income from any of the other income types we
consider has no statistically significant effect on the likelihood of hiring a preparer among the
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top 99% (and the magnitude of the estimated coefficients are considerably smaller than what
we observe for wages). We do observe statistically significant coefficients for the other types
of income among the bottom 99% of the income distribution, though this is driven in part
by the fact that we have about seven times as many observations in the bottom 99% as we
do in the top 1%. We estimate coefficients on income from partnerships and S-corporations,
rental income, and other income, that are all statistically significant at the 0.1% level and
comparable in sign and magnitude to the coefficient on wage income for the bottom 99%. In
contrast, the coefficients on self-employment income, capital gains, and ordinary dividends
Table 3.9: Probability of using a paid preparer based on proportion of income from wages:
testing equality of coefficients
Top 1% subgroups
Top 1% 99− 99.5 99.5− 99.9 99.9+
Proportion of total income from wages
Difference -0.080 -0.120 -0.067 -0.044
F-stat 72.803 41.755 26.715 4.799
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.028
Notes: Difference is equal to γ1,99% − γ1,1%, where γ1,99% is the value for
the bottom 99% and γ1,1% is the relevant value for the top 1% combined or
top 1% subgroup as indicated by the table header. The reported F-stat and
p-value are on the null hypothesis that difference is equal to 0.
are positive (i.e., higher proportions of total income from those types of income increase the
probability of hiring a paid tax preparer), with the coefficient on self-employment income
being significant only at the 5% level and an order of magnitude smaller than all of the other
coefficients.
Table 3.10 shows the results when the outcome of interest is how much the taxpayer
deducted in tax preparer fees, and Pj is the level of (corrected) income type j. We use the
level of income divided by $1,000, so that the interpretation of any coefficient is “the change
in total fees paid when type of income j increases by $1,000.” While this does not directly
address the question of why someone in the top 1% would not hire a tax preparer (because
everyone included in this analysis hired a tax preparer by default), it provides additional
insight into how paid-preparer use differs between the top 1% and the bottom 99%, and even
within the top 1%.
We find that higher wages are associated with marginally lower fees paid to tax professionals
among the bottom 99%, but with higher fees among the top 1% when considered as a whole.
This is counter to our intuition that higher wages would be associated with reduced fees paid
to professionals (because those returns may be less complex on average). When we consider
the top 1% subgroups, we see our intuition holds in the 99− 99.9 percent, but again we see a
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Table 3.10: Fees paid to professional preparers based on amount of income (in $1k) from...
Corrected AGI percentile
Top 1% subgroups
0− 99 Top 1% 99− 99.5 99.5− 99.9 99.9+ < 0 AGI
Wages -1.76∗ 4.34∗∗∗ -27.03∗∗∗ -13.51∗∗∗ 3.03∗ -31.72
(0.73) (0.66) (6.53) (2.38) (1.23) (28.75)
Self-emp. income 8.43∗∗∗ -5.33∗∗∗ -27.84∗∗∗ -11.68∗∗ -5.54∗ -125.28∗∗∗
(1.34) (1.50) (8.29) (4.10) (2.68) (5.99)
Cap. gains -5.26∗∗∗ 2.77∗∗∗ -27.10∗∗∗ 4.26 2.55∗∗∗ 98.08∗∗∗
(1.36) (0.16) (7.71) (2.81) (0.28) (3.64)
Ord. dividends 198.61∗∗∗ 72.30∗∗∗ 143.05∗∗∗ 121.32∗∗∗ 67.67∗∗∗ 206.68∗∗∗
(2.20) (1.84) (10.73) (5.31) (3.31) (30.09)
Partnerships/S-corp. -25.17∗∗∗ 3.42∗∗∗ -42.42∗∗∗ -15.41∗∗∗ 2.71∗∗ 0.95
(0.91) (0.50) (5.96) (2.49) (0.91) (2.98)
Rental income -0.89 -35.32∗∗∗ -8.86 -9.16 -35.18∗∗∗ -29.04
(4.56) (4.01) (25.67) (10.26) (7.14) (36.96)
Other income -43.39∗∗∗ -0.51 -12.72 16.91∗ -1.34 1.20
(2.08) (1.48) (14.43) (6.98) (2.62) (1.38)
Constant 1,309∗∗∗ 21,873∗∗∗ 16,671∗∗∗ 24,484∗∗∗ 50,357∗∗∗ -2,181
(106) (1,705) (2,992) (2,711) (5,943) (6,107)
N 17,741 7,676 1,474 3,997 2,205 336
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Limited to returns with a paid preparer with greater than 0 estimated
fees paid for professional tax services.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
positive relationship between wages and fees paid to tax professionals is positive.
Perhaps most telling is how small the magnitude of these coefficients are. Across income
types and the income distribution (with the exception of the negative AGI group), the
estimated γ coefficients are almost all lower than $40 and often lower than $10 in magnitude.
These magnitudes are particularly small relative to the constants associated with the various
income groups (e.g., the constant for the top 1% as a whole is over $21,500).
The primary exceptions to this are the coefficients on ordinary dividends. Notably, the
coefficient on ordinary dividends for the bottom 99% suggests that a $1,000 increase in ordinary
dividends is associated with a nearly $200 increase in fees paid to tax professionals–equivalent
to a 15% increase over the constant.
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Wages < 95% Income Wages = 95−100% Income
Notes: N = 117,303 individuals. See Table 3.2 for subtotals by corrected AGI percentile.
3.4.3.2 95-100% of total income from wages
In this section, we consider cases where an individual’s wages are equal to 95-100% of the
value of the individual’s total pre-tax income.22 We present the results graphically in Figure
3.13. Individuals with less than 95% of their income from wages are more likely to use paid
tax preparation services across the income distribution. This difference generally decreases
for higher income groups, reflecting the fact that higher income individuals are more likely to
use paid preparers.
We capture this relationship by running Equation 3.4.6 over various income subgroups.







The results of this analysis for zi being an indicator of using a paid tax preparer are given in
Table 3.11. The results are consistent with our previous analyses: the baseline probability of
using a paid preparer goes up with income group. Across all income groups, the probability
of using a paid preparer goes down if 95-100% of total income is from wage income, but the
22Because of cases with negative income (e.g., business losses), this indicator may capture some individuals
whose wage income is less than 95% of their total positive income.
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0− 99 Top 1% 99− 99.5 99.5− 99.9 99.9+ < 0 AGI
Wages = 95-100% of Income -0.201∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.0973∗∗∗ -0.699∗∗∗
(0.00305) (0.00675) (0.0148) (0.00957) (0.0114) (0.0599)
Constant 0.757∗∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗ 0.907∗∗∗ 0.923∗∗∗ 0.956∗∗∗ 0.908∗∗∗
(0.00171) (0.00259) (0.00605) (0.00359) (0.00430) (0.00700)
N 101,259 14,287 3,410 7,523 3,354 1,757
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
relative decrease in probability is smaller for higher income groups.
We perform the same analysis considering average fees paid to tax professionals. As
in Section 3.4.3.1, setting zi equal to fees paid to tax preparers does not itself answer the
question of why someone in the top 1% of the income distribution would not hire a professional
tax preparer, but it provides additional insight into how tax preparers are used by that
population.
We first present the results graphically in Figure 3.14. Figure 3.14a shows the average
fees paid to professional preparers by income group, split by whether or not the individuals
had 95-100% of their total income come from wage income. Figure 3.14b is the same analysis,
limited to fees that under $50,000. Both panels highlight that individuals who have less
than 95% of their total income come from wages pay considerably more, on average, for
professional tax preparation than individuals who receive nearly all of their income from
wages.
The results from running Equation 3.4.6 with zi as fees paid are given in Table 3.12. The
average fees paid increase considerably when comparing the bottom 99% to the top 1%. In
addition, the average decrease in fees paid is larger the higher up in the income distribution
we go (in particular, the average decrease in fees paid to tax professionals when the individual
receives most of their income from wages increases with each subsequent subgroup of the top
1%).
These results support the idea that having income from third-party reported sources
both decreases the likelihood of using a preparer to begin with, and decreases the fees that
a preparer is able to elicit for their services. These analyses are also consistent with the
literature and idea that simpler returns are less likely to be prepared by a paid professional.
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Figure 3.14: Tax preparation fees by indicator of wages being 95-100% of income


































































































































































































Wages < 95% Income Wages = 95−100% Income
Notes: N = 25,753 individuals. See Table 3.2 for subtotals by corrected AGI percentile.
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0− 99 Top 1% 99− 99.5 99.5− 99.9 99.9+
Wages = 95-100% of Income -2.333∗∗∗ -29.36∗∗∗ -10.14∗∗∗ -19.37∗∗∗ -59.82∗∗∗
(0.201) (4.983) (2.703) (2.714) (16.14)
Constant 3.080∗∗∗ 45.52∗∗∗ 12.30∗∗∗ 27.25∗∗∗ 100.7∗∗∗
(0.102) (1.898) (1.063) (1.022) (6.138)
N 17,741 7,676 1,474 3,997 2,205
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Limited to returns with a paid preparer with greater than 0 estimated
fees paid for professional tax services.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
3.5 Conclusion
This paper explores the use of professional tax preparers by the top 1% of the income
distribution. Given that recent literature has suggested that the rich might be responsible
for a large share of unpaid taxes, it seems important to understand the role tax preparers
play in shielding their income from taxation, and what regulation might address this state of
affairs. Our analysis provides crucial descriptive details, which will be key in understanding
this issue in future research.
We find that trends in tax preparer usage substantially differ across the income distribution,
both among individuals who use paid preparation services and the relative comparison with
self-prepared returns. In particular, we find that tax preparer usage is correlated with
different types of income for the top 1%, such as income from some pass-through businesses.
Additionally, while tax preparer usage is associated with higher corrections upon audit in the
bottom 99% of the income distribution, it is associated with smaller corrections among the
top 1%.
One limitation of these results is that post-NRP audit corrections may still not be
completely accurate. The auditor may fail to detect under- (or over-) reported income, or
may “correct” a line item that was originally accurate. The extent the top 1% are more likely
to have undetected, under-reported income, and/or more complicated tax returns, impacts
our conclusions about the role of tax preparation services in this population. Future research
on this topic should aim to integrate operational audit data and data on offshore accounts, to
further explore these issues. Another important and not-well understood piece of the puzzle
is the role of tax-preparation software, which has increased in prevalence over the last two





Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Additional institutional information about IRAs
A.1.1 Intuition for IRA tax benefit
Consider an individual that wants to invest an amount a of taxable income. She faces an
average income tax rate of t. She can either invest the amount in a regular savings account
after remitting income tax, or in a tax-benefited savings account before remitting income
tax. Both accounts face the same annual rate of return r. The growth of these accounts is
outlined in Table A.1:
Table A.1: Account growth over time in simple example
Regular account
Period Tax-benefited account No tax on return With tax on return
0 a a(1− ti) a(1− ti)
1 a(1 + r) a(1− ti)(1 + r) a(1− ti)(1 + r − rtr)
2 a(1 + r)2 a(1− ti)(1 + r)2 a(1− ti)(1 + r − rtr)2
3 a(1 + r)3 a(1− ti)(1 + r)3 a(1− ti)(1 + r − rtr)3
...
Account balance in period before withdrawing
k − 1 a(1 + r)k−1 a(1− ti)(1 + r)k−1 a(1− ti)(1 + r − rtr)k−1
Amount after withdrawal
k a(1− ti)(1 + r)k = a(1− ti)(1 + r)k > a(1− ti)(1 + r − rtr)k
If the individual withdraws from the tax-benefited account, she will owe income tax and her
take-home value will be equal to the balance in the regular account. However, this amount is
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not taxed further. In contrast, there are two additional taxes the individual faces if she holds
her money in the regular account depending on how the money is invested. She may owe tax
on the interest accumulated each year she held the account. Upon withdrawal, she may owe
capital gains taxes. Neither of these apply to the tax-benefited account. As a result, it is as
if the returns to the tax-benefited account were not subject to additional tax beyond income
tax.
A.1.2 Roth IRAs
The primary difference between traditional IRAs and Roth IRAs is the timing of when
income tax is due. Contributions to Roth IRAs are made after income tax is remitted, with
no tax due on qualified distributions (including on any earnings between contribution and
withdrawal). Roth IRAs are not subject to Required Minimum Distributions (withdrawals
are not required from Roth IRAs until after the death of the account owner). Roth IRA
holders do face the early withdrawal penalty, but the penalty only applies on withdrawals
that are larger than the principal investment.
There are a few other differences between traditional IRAs and Roth IRAs. All taxpayers
who earn sufficient income to make a contribution to a traditional IRA are eligible to hold a
traditional IRA, whereas eligibility to contribute to a Roth IRA is phased out for taxpayers
with high enough income (see Appendix A.1.4). There are also differences in when and what
taxes are owed upon death of the account holder (see Appendix A.1.6).
A.1.3 SEP and SIMPLE IRAs
There are two types of IRAs in addition to traditional IRAs and Roth IRAs: SIMPLE
IRAs and SEP IRAs. SIMPLE IRAs allow both employee and employer to contribute to a
traditional IRA set up for the employee, and are intended to be used by small employers (<100
employees) not sponsoring a retirement plan such as a 401(k). SEP (Simplified Employee
Pension) IRAs are used primarily by self-employed and small business owners. Only the
employer contributes, and the employee is always 100% vested. If an employer offers SEP
IRAs to their employees, the employer must contribute for all employees that meet a set of
requirements.1
Table A.2 shows the number of taxpayers that made contributions to or took distributions
from each of these account types, as well as the total end-of-year fair market value of these
accounts, in 2015. Because these IRAs make up a small fraction of total IRA accounts and
1A third additional type of IRA–the SARSEP (Savings Incentive Match Plan for Employees) IRA–are
SEP IRAs established before 1997 that include a salary reduction arrangement.
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face the same penalty structure as traditional IRA accounts, we follow Mortenson et al.
(2019) and count contributions toward (and distributions from) a SEP or SIMPLE IRA as
contributions toward (and distributions from) a traditional IRA for our analysis.
Table A.2: IRA activity by type of account, 2015
Contributions Distributions End-of-year FMV
IRA type Taxpayers Pct. Taxpayers Pct. FMV $1,000 Pct.
Traditional 4,305,106 31.6% 17,360,396 92.4% 6,386,720 85.4%
Roth 6,363,335 46.7% 708,221 3.8% 625,077 8.4%
SEP 1,093,512 8.0% 670,990 3.6% 364,264 4.9%
SIMPLE 1,865,777 13.7% 40,459 0.2% 101,194 1.4%
Total 13,627,730 100.0% 18,780,066 100.0% 7,477,255 100.0%
Total (unique) 13,006,314 n/a 18,670,599 n/a n/a n/a
Source: Authors’ calculations from Statistics of Incomes Tax Stats: Accumulation and Distribution
of Individual Retirement Arrangements (IRA) Table 1 (2015), available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-soi/15in01ira.xls. Total (unique) count is less than the total because some taxpayers may have made
contributions or distributions from more than one account. Contributions do not include rollovers.
A.1.4 Contribution and deductibility limits
Contributions into IRAs are capped. In 2015, individual taxpayers could not contribute
more than $5,500 in total to traditional and Roth IRA accounts. That amount was higher for
individuals over age 50 ($6,500). Contributions to IRAs are limited to an individual’s taxable
compensation, so if that was less than $5,500 for an individual, that individual’s contribution
limit would be equal to their taxable compensation. Taxpayers were not allowed to make
contributions to a traditional IRA after age 701
2
in 2015; contributions to a Roth IRA were
allowed after age 701
2
. In the event a taxpayer makes a contribution above the limit (or any
contribution at age 701
2
or older), the excess amount is taxed at 6% for each year it remains
in the IRA.
When money in one retirement account is moved into a different retirement account, it is
called a “rollover.” For example, if you leave job A, you can transfer the amount in your
401(k) from job A into the 401(k) you set up with your new job (or into your own IRA) and
it would not count toward your contribution limit. Rollovers from, e.g., a 401(k) into an IRA
are not counted toward the taxpayer’s contribution limit.
Contributions to Roth IRAs are not allowed for taxpayers above certain income levels.
Individual taxpayers with a modified adjusted gross income (MAGI) of less than $116,000
in 2015 were allowed to contribute the full $5,000 to a Roth IRA. Between a modified AGI
of $116,000 and $131,000, taxpayers were eligible to contribute a reduced amount of their
contribution limit to a Roth IRA. The partial amount for an individual taxpayer in 2015 can
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be calculated as:







After a modified AGI of $131,000, taxpayers wishing to contribute to an IRA were forced
to contribute to a traditional IRA. For married taxpayers filing jointly, the upper bound of
modified AGI for contributing the full amount to a Roth IRA was $183,000, and the lower
bound after which IRA contributions must be made to a traditional account was $193,000.
One strategy expected to be used by some taxpayers who earn too much to contribute to
a Roth IRA is to contribute to a traditional IRA and convert it to a Roth IRA later. No
taxes are assessed with a rollover, but if you rollover from a traditional account into a Roth
account, you must include the distributed amount as income (i.e., it will be included in your
taxable income that year).
The deductibility of contributions to a traditional IRA are limited for taxpayers who
are also covered by an employer-sponsored plan, such as 401(k). In 2015, only individual
taxpayers with a modified AGI of less than $61,000 ($98,000 for taxpayers filing jointly) were
able to deduct the full contribution limit of $5,000 if the entire amount was contributed
to a traditional IRA. The deductible amount phased out until a modified AGI of $71,000
($188,000 for taxpayers filing jointly), at which point individual taxpayers covered by an
employer-sponsored plan were not eligible to deduct any amount of a contribution to a
traditional IRA.
A.1.5 Schedule for Required Minimum Distributions
After age 701
2
, holders of traditional, SEP, and SIMPLE IRAs are required to take
“minimum distributions” from their account. The first RMD must be taken by April 1 of the
year after the calendar year in which the account holder turns 701
2
; after that, RMDs are due
by December 31 of each calendar year. This means that account holders who wait until the
calendar year after the year in which they turn 701
2
to remit their first RMD will owe two
RMD payments that year: one by April 1 and one by December 31.
The RMD amount for a given year is equal to the account balance on December 31 of the
preceding year divided by a value known as a “distribution period.” These values are given
by the IRS’s “Uniform Lifetime Table,” given below in Table A.3.2 The estimated RMD for
2The distribution schedule is different if the account owner’s spouse is the sole beneficiary of the account
and the spouse is more than 10 years younger than the account holder. In this case, the distribution period
value is determined by the account holder’s age and the spouse’s age on their respective birthdays in that
calendar year.
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an IRA is reported on IRS Form 5498. If a taxpayer holds more than one IRA subject to
RMDs, their total RMD is equal to the sum of the RMDs from each account. In this scenario,
the taxpayer may take the total RMD from one account.3










70 27.4 82 17.1 94 9.1 106 4.2
71 26.5 83 16.3 95 8.6 107 3.9
72 25.6 84 15.5 96 8.1 108 3.7
73 24.7 85 14.8 97 7.6 109 3.4
74 23.8 86 14.1 98 7.1 110 3.1
75 22.9 87 13.4 99 6.7 111 2.9
76 22.0 88 12.7 100 6.3 112 2.6
77 21.2 89 12.0 101 5.9 113 2.4
78 20.3 90 11.4 102 5.5 114 2.1
79 19.5 91 10.8 103 5.2 115+ 1.9
80 18.7 92 10.2 104 4.9
81 17.9 93 9.6 105 4.5
Source: IRA Required Minimum Distribution Worksheet, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/
uniform rmd wksht.pdf. This schedule has been in place since 2002. The schedule from
1999-2001 required slightly higher withdrawals than the schedule presented here.
A.1.6 Penalties and the death of the account holder
What happens to a traditional IRA after the account owner dies depends on who inherits
the account and the age of the original account owner upon death. If a spouse inherits the
account, the spouse is eligible to designate herself as the IRA account owner or keep the
account in the decedent’s name. In the former scenario, the surviving spouse is allowed to
make contributions, take distributions, rollover the assets into a different account, and even
name a new beneficiary for the account. The surviving spouse is also subject to RMD rules
based on their own age. If the surviving spouse keeps the account in the decedent’s name,
he or she must start taking distributions when the descendent would have turned 701
2
(or
continue taking distributions if the decedent had already started taking RMDs), but based
on his or her own life expectancy.
Non-spouse beneficiaries of traditional IRAs do not owe taxes on the assets in the account
until they begin taking distributions. If the original account owner died after RMDs began,
the beneficiary must continue to take distributions. The amount of the distribution is based
off of the longer of the original account owner’s and the beneficiary’s life calculated expectancy.
3The same is not true for 401(k)s: RMDs from 401(k)s must be taken from each account separately.
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If the owner died before they were subject to RMDs, the beneficiary must either take RMDs
based off of their own life expectancy starting the year after the original account owner’s
death, or elect to fully distribute the account under the “5-year rule.”4 The 5-year rule
requires the IRA beneficiaries to withdraw all of the assets of the IRA by December 31 of
the calendar year containing the fifth anniversary of the original account owner’s death, but
does not require any distributions before that time. Failing to fully distribute the assets
after electing to distribute according to the 5-year rule results in a 50% excise tax on the
remaining amount. The 5-year rule always applies in cases where the beneficiary isn’t an
individual (i.e., is a trust or an organization).
When the holder of a Roth IRA dies and the beneficiary is the spouse, the spouse
becomes the new owner of the account. The spouse may choose not to take ownership of
the account, in which case he or she faces the same options as a non-spouse beneficiary. A
non-spouse beneficiary may either distribute the entirety of the Roth IRA by the end of
the calendar year containing the fifth anniversary of the account holder’s death, or over his
or her own life expectancy. A surviving spouse is allowed to delay distributions until the
deceased spouse would have turned 701
2
. The ability of a non-spouse beneficiary to take
distributions based on their life expectancy was curtailed by the SECURE Act, which was
signed into law in December 2019. The SECURE Act includes a provision that, going forward,
requires non-spouse beneficiaries to distribute the funds of inherited IRAs within 10 years.
This is meant to prevent “Stretch IRAs,” in which IRA accounts are passed down, e.g. to
grandchildren, who are then able to take distributions over their expected lifespan and enjoy
tax-free growth along the way.
A.2 Data description
This appendix serves as a guide to the data and terminology used in this project. Appendix
A.2.1 defines relevant terms and, when applicable, provides additional information about how
key variables were constructed. Appendix A.2.2 discusses our sample construction and the
IRS forms from which we extracted the data.
A.2.1 Glossary of terms and variable construction
Contribution We get contribution information from Form 5498. We assume that anything
labeled as a contribution that was larger than 110% of the taxpayer’s contribution limit in
4If there are multiple non-spouse beneficiaries, the required distribution amounts are based on the age of
the oldest beneficiary. If the beneficiaries split the original account into separate accounts, each beneficiary
will be subject to RMD rules based on their own age.
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that year was a data error. In this case, we coded the contribution as a rollover.
Defined-benefit (DB) plan Employer-sponsored savings plan that pays pre-determined
benefits from a collective trust fund rather than an individualized account. Commonly
referred to as pensions.
Defined-contribution (DC) plan Employer-sponsored savings plan with an individual
account for each participant. When an individual retires, the designated account is used to
provide benefits to that individual.
Distribution The word used by the IRS and financial industry to talk about withdrawing
money from a tax-deferred retirement plan. We calculate distributions from IRA accounts
using data from Form 1099-R. We pull all Form 1099-Rs associated with our random sample.
We follow a standard algorithm for determining which Form 1099-Rs indicated distributions
from traditional, Roth, and SIMPLE IRAs, and which Form 1099-Rs indicated rollovers from
Roth accounts into traditional accounts. We exclude distributions from accounts other than
IRAs, as well as the following types of IRA distributions:
• IRA distributions due to death of the account holder
• IRA distributions due to disability
• Recharacterizations of this or prior year’s IRA distribution
• Corrective distributions due to IRA contributions or deferrals above the annual limit
These exclusions eliminate 5.7% from our sample of IRA-related Form 1099-Rs, the majority
of which come from distributions due to death of the account owner (4.8%).
For each taxpayer, we determine the taxable distributions and gross distributions for each
type of IRA, as well as gross distributions excluding any distributions not subject to the
early withdrawal penalty. Out of 22,192,136 Form 1099-Rs associated with our sample, there
are 388 cases where the taxable amount is greater than the gross amount. In these cases, we
assume the taxable amount is correct and replace the gross amount with the taxable amount,
unless the difference between the two is greater than 1, 000 and the value of the gross amount
is greater than 500. When this occurs, we add the value of the taxable amount to the gross
amount.
Early withdrawal penalty The penalty owed to the IRS when the owner of an individual
retirement account takes a distribution before the age of 591
2
. The penalty is equal to 10% of
the amount withdrawn. Taxpayers may receive an exemption if they take an early withdrawal
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from an IRA to pay for qualified medical or higher education expenses. First-time homebuyers
may take a distribution of up to $10,000 from an IRA without penalty.
Employer-sponsored plan (ESP) Can be either defined-contribution (DC) or
defined-benefit (DB). Figure A.1 presents evidence that DC employer-sponsored accounts
such as 401(k)s are increasingly popular over DB accounts such as pensions. In each of the
panels, DB plans are shown by the solid line and DC plans by the dashed line. Figure A.1a
shows the total number of plans offered (in thousands), Figure A.1b shows the total number
of active participants (in millions), and A.1c shows the total assets in these plans (in trillions).
For all three measures, it’s clear that DC plans are growing faster than DB plans (and, in
some cases, that DB plans are shrinking).
Figure A.1: Trends in employer-sponsored DB vs. DC plans
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Year
Source: Tables E1, E7, and E10 of Private Pension Plan Bulletin Historical Tables and Graphs 1975-2017,
respectively, published by the U.S. Department of Labor. Defined-contribution plans are shown by the dashed
line; defined-benefit plans are shown by the solid line. In 2004, the definition of who was participating was
revised.
Excess accumulation penalty The penalty owed to the IRS when the owner or beneficiary
of an individual retirement account fails to take a required minimum distribution. The penalty
is equal to 50% of the required amount not withdrawn. The penalty may be waived when
the excess accumulation was the result of a reasonable error and the account holder took
steps to correct the insufficient distribution.
Fair-market value (FMV) The value of an individual retirement account if all of the
assets were to be sold as reported on IRS Form 5498. For our purposes, equivalent to the
account balance.
Individual Retirement Account (IRA) Also known as an Individual Retirement
Arrangement. IRAs are tax-benefited retirement savings accounts. We define anyone in
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our sample that we observe making a contribution to an IRA (including rollovers), taking a
distribution from an IRA, or having a positive IRA balance as an “IRA account holder.”
Lump-sum distribution The distribution of the entire balance of a taxpayer’s ESP(s)
from a single employer.
Qualified charitable distribution (QCD) Direct transfer from an IRA account to a
qualified charity. These distributions can be counted toward RMDs. Conditions: must be
701
2
or older at the date of distribution, total amount contributed not to exceed the amount
that would otherwise be taxed as ordinary income up to the maximum amount ($100,000),
which applies to the sum of all QCDs made. A distribution made to an account holder that
is then donated to charity does not count as a QCD.
Required Minimum Distribution (RMD) Starting in the tax year that an account
holder turns 701
2
, holders of traditional 401(k) and IRA accounts are required to make a
minimum distribution every year. Late RMD payments are taxed at 50%. Amount is based
on account balance on Dec. 31 of previous tax year and life expectancy tables. First payment
is due by April 1 of the year after you turn 701
2
; subsequent payments must be made by
Dec. 31 of each calendar year. As a result, taxpayers may have two RMDs included in their
taxable income in the first calendar year they make RMD payments. In December 2019, the
Setting Every Community Up for Retirement Enhancement (SECURE) Act was signed into
law. Section 114 increases the age at which taxpayers are subject to excess accumulation
penalties for failing to take required distributions from 701
2
to 72. Because we consider a time
period before 2019, we use 701
2
as the age threshold throughout the paper.
Rollover The word used when money in one retirement account is moved into a different
retirement account. For example, if you leave job A, you can transfer the amount in your
401(k) from job A into the 401(k) you set up with your new job (or into your own IRA). No
taxes are assessed with a rollover unless it is a Roth conversion. Rollovers are not counted
toward contribution limits.
When a taxpayer rolls over funds from, e.g., a 401(k) or another IRA into an IRA, a
Form 1099-R will be issued to mark the distribution. If the rollover is a Roth conversion, the
distributions will be marked as a rollover on Form 1099-R and a Roth conversion on Form
5498. The Form 5498 is issued to mark the contribution to the IRA.
Roth conversion A type of rollover when funds in a traditional IRA are rolled over into a
Roth IRA. For this type of rollover, income tax is due on the distribution (i.e., you must
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include the distributed amount as income (i.e., it will be included in your taxable income
that year).
Roth IRA A type of IRA in which income tax is remitted before funds are moved into
the account. Income taxes are not due on qualified distributions, including on returns to the
principal.
Savings (initial distribution of non-tax-benefited) IRS Form 1099-INT is used to
report interest income to the IRS. We add together the values of Box 1 (“Interest income”)
and Box 3 (“Interest on U.S. Savings Bonds and Treasury obligations”), both winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentiles, as reported on IRS Form 1099-INT for the individuals in
our sample at age 40. We estimate assets in regular savings by dividing that amount by
0.01. The average estimated value of regular savings using this method is $57,539. This
is well within the ballpark of the average holdings in transaction accounts, Certificates of
Deposit, and savings bonds estimated by the Federal Reserve, which in 2016 was estimated
to be $64,800 for families with a head of household between 35 and 45. Source: authors’
calculations using the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, Historic Tables and Charts - Tables
Based on Internal Data - Estimates Inflation Adjusted to 2016 Dollars, Table 6, available at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/scfindex.htm.
Total distribution When all of the contents of an individual retirement account are
withdrawn.
Traditional IRA A type of IRA in which funds are contributed before income tax is




We take advantage of administrative tax data in this project. Our initial panel is a 5%
random sample of individuals aged 18 or older in 1999. We follow these taxpayers through
2015. The 17-year panel is balanced apart from exit due to death and emigration.
Our initial sample includes 14,606,095 individual taxpayers. We make several cuts to
this initial sample. We exclude taxpayers who died before 2000 and therefore are never alive
during our sample period. We also exclude taxpayers who were older than 90 (born before
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1909) in 1999. We exclude any taxpayer whose taxpayer identification number (TIN) was ever
associated with an invalid TIN flag or multiple Form 1040 filings.5 These last two exclusions
in particular are to deal with issues of identity theft. Table A.4 summarizes the impact these
exclusions have to our sample size. Our final sample includes 11,950,600 individual taxpayers,
32.7% of which are IRA account holders. We identify taxpayers as “IRA account holders”
if we ever observe them making a contribution to an IRA (including a rollover), taking a
distribution from an IRA, or having an outstanding IRA balance reported on Form 5498.






Original sample 14, 606, 095 100.0%
Died before 2000 456, 240 3.1%
Born before 1909 1, 072, 032 7.3%
Invalid TIN 1, 126, 383 7.7%
Multiple F-1040s 840 0.0%
Final sample 11, 950, 600 81.8%
IRA holders 3, 913, 401
Percent of
IRA sample
Traditional IRA holders 2, 790, 313 72.2%
Roth IRA holders 1, 071, 964 27.8%
Both types 616, 020 15.7%
We focus on IRAs because we can cleanly identify IRA contributions and distributions
in the administrative tax data. Form 5498 is intended for contributions to IRAs only, and
separately identifies contributions to traditional and Roth IRAs. Form 5498 is filed by the
individual or organization who made contributions on behalf of the recipient. For example,
the bank that manages Joe’s IRA would submit Form 5498 for Joe if Joe made a contribution
to his IRA. In addition to contribution information, Form 5498 includes the end-of-year
fair-market values (FMV) of an IRA. Financial institutions are required to submit Form 5498
each year for an existing IRA even if no contribution is made. There is some debate about
whether or not financial institutions actually do this, but our data suggest that most financial
institutions do submit Form 5498 even if the account holder did not make a contribution
that year.
Line 7 of Form 1099-R includes a checkbox to indicate that the distribution comes from
an IRA. We use the codes entered in Line 7 to then distinguish between distributions from
traditional and Roth IRAs. Notably, we can separately identify normal distributions, early
5We understand that this necessarily excludes individuals choosing to file Married Filing Separately.
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distributions without a known exception, and early distributions with a known exception.
We are also able to identify rollovers to traditional and Roth IRAs. In contrast, neither
Form 1099-R nor Form 1040 separately identify distributions from pensions and annuities
from distributions from 401(k)s and other employer-sponsored defined-contribution accounts.
Form 1099-R is filed by the institution who issued the distribution. If Joe took a distribution
from his IRA, the bank that manages the IRA would be responsible for submitting Form
1099-R to the IRS.
IRA distributions are also reported on Lines 15a and 15b of Form 1040. We prefer to use
the amounts from the third-party reported Form 1099-R. Using Form 1099-R has two primary
advantages. First, we are able to capture distributions from non-filers. Second, Lines 15a and
15b on Form 1040 aggregates distribution amounts for spouses for married taxpayers filing
jointly. We observe that, for single taxpayers, the total amount distributed from traditional
IRAs as reported on Form 1099-R and the taxable amount reported on Line 15b of Form
1040 are within 1% of each other in 78% of cases, and within $100 of each other in 94% of
cases. This is in line with what is reported in Brady and Bass (2020).
We also use data from individual income tax returns. In particular, we use data from
Forms 1040 and 5329. Form 1040 includes information such as total wages and adjusted
gross income. Schedules A and C for Form 1040 include charitable giving (for itemizers) and
self-employment income, respectively. Form 5329 is used to declare additional taxes owed
due to early withdrawal, non-qualified distributions, or failing to receive a minimum required
distribution. Finally, we use data from Form 1099-INT to estimate the initial distribution of
non-IRA savings in the model.
A.3 Additional evidence of bunching
A.3.1 Diagnostic tests
We conduct two diagnostic tests to confirm that our observed bunching is a result of the
age thresholds for penalties related to IRA withdrawals. In Appendix A.3.1.1, we plot the
proportion of taxpayers receiving two placebo sources of income (wages and Social Security)
at each age in 2005. In Appendix A.3.1.2, we separately plot the proportion of taxpayers
taking a distribution from an IRA for taxpayers whose half-birthday is in the first or second
half of the year. The results of both of these diagnostic tests suggest that taxpayers are





we presented in Section 1.4 was not a result of other policies related to timing of income).
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A.3.1.1 Placebo outcomes
We create the same figure as Figure 1.3a for two placebo outcomes: Social Security
payments and wages. Figure A.2a shows the proportion of taxpayers in our sample of IRA
account holders who receive a social security payment at that age. Similarly, Figure A.2b
shows the proportion of taxpayers in our sample of IRA account holders who receive a wage








are not confounded with
other changes in financial circumstances during retirement or pre-retirement.
Figure A.2: Fraction of traditional IRA holders receiving Social Security or wages in 2005,
by age
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Age of IRA holder
Notes: N = 1,449,868 taxpayers. Limited to taxpayers with a positive traditional IRA balance in 2004 or
2005.
A.3.1.2 Timing of birthday
In our second diagnostic, we take advantage of the fact that the age thresholds kick
in at taxpayers’ half birthdays. We compare traditional IRA holders who turn age X and
X.5 in the same calendar year versus traditional IRA holders who turn age X and X.5 in
different calendar years. Individuals who turn 59 and 591
2
in the same year are eligible to
take withdrawals penalty-free in that year, whereas individuals who turn 59 and 591
2
in
different years are not eligible to take distributions penalty-free in the year they turn 59. If
taxpayers are delaying withdrawals as a result of the age threshold, we should see a spike in
the proportion of taxpayers withdrawing at age 59 for taxpayers that turned 59 and 591
2
in
the same calendar year, but at age 60 for taxpayers that turned 591
2
in the calendar year
after the year in which they turned 59.
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Figure A.3 shows that this is exactly what happens. Figure A.3a shows taxpayers
whose half-birthday is in the same calendar year as their birthday. For these taxpayers, we
see increases in withdrawal rates at ages 59 and 70. Figure A.3b shows taxpayers whose
half-birthday is in a different calendar year than their birthday. For these taxpayers, we see
increases in withdrawal rates at ages 60 and 71. This is consistent with taxpayers changing
their behavior as a result of exactly when these specific age thresholds apply.
Figure A.3: Fraction of traditional IRA holders taking a distribution in 2005, by timing of
half-birthday
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Notes : Figure A.3a: N = 490,904 unique taxpayers. Figure A.3b: N = 517,808 unique taxpayers. Limited to
taxpayers with a positive traditional IRA balance in 2004 or 2005.
A.3.2 Roth IRAs
We created the same figures for Roth IRAs as we do to demonstrate bunching for
traditional IRAs. We do not observe the same clear bunching for Roth IRAs as we do for
traditional IRAs.
Figure A.4 shows the same empirical distribution as Figure 1.1 in Section 1.4.2, but for
Roth IRA account holders. Figure A.4a shows the number of Roth IRA holders taking their
first distribution from a Roth IRA at each age; Figure A.4b shows total amount taken at
those distributions.
There are a few key things to note about this figure. First, the scale of these graphs is
considerably different than that for traditional IRAs. Figure A.4a goes through 8 thousand,
whereas Figure 1.1a is scaled through 150 thousand. Similarly, Figure A.4b is scaled through
$50 million, whereas Figure 1.1b is scaled through $1.8 billion. We also observe small spikes
at age 591
2
, but not at 701
2
. This is consistent with the fact that the early withdrawal penalty
applies to Roth IRAs, but the excess accumulation penalty does not.
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Figure A.4: Age of first distribution from a Roth IRA
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Notes: N = 236,062 unique taxpayers. Excludes taxpayers older than age 65 at the beginning of our sample
period, and all data from 2009. Figure A.4a shows the number of taxpayers in our sample we observe taking
their first distribution from a Roth IRA at each age, excluding early distributions (before age 59 12 ) with a
known, qualifying exception. Figure A.4b shows the total amount withdrawn in the first distribution by Roth
IRA account holders who took their first withdrawal at each age. Distribution amounts are adjusted for
2015 dollar values. Because taxpayers may hold both types of accounts, some taxpayers may appear in both
Figure 1.1 (showing traditional IRAs in the main text) and this figure.
Figure A.5 shows the same empirical distribution as Figure 1.3 in Section 1.4.3, but for
Roth IRA holders. The first panel shows the proportion of Roth IRA account holders taking
a distribution in 2005; the second panel shows the average value of those distributions.
There are two things to note about these figures. First, we do not observe the same
striking bunching at age 591
2
that we observe for traditional accounts. Second, there is an
unexpected uptick in the number of Roth account holders who take their first distribution
from a Roth IRA at age 701
2
(A.4a), and in the proportion of Roth account holders taking a
distribution from a Roth IRA at age 701
2
(A.5a). This observation is unexpected because
Roth IRA holders are not bound to the RMD rules. Figure A.6 splits Roth IRA account
holders into those that also hold a traditional IRA (solid line) and those that only hold a
Roth IRA (dashed line). If it’s true that IRA account holders with both types of accounts
are more likely to take non-rollover distributions from a Roth account at age 701
2
than IRA
account holders who only have a Roth account, it would suggests that these taxpayers may
not realize the Required Minimum Distribution rules do not apply to Roth IRAs.
Figure A.6a shows the number of taxpayers taking their first distribution by age. We see
that there is an increase in the number of taxpayers taking their first distribution at age 701
2
for Roth IRA account holders that also have a traditional IRA, but not for Roth account
holders who do not have a traditional IRA. Figure A.6b shows the proportion of Roth IRA




Figure A.5: Distribution behavior in 2005: Roth IRAs
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Notes: Notes: N = 269,353 unique taxpayers. Excludes early distributions (before age 59 12 ) with a known,
qualifying exception. Excludes taxpayers older than age 65 at the beginning of our sample period. Limited to
taxpayers with a positive Roth IRA balance in 2004 or 2005. Figure A.5a shows the proportion of Roth IRA
account holders taking a distribution in 2005, while Figure A.5b show the total amount distributed from
Roth IRA by age in 2005. Distribution amounts are inflated to 2015 values. Because taxpayers may hold
both types of accounts, some taxpayers may appear in both Figure 1.3 (showing traditional IRAs in the main
text) and this figure.
the trend for Roth IRA account holders who do not also have a traditional IRA is generally
more erratic than that of Roth IRA account holders who do show evidence of also having
a traditional IRA. These figures suggest that it may be true that taxpayers that hold both
types of accounts are more likely to take distributions from their Roth IRA account at age
701
2
even though they are not required to.
A.4 Comparing different values of a59.5,− and a59.5,+
We estimated B̂59.5 using the values of a59.5,− and a59.5,− that minimized the difference
between B̂59.5 and M̂59.5. We find that, for the number of taxpayers impacted, a59.5,− =
54.5 and a59.5,+ = 61.5. Table A.5 shows the absolute value of B̂59.5 − M̂59.5 for all possible
combinations of a59.5,− and a59.5,+ for the number of taxpayers that change when they take
their first distribution. Table A.6 shows the same calculation, but for amount of money taken
out at those first distributions. Similarly, Table A.7 shows the absolute value of B̂59.5− M̂59.5
for all possible combinations of a59.5,− and a59.5,+ for the proportion of taxpayers taking
a withdrawal by age in 2005, while Table A.8 shows the same calculation for the average
withdrawal amount by age in 2005.
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Figure A.6: Distribution behavior of Roth IRA account holders by whether or not they also
hold a traditional IRA
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Notes: Figure A.6a: N = 26,904 taxpayers; excludes taxpayers older than age 65 at the beginning of our
sample period. Figure A.6b: N = 50,756; limited to taxpayers with a positive Roth IRA balance in 2004 or
2005. The dotted line represents Roth IRA account holders who do not also hold a traditional IRA. The
solid line represents Roth IRA account holders who do show evidence of holding a traditional IRA.
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Table A.5: Robustness check: B̂59.5 − M̂59.5 for reduced-form analysis: number of taxpayers, first distribution (1000s)
a59.5,+
a59.5,− 59.5 60.5 61.5 62.5 63.5 64.5 65.5 66.5 67.5 68.5 69.5
25.5 448.9 797.5 773.3 691.4 603692.6 2163406.3 2038868.1 270894.3 1302.2 1325.4 9631493.1
26.5 9794.1 521.8 12571.6 44365.1 153170.0 312354.3 226137.8 65355.0 1283.0 1295.2 350244.7
27.5 987.1 99.4 1174.7 1924.7 4593.9 5207.5 1044.2 1221.9 1269.2 1268.5 162897.1
28.5 1002.2 222.8 1166.9 1658.5 3018.9 2761.9 642.0 961.7 917.0 28.7 9216.3
29.5 1037.6 579.1 1158.8 1365.9 1816.9 1590.2 197.0 274.9 22.1 1363.8 7727.6
30.5 1115.8 898.7 1214.0 1315.9 1527.6 1392.0 585.9 301.6 511.3 1689.6 7380.5
31.5 1133.5 1013.1 1205.5 1267.6 1405.3 1301.0 668.3 436.0 627.1 1717.0 7014.0
32.5 1123.2 1041.3 1180.2 1225.8 1334.0 1242.1 683.3 474.4 653.8 1678.2 6569.6
33.5 1090.1 1024.6 1136.4 1172.5 1264.0 1176.9 660.4 464.8 631.2 1584.6 5918.8
34.5 1049.3 991.4 1086.8 1115.8 1194.9 1108.8 622.6 435.8 585.3 1448.0 5010.9
35.5 1003.4 949.1 1032.1 1054.2 1121.3 1032.9 571.4 389.8 514.8 1257.0 3876.2
36.5 949.9 896.4 967.9 981.5 1034.2 938.9 497.9 316.0 405.0 992.4 2663.2
37.5 894.4 840.3 899.9 903.3 938.9 832.8 411.6 228.0 276.1 700.4 1640.0
38.5 839.8 783.8 830.7 822.5 838.5 720.2 322.2 141.0 154.0 439.0 929.5
39.5 786.1 727.4 761.0 740.0 735.6 606.4 238.9 68.1 58.8 244.5 499.3
40.5 729.9 667.8 686.8 652.3 627.4 490.5 159.4 5.0 16.5 103.5 239.5
41.5 672.4 606.4 610.8 563.8 521.7 383.4 94.1 39.4 63.9 16.9 95.8
42.5 612.7 543.0 533.7 476.6 422.0 288.6 42.1 69.9 93.3 36.1 14.1
43.5 553.2 481.0 460.2 397.1 336.3 213.4 7.4 84.6 104.8 61.2 25.3
44.5 494.5 421.3 392.2 326.9 264.8 155.2 15.7 91.3 108.1 73.1 45.0
45.5 434.4 361.3 326.1 261.1 200.3 103.3 40.1 103.8 118.9 90.5 69.0
46.5 377.0 305.7 267.3 204.8 147.4 61.9 59.6 114.4 128.2 104.5 87.6
47.5 322.9 254.5 214.8 156.0 102.6 27.1 77.8 125.9 138.9 119.1 106.0
48.5 273.1 208.4 168.9 114.1 64.8 2.6 94.7 137.8 150.3 133.8 124.1
49.5 229.1 168.4 130.1 79.4 33.9 26.8 108.8 148.0 160.1 146.2 139.5
50.5 189.4 132.7 95.9 48.9 6.7 48.6 122.8 159.1 171.1 159.7 156.0
51.5 156.3 103.6 68.6 25.0 14.1 64.7 132.3 165.9 177.6 168.0 166.3
52.5 126.5 77.3 44.0 3.4 33.2 80.0 142.3 173.8 185.3 177.6 178.3
53.5 100.0 53.9 22.2 15.9 50.4 94.0 151.7 181.4 192.8 187.1 190.0
54.5 75.2 31.8 1.4 34.7 67.3 108.4 162.2 190.5 202.1 198.6 204.3
55.5 51.5 10.3 19.1 53.4 84.8 123.7 174.2 201.4 213.6 212.5 221.5
56.5 30.6 8.6 36.8 69.6 99.5 136.3 183.6 209.5 221.8 222.5 233.2
57.5 10.5 26.9 54.2 85.5 114.2 149.2 193.5 218.2 230.6 233.1 245.4
58.5 9.5 45.3 71.8 102.0 129.6 163.0 204.6 228.4 241.1 245.5 259.3
Notes: Shows (in thousands) the absolute value of B̂59.5 − M̂59.5 for each possible combination of a59.5,− and a59.5,+ for our estimates of
the number of taxpayers who changed when they took their first IRA distribution in response to the age thresholds.
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Table A.6: Robustness check: B̂59.5 − M̂59.5 for reduced-form analysis: gross distributions, first distribution ($bil)
a59.5,+
a59.5,− 59.5 60.5 61.5 62.5 63.5 64.5 65.5 66.5 67.5 68.5 69.5
25.5 7485.5 10.0 8.0 7.8 8061.2 21959.4 6154.0 21.9 23.0 23.5 110388.1
26.5 383.4 7.7 3.2 1.4 677.4 2002.8 17.0 21.2 21.8 16.9 3948.8
27.5 28.6 3.8 12.5 18.6 47.8 70.4 12.5 19.0 18.1 61.8 1813.2
28.5 28.7 6.3 16.1 22.9 40.9 48.1 5.2 1.2 18.9 48.8 89.8
29.5 28.9 13.4 23.1 27.8 35.1 36.8 21.2 20.3 30.7 46.9 73.5
30.5 28.6 20.4 26.3 28.8 32.4 33.1 24.0 23.5 31.3 44.9 68.3
31.5 28.2 23.6 27.2 28.8 31.2 31.7 24.5 24.2 31.0 43.5 65.0
32.5 27.3 24.1 26.8 28.0 29.8 30.1 23.8 23.4 29.7 41.3 60.3
33.5 26.4 23.9 26.1 27.0 28.6 28.8 22.8 22.4 28.2 38.7 54.1
34.5 25.5 23.4 25.2 26.0 27.3 27.4 21.8 21.2 26.4 35.6 45.6
35.5 24.4 22.4 24.0 24.6 25.7 25.6 20.1 19.3 23.5 30.7 33.6
36.5 23.3 21.4 22.7 23.2 24.0 23.6 18.2 17.0 20.1 24.8 21.6
37.5 22.1 20.2 21.4 21.6 22.1 21.4 15.9 14.3 16.1 18.3 11.4
38.5 20.9 19.0 19.9 19.9 20.0 18.8 13.4 11.3 11.8 12.1 4.2
39.5 19.6 17.7 18.3 17.9 17.6 16.0 10.6 8.1 7.7 6.7 0.6
40.5 18.1 16.2 16.5 15.8 15.0 12.9 7.8 5.1 4.1 2.6 3.7
41.5 16.8 14.8 14.7 13.7 12.5 10.3 5.5 3.0 1.9 0.3 4.7
42.5 15.2 13.2 12.8 11.5 10.1 7.7 3.5 1.1 0.0 1.5 5.6
43.5 13.7 11.6 11.0 9.5 7.9 5.6 2.0 0.1 1.1 2.4 5.8
44.5 12.1 10.0 9.2 7.6 6.0 3.9 0.7 1.0 2.0 3.1 6.1
45.5 10.6 8.5 7.6 6.0 4.4 2.5 0.2 1.7 2.6 3.6 6.2
46.5 9.0 7.1 6.0 4.5 3.0 1.2 1.1 2.5 3.3 4.2 6.6
47.5 7.6 5.7 4.6 3.2 1.8 0.2 1.8 3.0 3.8 4.7 6.8
48.5 6.3 4.6 3.5 2.2 0.9 0.6 2.4 3.5 4.2 5.0 7.0
49.5 5.2 3.6 2.6 1.3 0.1 1.1 2.8 3.8 4.4 5.2 7.0
50.5 4.3 2.7 1.7 0.6 0.5 1.7 3.2 4.1 4.7 5.4 7.2
51.5 3.5 2.1 1.1 0.1 0.9 2.0 3.3 4.2 4.8 5.5 7.0
52.5 2.8 1.5 0.6 0.4 1.3 2.3 3.5 4.3 4.9 5.5 7.0
53.5 2.2 1.0 0.2 0.7 1.6 2.5 3.7 4.4 4.9 5.5 6.8
54.5 1.6 0.5 0.3 1.1 1.9 2.8 3.9 4.6 5.1 5.6 6.8
55.5 1.1 0.0 0.7 1.5 2.3 3.1 4.1 4.8 5.3 5.8 6.9
56.5 0.6 0.4 1.1 1.8 2.6 3.3 4.3 4.9 5.3 5.8 6.8
57.5 0.2 0.8 1.4 2.2 2.9 3.6 4.5 5.1 5.5 6.0 6.9
58.5 0.3 1.2 1.8 2.5 3.2 3.9 4.7 5.2 5.7 6.1 6.9
Notes: Shows (in billions) the absolute value of B̂59.5 − M̂59.5 for each possible combination of a59.5,− and a59.5,+ for our estimates of the
value of the gross distributions taken by taxpayers who changed when they took their first IRA distribution in response to the age thresholds.
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Table A.7: Robustness check: B̂59.5 − M̂59.5 for reduced-form analysis: number of taxpayers, single year (proportion)
a59.5,+
a59.5,− 59.5 60.5 61.5 62.5 63.5 64.5 65.5 66.5 67.5 68.5 69.5
25.5 3.6234 3.6369 3.5574 3.3918 3.0002 2.4033 2.5100 3.2003 4.2430 6.0148 10.4817
26.5 0.1523 0.3600 0.5712 0.7627 0.9371 1.0700 1.1355 1.1857 1.2524 1.3824 10.4817
27.5 0.8126 0.9828 1.1586 1.3227 1.4772 1.6005 1.6673 1.7219 1.7942 1.9335 48.8059
28.5 1.0516 1.2062 1.3677 1.5207 1.6671 1.7862 1.8531 1.9092 1.9842 2.1297 25.1869
29.5 1.1796 1.3254 1.4788 1.6255 1.7670 1.8835 1.9503 2.0074 2.0843 2.2349 15.7760
30.5 1.2365 1.3760 1.5234 1.6651 1.8026 1.9166 1.9826 2.0395 2.1166 2.2684 9.9137
31.5 1.2662 1.4006 1.5432 1.6809 1.8150 1.9265 1.9914 2.0476 2.1239 2.2740 6.6321
32.5 1.2727 1.4028 1.5411 1.6751 1.8057 1.9146 1.9778 2.0323 2.1060 2.2496 4.3943
33.5 1.2753 1.4017 1.5363 1.6668 1.7943 1.9005 1.9619 2.0145 2.0851 2.2204 3.1488
34.5 1.2681 1.3909 1.5220 1.6491 1.7733 1.8766 1.9356 1.9854 2.0512 2.1733 2.2295
35.5 1.2607 1.3803 1.5079 1.6318 1.7527 1.8530 1.9096 1.9564 2.0169 2.1243 1.6922
36.5 1.2568 1.3734 1.4979 1.6187 1.7365 1.8340 1.8882 1.9321 1.9875 2.0808 1.4344
37.5 1.2398 1.3531 1.4741 1.5913 1.7055 1.7992 1.8500 1.8891 1.9358 2.0057 1.0613
38.5 1.2228 1.3329 1.4504 1.5641 1.6745 1.7644 1.8114 1.8454 1.8829 1.9281 0.8241
39.5 1.2137 1.3209 1.4353 1.5457 1.6525 1.7389 1.7827 1.8125 1.8426 1.8684 0.7739
40.5 1.2001 1.3043 1.4153 1.5221 1.6252 1.7076 1.7476 1.7722 1.7930 1.7957 0.6955
41.5 1.1781 1.2789 1.3861 1.4890 1.5875 1.6652 1.7001 1.7179 1.7265 1.6995 0.5596
42.5 1.1523 1.2496 1.3529 1.4514 1.5451 1.6174 1.6469 1.6569 1.6520 1.5936 0.4340
43.5 1.1232 1.2169 1.3159 1.4099 1.4983 1.5650 1.5883 1.5899 1.5705 1.4803 0.3215
44.5 1.0951 1.1851 1.2799 1.3692 1.4525 1.5134 1.5307 1.5241 1.4911 1.3732 0.2520
45.5 1.0685 1.1548 1.2455 1.3302 1.4082 1.4635 1.4750 1.4606 1.4154 1.2750 0.2167
46.5 1.0400 1.1226 1.2088 1.2888 1.3614 1.4108 1.4163 1.3942 1.3370 1.1766 0.1838
47.5 1.0095 1.0882 1.1700 1.2450 1.3120 1.3555 1.3549 1.3250 1.2563 1.0787 0.1525
48.5 0.9724 1.0469 1.1238 1.1935 1.2544 1.2913 1.2839 1.2453 1.1643 0.9692 0.0976
49.5 0.9327 1.0029 1.0749 1.1390 1.1938 1.2239 1.2097 1.1629 1.0705 0.8613 0.0459
50.5 0.8672 0.9319 0.9976 1.0547 1.1013 1.1223 1.0981 1.0385 0.9281 0.6935 0.1064
51.5 0.7967 0.8559 0.9151 0.9650 1.0032 1.0150 0.9810 0.9092 0.7825 0.5274 0.2472
52.5 0.7117 0.7648 0.8169 0.8588 0.8880 0.8896 0.8447 0.7596 0.6155 0.3396 0.4151
53.5 0.6208 0.6676 0.7125 0.7464 0.7664 0.7581 0.7027 0.6051 0.4457 0.1542 0.5734
54.5 0.5261 0.5666 0.6044 0.6304 0.6416 0.6237 0.5586 0.4500 0.2782 0.0232 0.7172
55.5 0.4244 0.4586 0.4891 0.5071 0.5095 0.4822 0.4078 0.2891 0.1067 0.2012 0.8606
56.5 0.3180 0.3459 0.3693 0.3795 0.3734 0.3372 0.2543 0.1268 0.0638 0.3742 0.9974
57.5 0.2146 0.2365 0.2533 0.2564 0.2426 0.1988 0.1091 0.0246 0.2198 0.5270 1.1095
58.5 0.1059 0.1219 0.1321 0.1283 0.1072 0.0562 0.0397 0.1787 0.3769 0.6794 1.2236
Notes: Shows the absolute value of B̂59.5 − M̂59.5 for each possible combination of a59.5,− and a59.5,+ for our estimates of the value of the
proportion of taxpayers who changed when they took a distribution from a traditional IRA in response to the age thresholds.
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Table A.8: Robustness check: B̂59.5 − M̂59.5 for reduced-form analysis: gross distributions, single year ($mil)
a59.5,+
a59.5,− 59.5 60.5 61.5 62.5 63.5 64.5 65.5 66.5 67.5 68.5 69.5
25.5 19.474 28.539 28.933 30.573 77.559 123.478 151.917 252.767 253.322 79.845 2.047
26.5 24.004 24.751 24.675 24.646 25.926 26.008 24.918 24.041 21.156 18.426 2.047
27.5 25.321 25.909 25.874 25.873 26.957 27.044 26.082 25.283 22.542 19.906 145.757
28.5 25.300 25.817 25.784 25.782 26.784 26.863 25.941 25.166 22.485 19.890 49.319
29.5 25.369 25.850 25.820 25.818 26.775 26.851 25.956 25.200 22.570 20.021 37.169
30.5 24.854 25.300 25.260 25.248 26.161 26.222 25.334 24.574 21.960 19.385 6.531
31.5 24.323 24.741 24.691 24.668 25.543 25.588 24.700 23.930 21.321 18.694 5.961
32.5 23.757 24.149 24.088 24.051 24.891 24.917 24.024 23.236 20.619 17.904 12.496
33.5 23.192 23.560 23.487 23.436 24.240 24.245 23.342 22.530 19.895 17.064 15.374
34.5 22.618 22.963 22.877 22.811 23.578 23.559 22.642 21.799 19.134 16.157 16.697
35.5 22.081 22.403 22.304 22.223 22.954 22.909 21.977 21.100 18.401 15.272 16.248
36.5 21.642 21.945 21.835 21.741 22.438 22.371 21.425 20.520 17.800 14.556 13.695
37.5 21.090 21.370 21.245 21.132 21.789 21.691 20.721 19.769 16.998 13.560 13.516
38.5 20.717 20.979 20.844 20.718 21.342 21.222 20.241 19.262 16.481 12.970 10.446
39.5 20.308 20.550 20.404 20.263 20.851 20.703 19.707 18.694 15.894 12.291 8.505
40.5 19.935 20.160 20.002 19.848 20.400 20.227 19.218 18.175 15.370 11.717 6.452
41.5 19.471 19.674 19.501 19.328 19.837 19.631 18.597 17.509 14.672 10.911 5.714
42.5 18.871 19.047 18.853 18.654 19.110 18.859 17.784 16.625 13.717 9.759 6.229
43.5 18.454 18.609 18.401 18.185 18.600 18.319 17.227 16.035 13.130 9.173 4.886
44.5 17.803 17.928 17.695 17.449 17.806 17.472 16.335 15.064 12.088 7.963 5.494
45.5 17.430 17.536 17.293 17.032 17.351 16.993 15.849 14.565 11.635 7.631 3.882
46.5 16.914 16.995 16.733 16.451 16.720 16.324 15.157 13.833 10.909 6.932 3.422
47.5 16.267 16.318 16.032 15.719 15.930 15.484 14.279 12.893 9.944 5.933 3.706
48.5 15.625 15.646 15.336 14.995 15.148 14.656 13.419 11.983 9.030 5.040 3.813
49.5 15.110 15.108 14.782 14.422 14.529 14.007 12.761 11.312 8.422 4.586 3.208
50.5 13.921 13.866 13.489 13.067 13.076 12.456 11.112 9.519 6.479 2.386 5.651
51.5 12.900 12.800 12.383 11.913 11.842 11.150 9.742 8.062 4.970 0.825 6.897
52.5 11.524 11.364 10.890 10.353 10.178 9.383 7.875 6.056 2.838 1.486 9.229
53.5 10.218 10.005 9.481 8.885 8.618 7.738 6.154 4.238 0.960 3.410 10.885
54.5 8.715 8.442 7.860 7.197 6.828 5.854 4.183 2.156 1.196 5.631 12.914
55.5 6.977 6.636 5.987 5.247 4.768 3.687 1.916 0.234 3.678 8.199 15.357
56.5 5.270 4.864 4.156 3.347 2.768 1.597 0.251 2.490 5.972 10.488 17.377
57.5 3.497 3.028 2.260 1.385 0.711 0.544 2.460 4.772 8.268 12.745 19.335
58.5 1.560 1.024 0.192 0.754 1.526 2.867 4.853 7.237 10.750 15.189 21.520
Notes: Shows (in millions) the absolute value of B̂59.5 − M̂59.5 for each possible combination of a59.5,− and a59.5,+ for our estimates of
change of the value of the average distribution from traditional IRAs in response to the age thresholds.
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A.5 Intuition from a stylized model
In this section, we provide intuition for why we would expect taxpayers to bunch at
the age thresholds in order to avoid the early withdrawal penalty. We consider a simple,
highly-stylized model that allows us to graphically demonstrate our anticipated bunching. We
also discuss how we can use bunching in this setting to identify the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution.
A.5.1 A simple model with no penalties
Consider a taxpayer with assets A in an account earning a rate of return R = 1 + r.
These assets are the only source of wealth available to the taxpayer, and the taxpayer must
withdraw all of the assets at once. Once the assets are withdrawn, they stop earning the rate
of return and the taxpayer’s lifetime consumption is then equal to the value of the account.
The taxpayer chooses when to withdraw the assets and their subsequent consumption stream











The benefit of withdrawing in an earlier time period is the taxpayer receives utility from
consumption earlier (the discount factor does not have as much of an impact on lifetime
utility). The benefit of waiting to withdraw is the account grows in value and total lifetime
consumption is higher. The taxpayer will pick t∗ to equalize the marginal benefit of these
two options, given their initial level of assets A and the rate of return R.
A.5.2 Anticipated bunching due to an early withdrawal penalty
Now introduce a penalty ρ on withdrawing before t = tp. This reduces the value of lifetime
consumption for withdrawing before t = tp by ρ times the values of the assets at the point of
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t∗A− ρRt∗AI(t∗ < tp)
Some taxpayers who otherwise would have chosen t∗ < tp will wait to withdraw until after
t = tp.
Figure A.7 shows the choice of a taxpayer deciding when to withdraw assets from an
account when faced with an early withdrawal penalty and the subsequent bunching in the
distribution of chosen ages for withdrawal. Figure A.7a illustrates how the taxpayer’s choice
of when to withdraw the assets from the account translates directly into total lifetime
consumption. The solid black line represents the budget constraint when there is a penalty
for withdrawing the assets before age tp. The slope of the budget constraint is equal to
tRt−1A above tp and (1 − ρ)tRt−1A below. The discrete change in the budget constraint
at t = tp is due to the lack of early withdrawal penalty above that age. The solid red line
represents the indifference curve for the marginal buncher. The marginal buncher is indifferent
to withdrawing at ages tI and tp. The dashed red line represents the indifference curve for
the marginal buncher in the absence of the early withdrawal penalty. In this scenario, the
taxpayer would have chosen t∗.
Figure A.7b demonstrates how the early withdrawal penalty might impact the distribution
of withdrawal ages chosen. We’ve drawn a potential, arbitrary distribution as a dotted red
line. The solid red line illustrates what happens when we introduce the early withdrawal
penalty. Taxpayers for whom the optimal age of withdrawal would have been between tI and
tp now prefer to wait to withdraw until tp. This results in bunching in the distribution of
withdrawal ages at tp.
A.5.3 Identifying the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
The elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) measures the relative response of
consumption in period 1 versus consumption in period 2 when the rate of return changes.
When the real rate of return increases, two things happen. First, the taxpayer’s lifetime
budget increases. This suggests an increase in consumption in all periods (an income effect).
Second, consumption in period 1 becomes more expensive, because it means the taxpayer
saves less (and therefore benefits less from the increased interest rate). This suggests a
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Figure A.7: Bunching due to early withdrawal penalty in a highly stylized model













Notes: The distribution of “age of withdrawal” is arbitrary and used for illustrative purposes only.
decrease of consumption in period 1 in favor of consumption in period 2 (a substitution
effect). The net effect of these two forces is represented by the EIS.
The value of the EIS directly impacts the curvature of the indifference curve. Greater
values of the EIS equal less curved indifference curves. The more elastic the taxpayer’s
preferences are between periods 1 and periods 2, the less period 2 consumption the taxpayer
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needs to be compensated with to maintain their utility level if their period 1 consumption
decreases. We can take advantage of the relationship between the EIS and the curvature of
the indifference curve to identify the EIS in our setting. Figure A.8 shows the same setting
as in Figure A.7, but where the indifference curves are drawn using different values of the
EIS. The taxpayers represented in the left-hand panel have more strongly curved indifference
curves (i.e., a lower EIS) than the taxpayers in the right-hand panel. This causes the space
between tI and tp to be narrower, resulting in fewer taxpayers bunching at tp. The amount
of bunching at tp, then, is directly related to the value of the EIS.
Figure A.8: Identifying the EIS using a bunching response



































Notes: The distribution of “age of withdrawal” is arbitrary and used for illustrative purposes only.
The previous argument assumed that we knew the value of the discount factor. In the
model presented above, present versus future consumption decisions are dictated by two
parameters: the EIS and the discount factor. If we only had one notch, we would not
separately be able to identify either parameters. However, there are two age notches in
our setting: the notch used in the simple model above (equivalent to the notch created by
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the early withdrawal penalty), and the notch generated by the onset of required minimum
distributions. Because we have two bunching conditions, we are able to separately identify
the two relevant parameters.
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A.6 Parameters used in the structural model
Table A.9 defines the parameters used in the life-cycle model described in Section 1.5.
Table A.9: Structural model parameters
Preference parameters
β Discount factor




Ω Set of all state variables
St Stock of assets in standard savings account
At Stock of assets in tax-benefited savings account
θ Labor income shock
zt Total income subject to income tax (= yt + P · I[t ≥ tP ] + q(St · r))
t period (equivalent to age)
P Value of annual pension
tP Age at which individual claims pension
Choice variables
St+1 Next period stock of assets in standard savings account




{ρi}3i=0 Deterministic part of labor income
εit Stochastic part of labor income
η Autocorrelation of stochastic part of labor income
σ2ζ Variance of stochastic term
Tax-benefited savings account parameters
at Contribution limit for tax-benefited savings account
te Age before which early withdrawal penalty applies
pe Rate of early withdrawal penalty
trmd Age after which excess accumulation penalty applies
prmd Rate of excess accumulation penalty
at,rmd Value of RMD (function of age and At)
Taxes
τy Income tax function
τe Amount of early withdrawal penalty
τrmd Amount of excess accumulation penalty
Additional parameters
rA Rate of return on regular savings
rS Rate of return on tax-benefited savings
πt The probability of living to period t conditional on surviving to period t− 1
Wt+1 Bequeathed wealth if die at end of period t (= (1 + rS)St+1 + (1 + rA)At+1)
150
A.7 Numerical solution
We numerically solve the dynamic optimization problem presented in Section 1.5 using
backwards iteration. Two of our state variables are already discrete: age, and age at which
the individual claims Social Security. We solve the model for three values of claiming Social
Security age: 62, 67, and 70. These ages respectively correspond to the earliest age an
individual is eligible to claim Social Security, the full retirement age, and the age after which
delayed retirement credits stop permanently increasing the monthly (and therefore annual)
Social Security benefit for individuals born in 1940 or later.
We have three continuous state variables that we need to discretize: labor income shocks
and the stock of both regular savings and tax-benefited savings. Labor income shocks are
placed on a 5-point grid using the Rouwenhorst method (Rouwenhorst, 1995).
Discretizing the stocks of tax-benefited saving is finicky in our setting. For each period in
our model, we need at least one non-zero contribution option, and a “no contribution” option.
Ensuring that both of these options were available at each period required that we make
some non-standard choices. We space the grid at the oldest age individuals in our model can
make a contribution (70) by the contribution limit at age 69. We then create age-specific
grids working backwards, where grid point Aj,t = Aj,t+1/(1 + rA). Because savings accounts
will be depleted as the simulated individuals near the final period, we also create age-specific
grids from 70 forward such that Aj,t = Aj,t−1/(1 + rA).
This methodology ensures that, for any grid point Aj,t with t < 70, the model can choose
not to contribute by choosing point Aj,t+1.
6 This procedure also ensures that the model
always has at least one gridpoint to choose that is within the contribution limit, because
the grid points are spaced within the contribution limit at the oldest age one can make a
contribution and become closer together as age decreases. We set the standard savings grid
to be equal to the grid used for tax-benefited savings so that, when solving the model, it is
never beneficial to take a distribution from the tax-benefited account in order to save in the
regular savings account. In other words, the next-period options for both accounts are the
same.
In order to not severely truncate the maximum level of assets that can be saved in
these accounts, we use 90-point grids for both regular and tax-benefited savings. This is
considerably larger than is often used in these models (e.g., Choukhmane (2021) uses 20 grid
points for liquid assets and 16 grid points for retirement wealth). Solving the model for ages
40-85 with two 90-point asset grids, a 5-point labor income shock grid, and 3 possible ages for
6This is because choosing not to contribute is equivalent to picking a next-period stock equal to the
current stock multiplied by the return.
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claiming Social Security means that we are finding the solution for 5,589,000 combinations of
the state variables, each of which faces 8,100 possible combinations of the choice variables.7
Even with these large grids, the top 3.7% of IRA balances in our simulated sample are
constrained by our highest grid value at age 40, and the top 1.6% are constrained at age 41.
We minimize the score (Z(Φ, n), see Equation 1.6.4 using Nelder-Mead optimization.
Because Nelder-Mead can get stuck at local minima, we pick our starting point for the SMM
algorithm as follows: we generate 4,000 points defined by a Sobol sequence over a wide range
of possible parameter values: between 0.1 and 2.0 for the EIS (σ) and bequest elasticity (α),
between 0.85 and 1.0 for the discount factor (β), and between 0.25 and 5.0 for the bequest
weight (A). We then calculate the score for all 4,000 preference parameter combinations. We
use the parameter combination that minimizes the score as our initial guess for the SMM
procedure.
Estimating the model is computationally intensive. The code is written in Python. All
functions are JIT-compiled in “nopython” mode using Numba v0.49.1 with parallel = True,
cache = True, and all object types defined.
7We solve for optimal next-period stocks in both assets using a grid search, which implies post-tax
consumption. Not every state space has this many options because of the contribution limit to the tax-benefited
savings account and the no borrowing constraint.
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A.8 Counterfactual policy analysis
A.8.1 Changing the excess accumulation penalty
Table A.10 shows the results of changing the excess accumulation penalty. We compare
the values of four outcomes to the base policy with an age threshold = 701
2
and penalty rate
= 50%. For all outcomes considered, a positive value indicates that our simulated individuals
are, on average, better off in the counterfactual world, while a negative value indicates that
our simulated individuals are, on average, better off in the base policy.
Table A.10a shows a measure of equivalent variation: the average amount of income
that our simulated individuals would need to receive (give up) in the base policy to reach
the present discounted value of lifetime utility for each counterfactual policy. We show the
value in levels, and as a percentage of average income at age 401
2
(i.e., the first period in our
model). Table A.10b shows the change in the present discounted value of lifetime total tax
remittances relative to the base policy, where total tax remittances include income taxes plus
any tax penalties paid. Table A.10c shows the change in the present discounted value of of
lifetime income tax remittances relative to the base policy. Table A.10d shows the change in
the bequeathed IRA balance relative to the base policy. For each panel, we show the amount
in levels and as a percentage of the value in the base policy.
Table A.10: Results of changing the excess accumulation penalty
(a) Change in income at age 4012 under base policy to reach counterfactual PDV lifetime utility
Age 40% penalty 50% penalty 60% penalty 70% penalty
threshold Levels ($) Percent Levels ($) Percent Levels ($) Percent Levels ($) Percent
68 1
2
-761 -0.0037% -811 -0.0040% -851 -0.0042% -878 -0.0043%
69 1
2
-335 -0.0016% -362 -0.0018% -395 -0.0019% -411 -0.0020%
70 1
2
22 0.0001% 0 0.0000% -38 -0.0002% -53 -0.0003%
71 1
2
204 0.0010% 186 0.0009% 168 0.0008% 151 0.0007%
72 1
2
344 0.0017% 339 0.0017% 325 0.0016% 309 0.0015%
73 1
2
459 0.0023% 454 0.0022% 451 0.0022% 441 0.0022%
74 1
2
533 0.0026% 531 0.0026% 530 0.0026% 525 0.0026%
75 1
2
565 0.0028% 570 0.0028% 570 0.0028% 571 0.0028%
76 1
2
579 0.0029% 588 0.0029% 595 0.0029% 597 0.0029%
77 1
2
568 0.0028% 586 0.0029% 597 0.0029% 604 0.0030%
78 1
2
550 0.0027% 569 0.0028% 579 0.0028% 584 0.0029%
Notes: Each iteration includes 10,000 unique simulated individuals. This table compares the base policy for the excess
accumulation policy (age threshold = 70 1
2
, penalty rate = 50%) and a range of counterfactual policies. Table A.10a shows the
average amount of income that our simulated individuals would need to receive (give up) in the base policy to reach the present
discounted value of lifetime utility for each counterfactual policy. Table A.10b shows the change in the present discounted
value of lifetime total tax remittances. Table A.10c shows the change in the present discounted value of lifetime income tax
remittances. Table A.10d shows the change in the bequeathed IRA balance. For each panel, we show the amount in levels and
as a percentage of the value in the base policy.
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Table A.10: Results of changing the excess accumulation penalty, continued
(b) Change in PDV lifetime total tax remittances relative to base policy
Age 40% penalty 50% penalty 60% penalty 70% penalty
threshold Levels ($) Percent Levels ($) Percent Levels ($) Percent Levels ($) Percent
68 1
2
-57 -0.0178% 8 0.0026% 53 0.0165% 77 0.0243%
69 1
2
-27 -0.0086% 59 0.0187% 122 0.0385% 140 0.0442%
70 1
2
-94 -0.0296% 0 0.0000% 64 0.0201% 88 0.0276%
71 1
2
-124 -0.0391% -38 -0.0120% 25 0.0079% 67 0.0211%
72 1
2
-167 -0.0526% -81 -0.0254% -16 -0.0052% 20 0.0062%
73 1
2
-225 -0.0707% -143 -0.0449% -75 -0.0237% -32 -0.0102%
74 1
2
-288 -0.0905% -206 -0.0649% -140 -0.0442% -103 -0.0323%
75 1
2
-373 -0.1175% -295 -0.0928% -236 -0.0743% -195 -0.0614%
76 1
2
-478 -0.1504% -404 -0.1273% -346 -0.1089% -311 -0.0980%
77 1
2
-601 -0.1890% -534 -0.1682% -480 -0.1509% -445 -0.1402%
78 1
2
-731 -0.2299% -672 -0.2115% -624 -0.1964% -596 -0.1875%
(c) Change in PDV lifetime income tax remittances relative to base policy
Age 40% penalty 50% penalty 60% penalty 70% penalty
threshold Levels ($) Percent Levels ($) Percent Levels ($) Percent Levels ($) Percent
68 1
2
-205 -0.0648% -73 -0.0232% 50 0.0157% 156 0.0495%
69 1
2
-109 -0.0344% 13 0.0040% 149 0.0473% 250 0.0792%
70 1
2
-123 -0.0388% 0 0.0000% 137 0.0434% 240 0.0761%
71 1
2
-98 -0.0310% 33 0.0104% 161 0.0509% 240 0.0758%
72 1
2
-95 -0.0300% 27 0.0086% 142 0.0451% 234 0.0740%
73 1
2
-97 -0.0307% 25 0.0078% 128 0.0405% 205 0.0649%
74 1
2
-125 -0.0395% -7 -0.0021% 95 0.0301% 167 0.0528%
75 1
2
-159 -0.0504% -56 -0.0176% 39 0.0124% 98 0.0311%
76 1
2
-212 -0.0670% -125 -0.0396% -44 -0.0138% 16 0.0050%
77 1
2
-285 -0.0901% -208 -0.0659% -133 -0.0421% -84 -0.0265%
78 1
2
-377 -0.1192% -309 -0.0978% -239 -0.0757% -198 -0.0627%
(d) Bequeathed IRA balance relative to base policy
Age 40% penalty 50% penalty 60% penalty 70% penalty
threshold Levels ($) Percent Levels ($) Percent Levels ($) Percent Levels ($) Percent
68 1
2
-5,580 -8.6% -7,286 -11.3% -8,910 -13.8% -10,176 -15.8%
69 1
2
-1,937 -3.0% -3,527 -5.5% -5,159 -8.0% -6,462 -10.0%
70 1
2
1,441 2.2% 0 0.0% -1,539 -2.4% -2,863 -4.4%
71 1
2
3,554 5.5% 1,992 3.1% 516 0.8% -352 -0.5%
72 1
2
5,724 8.9% 4,283 6.6% 2,946 4.6% 1,976 3.1%
73 1
2
7,504 11.6% 6,198 9.6% 5,045 7.8% 4,297 6.7%
74 1
2
9,360 14.5% 8,130 12.6% 7,041 10.9% 6,330 9.8%
75 1
2
11,053 17.1% 10,004 15.5% 9,022 14.0% 8,397 13.0%
76 1
2
12,642 19.6% 11,782 18.3% 10,926 16.9% 10,309 16.0%
77 1
2
14,246 22.1% 13,454 20.9% 12,657 19.6% 12,142 18.8%
78 1
2
15,788 24.5% 15,106 23.4% 14,417 22.3% 14,033 21.7%
Notes: Each iteration includes 10,000 unique simulated individuals. This table compares the base policy for the excess
accumulation policy (age threshold = 70 1
2
, penalty rate = 50%) and a range of counterfactual policies. Table A.10a shows the
average amount of income that our simulated individuals would need to receive (give up) in the base policy to reach the present
discounted value of lifetime utility for each counterfactual policy. Table A.10b shows the change in the present discounted
value of lifetime total tax remittances. Table A.10c shows the change in the present discounted value of lifetime income tax
remittances. Table A.10d shows the change in the bequeathed IRA balance. For each panel, we show the amount in levels and
as a percentage of the value in the base policy.
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A.8.2 Changing the early withdrawal penalty
Table A.11 shows the results of changing the early withdrawal penalty. We compare the
values of four outcomes to the base policy with an age threshold = 591
2
and penalty rate =
10%. For all outcomes considered, a positive value indicates that our simulated individuals
are, on average, better off in the counterfactual world, while a negative value indicates that
our simulated individuals are, on average, better off in the base policy.
Table A.11a shows a measure of equivalent variation: the average amount of income
that our simulated individuals would need to receive (give up) in the base policy to reach
the present discounted value of lifetime utility for each counterfactual policy. We show the
value in levels, and as a percentage of average income at age 401
2
(i.e., the first period in our
model). Table A.11b shows the change in the present discounted value of lifetime total tax
remittances relative to the base policy, where total tax remittances include income taxes plus
any tax penalties paid. Table A.11c shows the change in the present discounted value of of
lifetime income tax remittances relative to the base policy. Table A.11d shows the change in
IRA balance at age 651
2
relative to the base policy. For each panel, we show the amount in
levels and as a percentage of the value in the base policy.
Table A.11: Results of changing the early withdrawal penalty
(a) Change in income at age 4012 under base policy to reach counterfactual PDV lifetime utility
Age 5% penalty 10% penalty 20% penalty 30% penalty
threshold Levels ($) Percent Levels ($) Percent Levels ($) Percent Levels ($) Percent
55 1
2
3,427 0.0169% 1,408 0.0069% -1,600 -0.0079% -3,806 -0.0187%
56 1
2
3,246 0.0160% 1,092 0.0054% -2,140 -0.0105% -4,472 -0.0220%
57 1
2
3,076 0.0151% 749 0.0037% -2,685 -0.0132% -5,205 -0.0256%
58 1
2
2,884 0.0142% 390 0.0019% -3,302 -0.0162% -5,964 -0.0293%
59 1
2
2,672 0.0131% 0 0.0000% -3,892 -0.0191% -6,753 -0.0332%
60 1
2
2,462 0.0121% -365 -0.0018% -4,521 -0.0222% -7,547 -0.0371%
61 1
2
2,237 0.0110% -724 -0.0036% -5,205 -0.0256% -8,404 -0.0413%
62 1
2
2,004 0.0099% -1,164 -0.0057% -5,921 -0.0291% -9,353 -0.0460%
63 1
2
1,862 0.0092% -1,488 -0.0073% -6,445 -0.0317% -10,034 -0.0494%
64 1
2
1,684 0.0083% -1,817 -0.0089% -7,026 -0.0346% -10,716 -0.0527%
65 1
2
1,486 0.0073% -2,148 -0.0106% -7,665 -0.0377% -11,519 -0.0567%
Notes: Each iteration includes 10,000 unique simulated individuals. This table compares the base policy for the early withdrawal
policy (age threshold = 59 1
2
, penalty rate = 10%) and a range of counterfactual policies. Table A.11a shows the average amount
of income that our simulated individuals would need to receive (give up) in the base policy to reach the present discounted
value of lifetime utility for each counterfactual policy. Table A.11b shows the change in the present discounted value of lifetime
total tax remittances. Table A.11c shows the change in the present discounted value of lifetime income tax remittances. Table
A.11d shows the change in IRA balances at age 65 1
2
. For each panel, we show the amount in levels and as a percentage of the
value in the base policy.
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Table A.11: Results of changing the early withdrawal penalty, continued
(b) Change in PDV lifetime total tax remittances relative to base policy
Age 5% penalty 10% penalty 20% penalty 30% penalty
threshold Levels ($) Percent Levels ($) Percent Levels ($) Percent Levels ($) Percent
55 1
2
-385 -0.1210% -167 -0.0525% 20 0.0062% 144 0.0453%
56 1
2
-368 -0.1159% -160 -0.0505% -7 -0.0021% 94 0.0297%
57 1
2
-341 -0.1072% -132 -0.0415% -20 -0.0062% 33 0.0105%
58 1
2
-301 -0.0948% -73 -0.0231% 4 0.0014% -4 -0.0012%
59 1
2
-250 -0.0787% 0 0.0000% 78 0.0245% -3 -0.0009%
60 1
2
-179 -0.0563% 100 0.0316% 199 0.0625% 70 0.0221%
61 1
2
-84 -0.0264% 244 0.0769% 369 0.1162% 225 0.0709%
62 1
2
41 0.0130% 432 0.1360% 620 0.1951% 449 0.1413%
63 1
2
144 0.0453% 597 0.1880% 844 0.2657% 669 0.2104%
64 1
2
268 0.0845% 801 0.2520% 1,138 0.3580% 937 0.2948%
65 1
2
412 0.1295% 1,057 0.3326% 1,512 0.4756% 1,300 0.4092%
(c) Change in PDV lifetime income tax remittances relative to base policy
Age 5% penalty 10% penalty 20% penalty 30% penalty
threshold Levels ($) Percent Levels ($) Percent Levels ($) Percent Levels ($) Percent
55 1
2
521 0.1649% 379 0.1199% 129 0.0407% 28 0.0088%
56 1
2
470 0.1489% 274 0.0867% -51 -0.0161% -188 -0.0594%
57 1
2
424 0.1342% 178 0.0564% -236 -0.0747% -429 -0.1358%
58 1
2
379 0.1199% 89 0.0280% -422 -0.1334% -684 -0.2167%
59 1
2
332 0.1052% 0 0.0000% -586 -0.1856% -933 -0.2952%
60 1
2
292 0.0924% -90 -0.0284% -746 -0.2363% -1,155 -0.3655%
61 1
2
254 0.0804% -175 -0.0554% -903 -0.2859% -1,363 -0.4316%
62 1
2
216 0.0683% -262 -0.0830% -1,064 -0.3367% -1,579 -0.4997%
63 1
2
182 0.0576% -331 -0.1048% -1,192 -0.3772% -1,738 -0.5501%
64 1
2
150 0.0476% -408 -0.1293% -1,325 -0.4196% -1,939 -0.6139%
65 1
2
108 0.0343% -486 -0.1539% -1,464 -0.4635% -2,153 -0.6814%
(d) IRA balance at age 6512 relative to base policy
Age 5% penalty 10% penalty 20% penalty 30% penalty
threshold Levels ($) Percent Levels ($) Percent Levels ($) Percent Levels ($) Percent
55 1
2
-186 -0.1912% -40 -0.0413% 31 0.0322% 183 0.1875%
56 1
2
-209 -0.2146% -106 -0.1084% -83 -0.0847% 68 0.0695%
57 1
2
-221 -0.2271% -121 -0.1247% -177 -0.1816% -41 -0.0426%
58 1
2
-202 -0.2072% -106 -0.1084% -192 -0.1969% -122 -0.1257%
59 1
2
-138 -0.1421% 0 0.0000% -121 -0.1246% -104 -0.1071%
60 1
2
-39 -0.0396% 143 0.1463% 106 0.1090% 161 0.1653%
61 1
2
135 0.1386% 384 0.3942% 520 0.5335% 655 0.6722%
62 1
2
322 0.3304% 748 0.7674% 1,148 1.1781% 1,498 1.5375%
63 1
2
484 0.4969% 1,126 1.1561% 1,804 1.8519% 2,476 2.5419%
64 1
2
712 0.7311% 1,572 1.6139% 2,666 2.7370% 3,646 3.7424%
65 1
2
1,096 1.1249% 2,279 2.3391% 3,931 4.0346% 5,309 5.4494%
Notes: Each iteration includes 10,000 unique simulated individuals. This table compares the base policy for the early withdrawal
policy (age threshold = 59 1
2
, penalty rate = 10%) and a range of counterfactual policies. Table A.11a shows the average amount
of income that our simulated individuals would need to receive (give up) in the base policy to reach the present discounted
value of lifetime utility for each counterfactual policy. Table A.11b shows the change in the present discounted value of lifetime
total tax remittances. Table A.11c shows the change in the present discounted value of lifetime income tax remittances. Table
A.11d shows the change in IRA balances at age 65 1
2
. For each panel, we show the amount in levels and as a percentage of the
value in the base policy.
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APPENDIX B
Appendix to Chapter 2
157
B.1 Overview of the collections process
158
B.2 Data dictionary and sample statistics
B.2.1 Acronyms
ALE Allowable living expenses
ACS Automated Collection System
AGI Adjusted gross income
CNC Currently not collectible
EAP Estimated ability to pay
GS General schedule
IRM Internal Revenue Manual
IRS Internal Revenue Service
TPI Total positive income
B.2.2 Variable definitions
B.2.2.1 Variables included in the residualization process
Allowable living expenses The allowable living expenses data is provided quarterly at
the county level by the IRS. We used the “housing and utilities” standard. We used the value
for a “Family of 1” unless we had evidence that the taxpayer was married, in which case we
used the value for a “Family of 2.” When a zip code covered multiple counties, we took the
average of the allowable living expenses given for those counties. Because we conduct our
analysis at the annual level, we use the values from quarter 4. The zip-to-county conversion
was done using data provided by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
We matched this to the administrative tax data by zip code.
Case grade Provided in the field data. Cases have a grade of 9, 11, 12, or 13. The assigned
grade reflects the expected difficulty of closing the case.
Estimated ability to pay We develop an “estimated ability to pay” metric which is equal
to a taxpayers average AGI for the three years before their case was assigned to a Revenue
Officer, multiplied by the lesser of 10 and the number of years before the taxpayer turns
65, divided by the outstanding balance on the account when the taxpayer is assigned to a
Revenue Officer. When AGI is missing for some year, we impute the filing threshold. Larger
values suggest that the taxpayer would have greater income and therefore be more able to
resolve their outstanding debt.
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Group Provided in the Revenue Officer data. This is the group to which the Revenue
Officer belongs. A Revenue Officer is assigned cases by the group manager.
High priority indicator Cases are assigned priority codes. The relationship between
priority code and priority level is described in IRM 1.4.50.8.4 1. High priority cases include
priority codes 99-108, with priority 99 and 100 cases being the highest priority cases. Medium
priority cases include priority codes 201-208. Low priority cases include priority codes 301-303.
This indicator is equal to 1 for cases with priority code 99 or 100.
Oldest debt more than 12 months old indicator This indicator is equal to 1 if the
oldest debt on the case when it is assigned to field is older than 12 months old.
Oldest debt more than 36 months old indicator This indicator is equal to 1 if the
oldest debt on the case when it is assigned to field is older than 36 months old.
Previously assigned to field indicator This indicator is equal to 1 if the taxpayer had
modules assigned to the field before the case considered in the project. We consider debt
starting in 2009 when constructing this variable.
Revenue Officer GS grade Provided in the Revenue Officer data. Revenue Officers may
have a GS grade of 4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, or 13. A grade of 4 indicates a group manager. Grades
5 and 7 are training grades. As of 2017, IRS employees with a GS grade of 9 could no longer
serve as Revenue Officers. Because our analysis focuses on cases closed before 2017, we
observe Revenue Officers with GS grades 9, 11, 12, and 13.
Urban indicator The urban dummy is based on data provided by the U.S. Department
of Agriculture Economic Research Service (USDA ERS). The data include the Rural Urban
Continuum Code (RUCC) by county. We designate a location as not urban if the RUCC
for the zip code is 7 or 9, which includes areas with populations less than 20,000 that are
non-adjacent to metro areas. We match the county to zip code using the 2014 Q4 zip-to-county
data provided by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. For a few zip
codes not included in the data from USDA ERS we use population-by-zip code data from
the 2010 Census. We categorize these zip codes as urban if the population is greater than
20,000. We matched this to the administrative tax data by zip code.
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Year of birth The year of birth of the taxpayer. We censor at both ends: we set the year
of birth equal to 1930 for taxpayers with year of birth older than 1930, and we set the year
of birth equal to 1997 for taxpayers with year of birth earlier than 1997.
B.2.2.2 Outcome variables
Adjusted gross income We use the value of Adjusted Gross Income provided on a
taxpayer’s Form 1040 when available. When this value is blank, we use the sum of income
from all third party information reporting sources. When this second value is not available,
we use the sum of all unique W-2s received for the taxpayer.
Filing conditional on Form W-2 (indicator) This indicator is equal to 1 if the taxpayer
filed a return conditional on whether or not the IRS received a W-2 for the taxpayer.
Fully paid new tax liability (indicator) This indicator is equal to 1 if the taxpayer
fully paid any new tax liability in the tax year after their case was closed.
Payments to the IRS Calculated as the sum of all payments remitted to the IRS against
tax debt from the current tax year, plus all payments remitted to the IRS during the current
tax year against debt from previous tax years.
Self employed income The total amount of reported Schedule C income (self-employed
business) income (or loss) from all Schedule C (or C-EZ) attached to the taxpayer’s tax
return.
W-2 wages We use the sum of all unique W-2s received for the taxpayer. We present this
variable at the household, individual, and spouse level.
B.2.2.3 Balance variables
Model score An estimate generated by the IRS of the probability of repayment, with
lower scores indicating a lower estimated probability of collection. This variable has 25th,
50th, and 75th percentile values of approximately 0.05, 0.09, and 0.2, respectively.
Average W-2 wages The average of wages reported through W-2s for the three years
prior to assignment to a Revenue Officer.
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Average AGI The average of Adjusted Gross Income (as defined above) for the three
years prior to assignment to a Revenue Officer.
AGI before assignment The value of Adjusted Gross Income (as defined above) for the
year prior to assignment to a Revenue Officer.
Filed before assignment This indicator is equal to 1 if the taxpayer filed a tax return in
the year prior to assignment to a Revenue Officer.
B.2.3 Sample statistics
Table B.1 shows the mean and standard deviation of the variables used in our analysis in
Year 0 by CNC designation.
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Table B.1: Sample statistics (Year 0)
Non-CNC CNC Total
Observations 86,083 37,313 123,396
Residualization variables
High priority indicator 0.216 0.219 0.217
(0.411) (0.414) (0.412)
Case grade = 9 0.142 0.142 0.142
(0.349) (0.349) (0.349)
Case grade = 11 0.480 0.538 0.497
(0.500) (0.499) (0.500)
Case grade = 12 0.334 0.306 0.325
(0.471) (0.461) (0.468)
Case grade = 13 0.045 0.014 0.036
(0.207) (0.118) (0.185)
Year of birth 1963 1961 1962
(11) (12) (11)
Estimated ability to pay 54.566 15.733 42.824
(148.502) (65.649) (130.406)
Previously assigned 0.413 0.425 0.417
(0.818) (0.806) (0.814)
Oldest debt > 12 mo. 0.713 0.755 0.726
(0.452) (0.430) (0.446)
Oldest debt > 36 mo. 0.598 0.701 0.629
(0.490) (0.458) (0.483)
Allowable living expenses 1,860 1,731 1,820
(585) (524) (570)
Urban indicator 0.978 0.973 0.976
(0.147) (0.163) (0.152)
RO Inventory 54.330 54.881 54.497
(16.518) (15.883) (16.331)
RO GS grade = 9 0.150 0.137 0.146
(0.357) (0.344) (0.353)
RO GS grade = 11 0.429 0.482 0.445
(0.495) (0.500) (0.497)
RO GS grade = 12 0.390 0.368 0.383
(0.488) (0.482) (0.486)
RO GS grade = 13 0.031 0.014 0.026
(0.174) (0.116) (0.159)
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Table B.1: Sample statistics (Year 0, continued)
Non-CNC CNC Total
Observations 86,083 37,313 123,396
Outcome variables
Payments, HH (total debt) 14,047 4,573 11,182
(146,792) (40,091) (124,648)
W-2 withholding, HH 6,994 1,642 5,376
(133,826) (9,955) (111,936)
QES payments, HH 276 41 205
(20,040) (1,810) (16,768)
Remittances, HH -0 0 -0
(4) (0) (3)
Fully paid new debt 0.507 0.475 0.499
(0.500) (0.499) (0.500)
Filed | W-2s 0.793 0.668 0.755
(0.405) (0.471) (0.430)
AGI, HH 114,976 59,872 98,314
(183,863) (105,126) (166,029)
W-2 wages, HH 63,925 36,810 57,061
(90,438) (55,207) (83,780)
W-2 wages 81,609 48,491 73,269
(99,555) (62,130) (92,704)
W-2 wages, spouse 11,801 6,047 10,165
(30,817) (19,626) (28,212)
Sch. C profit/loss | filed 28,437 23,103 27,010
(66,492) (49,872) (62,523)
Balance variables
Model score 0.170 0.105 0.150
(0.162) (0.098) (0.148)
Pre-Ave. W-2 wages, HH 62,430 22,431 50,335
(485,752) (51,761) (407,128)
Pre-Ave. AGI, HH 170,507 54,989 135,577
(2,699,416) (1,365,700) (2,377,013)
AGI year before assignment, HH 209,803 50,231 161,551
(5,323,174) (330,781) (4,450,411)
Filed before assignment 0.831 0.671 0.783
(0.375) (0.470) (0.412)
Instruments
Simple LOO instrument 0.290 0.331 0.302
(0.108) (0.115) (0.112)
Residualized instrument -0.010 0.022 0.000
(0.079) (0.084) (0.082)
Notes: Includes all cases that meet our sample restriction criteria between November 2014 and December
2018. Limited to cases worked by Revenue Officers who closed at least 20 cases that met our sample
restriction criteria between November 2014 and December 2018. All monetary values adjusted for inflation to
2017 values.
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Figure B.1: Effect of a CNC designation on payments toward outstanding tax debt ($1,000),
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Years After Case Closed
Notes: Includes cases worked by all Revenue Officers that meet our sample restriction criteria between
November 2014 and December 2018. Coefficients are shown in thousands. Payment values adjusted for
inflation to 2017 values.
B.3 Robustness to choice of case count cutoff
Figures B.1 through B.8 show our residualized IV results using the alternative Revenue
Officer case count cut-offs of 10, 20, and 30.
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Figure B.2: Effect of a CNC designation on payments toward current tax liability ($1,000),
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Years After Case Closed
Notes: Includes cases worked by all Revenue Officers that meet our sample restriction criteria between
November 2014 and December 2018. Coefficients are shown in thousands. All payment variables adjusted for
inflation to 2017 values.
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Figure B.3: Effect of a CNC designation on whether or not the taxpayer remitted their








-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4









−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4







-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Years After Case Closed
Notes: Includes cases worked by all Revenue Officers that meet our sample restriction criteria between
November 2014 and December 2018.
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Years After Case Closed
Notes: Includes cases worked by all Revenue Officers that meet our sample restriction criteria between
November 2014 and December 2018.
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Years After Case Closed
Notes: Includes cases worked by all Revenue Officers that meet our sample restriction criteria between
November 2014 and December 2018. Values given are the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the
outcome values. Adjusted gross income adjusted for inflation to 2017 values.
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Years After Case Closed
Notes: Includes cases worked by all Revenue Officers that meet our sample restriction criteria between
November 2014 and December 2018. Values given are the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the
outcome values. W-2 income adjusted for inflation to 2017 values.
Figure B.7: Effect of a CNC designation on W-2 Wages (IHS): Taxpayer vs. Spouse
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Years After Case Closed
Notes: Includes cases worked by all Revenue Officers that meet our sample restriction criteria between
November 2014 and December 2018. Values given are the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the
outcome values. Spouses include individuals married to taxpayers in the year in which their case was closed.
W-2 income adjusted for inflation to 2017 values.
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Years After Case Closed
Notes: Includes cases worked by all Revenue Officers that meet our sample restriction criteria between
November 2014 and December 2018. Values given are the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the
outcome values. Self employment income adjusted for inflation to 2017 values.
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APPENDIX C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Glossary
This glossary serves as a guide to the acronyms and terminology used in this project.
C.1.1 Acronyms
AGI Adjusted Gross Income
CPA Certified Public Accountant
IRS Internal Revenue Service
NRP National Research Program
PTIN Preparer Tax Identification Number
SRTP Supervised Registered Tax Preparer
VITA program Volunteer Income Tax Assistance program
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C.1.2 Terminology
Enrolled Agent An Enrolled Agent is a tax advisor who has been federally authorized
by the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Unlike CPAs and attorneys, which are licensed
to practice on a state-by-state basis, the “Enrolled Agent” credential is recognized in all 50
states.
NRP audit A random, full-return audit performed as part of the IRS’s National Research
Program.
Operational audit A non-random audit of a specific portion of a tax return.
Paid-prepared return A return that was prepared by a paid tax professional. A taxpayer
might get assistance from four types of tax preparers: Certified Public Accountants (CPAs),
Enrolled Agents, tax attorneys, and non-credentialed preparers. While the IRS does not
currently require tax preparers to be licensed or receive continuing education, preparers are
required to register with the IRS and obtain a Preparer Tax Identification Number (PTIN)
to receive payment for assisting with tax returns. Throughout the paper, a “paid-prepared”
return refers to returns completed by the professionals who have a PTIN.
Self-prepared return A return that was not prepared by a paid tax professional or
through the VITA program. Could have been prepared by hand or using tax-preparation
software.
Supervised Registered Tax Preparer SRTPs do not themselves sign tax returns (nor
are they required to), but work for an organization that is owned at least 80% by CPAs,
attorneys, or Enrolled Agents and who is supervised by a CPA, attorney, or Enrolled Agent
who has a PTIN.
C.2 Additional and alternative figures
C.2.1 Individuals with negative AGI
In this section, we undertake one exercise with the individuals in our negative AGI group
in an attempt to tease out the extent to which these individuals looked like other parts of
the income distribution. We ask the question: if we took these individuals’ AGI for our
sample period (2006-2014), scaled everything up to 2014 dollars, and computed the average
2014-adjusted AGI for each individual, what AGI percentile would they fall into?
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The results of this exercise are given in Figure C.1. We observe that the overwhelming
majority of these individuals have a negative average AGI over the sample period, with the
remaining individuals scattered across the rest of the income distribution.

































































































Notes: N = 1,757. See Table 3.2 for counts by subgroup.
C.2.2 Tax return preparation methods over time
Figure C.2 shows the proportion of returns (excluding VITA-prepared returns) that were
prepared by a paid professional or self-prepared over the period from 2004-2017. The figure
also breaks down self-prepared returns by those done by hand or using tax preparation
software. Over this time period, the proportion of individuals using a paid preparer has
slowly declined, while the proportion of self-prepared returns has slowly increased.
What’s more striking is the share of self-prepared returns that are prepared by hand or
with tax software. At the beginning of this time period, about one-third of self-prepared
returns were completed by hand and about two-thirds using tax software. By the end of this
period, over 90% of self-prepared returns were prepared using tax preparation software.
C.2.3 Tax preparation fees: Figure 3.9d with 0− 10 percentile group included
Figure C.3 is the same as Figure 3.9d in the text, but includes the 0− 10 corrected AGI
percentile group. This figure suggests that, among taxpayers in the 0− 10 corrected AGI
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2004 2007 2010 2013 2016
Year
Paid−prepared Self−prepared
Self, by hand Self, with software
Notes: N = 1,989,052,208 individual-years. Covers 2004 - 2017.
percentile group who itemized their deductions and deducted tax preparation fees, those
fees were, on average, almost two times the value of the adjusted gross income reported by
those taxpayers. This statistic leads us to believe that some of the individuals included in
the 0− 10 corrected AGI percentile group are actually more similar to those in the negative
AGI group (in that they are likely actually high income and/or high wealth individuals), but
happened to have low but non-negative AGI during the study year.
C.2.4 Number of returns by preparer: figures with alternative return count
cut-offs
Figure C.4 is the same as Figure 3.10 in the body of the text, but with alternative return
count cut-offs for which tax preparers were included. In the body of the text, we use a
cut-off of 30,000 cases. Below, we show the figure for cut-offs of 1,000, 5,000, and 10,000
cases. The trends in these figures mirror what we observe in Figure 3.10: as corrected AGI
percentile group increases, the average number of returns prepared by the preparers used by
that percentile group decreases.
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Notes: N = 25,753. See Table 3.2 for subtotals by corrected AGI percentile.
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Figure C.4: Average number of returns prepared: alternative return count cut-offs






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes : Figure C.4a N = 75,969; Figure C.4b N = 83,137; Figure C.4c N = 83,259. See Table 3.2 for subtotals
by corrected AGI percentile.
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C.3 Proofs
Lemma 3. Under Assumption 1, as y becomes arbitrarily large:
• g1(y, p1)− g0(y, p1) converges to 0,
• g2(y, p2)− g1(y, p2) converges to 0.
Proof. We direct the reader to Guyton et al. (2021) for the proof of the first statement, which
is the same as Lemma 2 in that paper.1 To prove the second statement, we replicate the proof
of Lemma 2 in Guyton et al. (2021) using our notation and with the revised Assumption 1.
The optimization problem in Equation 3.4.1 can be restated with (g, a) as the choice
variables instead of (e, a). After fixing a hiring decision, a, the first-order condition with







where cN = (1− τ + τg− κ̃a)y and cD = (1− τ − τθg− κ̃a)y denote consumption in the case
of no detection and detection respectively, and κ̃a = κa/y denote the fixed cost to income
ratio, given a.
As we are interested in g2(y, p2) − g1(y, p2), we substitute the relevant consumption
function into the FOC to get the condition given in Equation C.2:
u′
(




(1− τ + τg2(y, p2)− κ̃2)y
) = u′((1− τ − τθg1(y, p2)− κ̃1)y)
u′
(
(1− τ + τg1(y, p2)− κ̃1)y
) = 1− p2
p2θ
(C.2)
Because u′′ < 0, u′−1 is uniquely defined, both sides of the first equality are invertible in e.
Assumption 1 guarantees that for sufficiently large y, g1(y, p2) approaches a strictly positive
constant, whereas κ̃a converges to 0 as y becomes arbitrarily large.
Next, let p2 = p be fixed across g1 and g2 and restate the g functions as g(y, κ̃1) = g1(y, p2)
and g(y, κ̃2) = g2(y, p2):








(1− τ − τθg − κ̃2)y
)
(C.3)








(1− τ − τθg − κ̃1)y
)
(C.4)
Because both κ1 and κ2 are constants, limy→∞κ̃a = 0 for a ∈ {1, 2}, which yields limy→∞(κ̃2−
1Alternatively, the first statement can be proven by the following substitutions in the proof of the second
statement, given below: p1 instead of p2, p0 instead of p1, κ2 instead of κ1 and 0 instead of κ1.
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κ̃1) = 0. By definition of the limit, ∀δ > 0,∃c ∈ R, such that
y > c =⇒ |κ̃2 − κ̃1| < δ. (C.5)
Continuity of g on R++ implies that for a given ε > 0, ∃c ∈ R, such that
y > c =⇒ |κ̃2 − κ̃1| < δ =⇒ |g(y, κ̃2)− g(y, κ̃1)|. (C.6)
g2(y, p2) converges to g1(y, p2) as y becomes arbitrarily large. Furthermore, Assumption 1
guarantees that, as y becomes arbitrarily large, g1(y, p2) will be arbitrarily close to a non-zero
constant.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 1,
• There is a cutoff income level, y′, such that all else equal, agents with income higher
than this cutoff will prefer to hire a generalized tax preparer over self-preparation,
• There is a cutoff income level, y′′, such that all else equal, agents with income higher
than this cutoff will prefer to hire a specialized tax preparer over generalized tax preparer.
• y′′ > y′.
Proof. As Guyton et al. (2021) show, proving that for a sufficiently large, y, the difference in
expected utility between a = 1 and a = 0 given optimal g1 and g0 is enough to prove the first
item. The fact that there is a third option (a = 2) does not change the trade-off between
actions a = 0 and a = 1. As a result, the proof of Proposition 1 in Guyton et al. (2021) can
be applied directly to show the first claim.
To prove the second claim, we follow the proof in Guyton et al. (2021), replacing κ with
κ2, 0 with κ1, p0 with p1, and p1 with p2. We want to show that for high enough y, the
difference in the indirect utility between a = 2 and a = 1 given the respective optimal choices
is positive. In other words, we want to show the following:
∆21U = U(p2, κ2, y)− U(p1, κ1, y) > 0, (C.7)
where the indirect utility as a function of a and ga is defined as follows:
U(p, κi, y) = (1− p)u
(
(1− τ + τg(p, κi, y
)
− κ̃i)y) + pu
(






denotes the related fixed cost as a share of income.
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By leveraging Lemma 2, we can decompose the difference in Equation C.7 into the
difference due to increased cost, and the difference due to decreased probability as shown in
Equation C.9:
∆21U = [U(p2, κ2, y)− U(p2, κ1, y)] + {U(p2, κ1, y)− U(p1, κ1, y)}. (C.9)
Note that the term in square brackets is negative because, all else equal, utility decreases
in κi and κ1 < κ2, whereas the term in the curly brackets is positive because, all else equal,
expected utility decreases in p and p2 < p1.
We next show that, given the second part of Assumption 1 (i.e., that g1(y, p2) diminishes
as y becomes larger), the expression in the square brackets is dominated by the expression in
the curly brackets in Equation C.9.
The term in the curly brackets can be expressed as the following by using second
fundamental theorem of calculus:
U(p2, κ1, y)− U(p1, κ1, y) = −
∫ p1
p2




. Invoking the envelope theorem gives us








(1− τ − τθg(p, κ1, y)− κ̃1)y
)
]dp
Given that a risk-averse agent will choose g(p, κ1, y) > 0 for p ∈ [0, 1) and u′ > 0, the
expression in Equation C.11 is positive.
Next, let cD(p, κi, y) denote the consumption in the case of detection and cN(p, κi, y)
denote the consumption in case of no detection, given the optimal behavior g(p, κi, y). By
substituting Equation C.11, we can rewrite Equation C.9 as the following:
∆21U =
[















Substituting the definition of U as given in Equation C.8 into Equation C.12 yields:



































Applying the second fundamental theorem of calculus again for the terms in square brackets,
we get,














Note that, both cN(p, κi, y) and cD(p, κi, y) decreases in κi and cN(.) > cD(.), therefore, all
integrals in the previous expression are well defined.
Next, we construct a lower bound for ∆21U by evaluating the integrals in the previous
equation:
∆21U >− (1− p2)
[
















The first and second terms in Equation C.15 are the integrals in the first and second terms
in Equation C.14 respectively, evaluated at their lower limits of integration. Similarly, the
third term in Equation C.15 is the integral in the last term in Equation C.14 evaluated at its
upper limit. Because u′′ > 0, u′ decreases with consumption, the inequality in Equation C.15
holds strictly.
To further simplify the lower bound, we substitute the following first-order condition from
the agent’s problem:





























As cN is decreasing in p and u




























Lemma 1 implies that cN (p, κ1, y)− cD(p, κ1, y) = τ(1 + θ)g(p, κ1, y)y is decreasing in p. We
can therefore shrink the expression in the previous equation further by evaluating it at the
upper limit of integration. This final simplification provides us with the following inequality,
where we define the final bound as follows:















(p1 − p2)τ(1 + θ)g(p1, κ1, y)y
(C.19)





f21(y) > 0 ⇐⇒ − (1− p2)
(














)(p1 − p2)τ(1 + θ)g(p1, κ1, y)y > 0
(C.20)
Now consider high levels of income, y. Recall that the second part of Lemma 2 implies that as
income becomes arbitrarily large, the difference in fixed cost κ2−κ1 becomes negligible, which
in turn implies that both cN(p2, κ1, y) − cN(p2, κ2, y) and cD(p2, κ1, y) − cD(p2, κ2, y) also
become negligible. Therefore, the term in the top row of Equation C.20 can be made arbitrarily









converges to unity as y grows. Finally, the second part of Assumption 1 guarantees that
τ(1 + θ)g(p, κ1, y)y becomes arbitrarily large as y grows. Hence, f21(y) > 0 for sufficiently
high y, which in turn implies that ∆21U > 0 also for sufficiently large y.
To prove the third statement of Proposition 1, it is enough to show that at least one
individual chooses a = 1. We start with deriving the conditions under which U(p1, κ1, y) >
U(p2, κ2, y). We follow similar steps as in the previous statement’s proof. Let ∆12 =
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U(p1, κ1, y)− U(p2, κ2, y) denote the maximized utility difference between the cases where
agent chooses a = 1 and a = 2. Using Lemma 2, we decompose this difference as follows:
∆12U =
[
U(p1, κ1, y)− U(p1, κ2, y)
]
+ {U(p1, κ2, y)− U(p2, κ2, y)} (C.21)
Note that the item in the square brackets is positive, whereas the item in the curly brackets
is negative because, all else constant, utility decreases in κi and p respectively.
Next, using the second fundamental theorem of calculus and the envelope theorem, we
get the following expression for the item in curly parentheses:















Substituting the definition of U given in Equation C.8 for the square brackets in Equation
C.21 yields:




















Combining Equations C.22 and C.23 gives a new expression for the difference equation:



























(1− τ + τg(p, κ2, y)− κ̃2)y)− u
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Note that the upper bounds of each integral are arranged such that the integrals are
well-defined.
We next want to find a minimum bound for this expression. Due to the diminishing
marginal utility of U , the first two integrals are at their minimum when evaluated at their
upper bounds, whereas the third term is largest when evaluated at its lower bound. Evaluating




























We use the FOC from the agent’s problem, given in Equation C.1, to further simplify Equation
C.26:
∆12U > p1u













Because cD increases in p, u
′(cD(p, κ2, y) decreases in p, evaluating this marginal utility as
constant at p = p2 will simplify the previous equation without violating the inequality:
∆12U > p1u











Substituting the definitions of cD and cN with the relevant parameters we get:
cD(p1, κ1, y)− cD(p1, κ2, y) = y
(
κ̃2 − κ̃1 − τθ
(
g(p1, κ1, y)− g(p1, κ2, y)
))
(C.29)
cN(p1, κ1, y)− cN(p1, κ2, y) = y
(
κ̃2 − κ̃1 + τ
(
g(p1, κ1, y)− g(p1, κ2, y)
))
(C.30)
The expression in the big parenthesis boils down to the following:(
cD(p1, κ1, y)− cD(p1, κ2, y) + θ
(
cN(p1, κ1, y)− cN(p1, κ2, y)
))
= y(1 + θ)(κ̃2 − κ̃1)
= (1 + θ)(κ2 − κ1)




















Note that cN (p, κ2, y)−cD(p, κ2, y) = τ(1+θ)g(p, κ2, y)y which decreases in p as g(p, κ2, y)
decreases in p for a risk-averse agent by Lemma 1. Therefore, evaluating the integral at p2,
does not violate the above inequality. We define f(y12) as a lower bound for ∆12U :













(p1 − p2)τ(1 + θ)g(p2, κ2, y)y
rearranging the terms gives us the following condition








) (p1 − p2)
p1
τg(p2, κ2, y)y (C.33)
We next need to show that the agents with income levels that satisfy this inequality will
not prefer self-preparation over the action a = 1. Following the same steps as the first part of
the proposition, we get the following lower bound, f10(y), on the utility difference between
the cases a = 0 and a = 1 (denoted by ∆10U):
∆10U > f10(y) = −(1− p1)
(














)(p0 − p1)τ(1 + θ)g(p0, 0, y)y
(C.34)
where ∆10U = U(p1, κ1, y)− U(p0, 0, y).
Similar to equation C.31, the expression in the big parenthesis boils down to κ1. Therefore,
the lower bound can further be simplified to get the following condition:





τθg(p0, κ0, y)y (C.35)
Finally, we can conclude that if the fixed costs for low-and specialized tax preparation, κ1
and κ2 respectively, satisfy the following condition, then some agents in the interval [y
′, y′′]









cN (p1, κ1, y)
) (p0 − p1)
1− p1
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